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Abstract 
 
This dissertation explores the varied phenomena of “automatic writing” in Victorian 
Gothic fiction, reading the genre’s fascination with the irrepressible signifying practices 
of the body in light of the medical, criminological and scientific discourses that 
underwrite the “scriptural economy” of the late nineteenth century with their own arsenal 
of automatic writing machines.  
 Though critics tend to describe Gothic as genre, the fundamental distinctiveness 
of Gothic inscription is derived from the pronounced and often dramatically visceral 
relation it enacts between script and medium. Indexical inscription constitutes the 
privileged mode of signifying within Gothic fiction; as such, the tradition is uniquely 
positioned to explore the entanglement of bodies and signs within a modern information 
society often misunderstood as a disembodied network of dematerialized signs.    
 I have titled the project Graphomania, and I consider the term a keyword of late-
Victorian culture—one that names a distinctly Victorian pathology of compulsive 
writing, but that alludes also to the widespread epistemic hope that writing could render 
objectively the internal and subjective experiences of individuals. Asserting the centrality 
of representation-machines in the construction of modern bodies and subjectivities, the 
project draws upon the natural sciences, pseudo-sciences, technology and literature (as 
well as many curious hybrids of these discourses), to develop a heterogeneous conception 
of automatic writing. This species of writing—the trace of unconscious gestures, rather 
than the imprint of deliberate expression—opened up a significant gap between writing 
and authoring. To the trained experts produced by the Victorian age of science, this gap 
granted un-authorized admittance to the subject.  
 iv 
 In a chapter devoted to Victorian graphomania and the three studies that follow 
(graphology in Jekyll and Hyde, retinal photography in The Beetle, and phonography in 
Dracula), the project is particularly interested in convergences and correspondences 
between graphical machines and human bodies. In this study, Victorian technology and 
Gothic literature emerge as twin registers of the divided self, joined in their shared 
strategy of externalizing conflicts traditionally understood as invisible processes, but also 
in the consequent tendency of each uncanny text to expose its ghostly remainders and 
excesses in the process of trying to contain them. 
 
 
 
Keywords 
Literature; British Literature; Victorian Novel; Nineteenth Century; Gothic; Technology; 
Media; Automatic Writing; Graphomania; Inscription; Graphology; Autobiography; 
Physiognomy; Embodiment; Index; Optics; Optogram; Psychoanalysis; Phonograph; 
Vampires; Horace Walpole; The Castle of Otranto; Robert Louis Stevenson; The Strange 
Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde; Richard Marsh; The Beetle; Bram Stoker; Dracula. 
 
 
 v 
Acknowledgements  
There’s a quiet, striking moment in Bram Stoker’s Dracula, where Mina returns 
Seward’s phonographic records to him, having patiently transcribed their contents on her 
typewriter. “I think that the cylinders which you gave me,” she tells him gingerly, 
“contained more than you intended me to know.” Seward’s unnerving predicament is one 
in which graphomaniacs commonly find themselves, and these simple words stir up the 
feelings of dread and excitement attendant upon submitting my own writing for 
examination over the past few years. 
 
I’m indebted to a number of interlocutors who have demonstrated the uncanny ability to 
see what I could not read in my own writing. They have patiently shown me where my 
work shows more, and where it tells less, than I’ve intended to say. Foremost among 
these readers has been my supervisor, Christopher Keep, whose expert guidance, kind 
encouragement and limitless patience have anchored this project from its beginnings. 
Tilottama Rajan’s extreme generosity as a reader, a teacher and a thinker has been of 
inestimable help in the recognition and pursuit of the most expansive questions prompted 
by this study. Thanks to Joel Faflak, whose support, and simple presence, at many key 
moments has brought a rare warmth and humanity to the Ph.D. process. I’d also like to 
thank Chris and Tilottama, along with Călin-Andrei Mihăilescu, Michael Groden, and 
Victoria De Zwaan, for their assistance in securing the funding—generously provided by 
the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Ontario 
Graduate Scholarship Fund—necessary to complete this project. I’m grateful too, to the 
administrative staff at Western’s English Department, particularly Pat Dibsdale and 
Leanne Trask. 
 
I’d like to thank Cristian, Nicholas, and Jordan, who have been with me since the hazy 
origins of my life in academia, and with whom the pleasure and labour of friendship, 
analysis, and intellectual work now hardly seem separable. For their support and 
companionship through the peaks and valleys of postgraduate life, many thanks go to 
Dustin, Rebecca, Ross, Alexandra and Kathryn. Thank you to Michael, my sublime 
accomplice in ecstatic interpretation. And also to Megan, for the mystery and delight you 
find in the lives of others, and for showing me how to disclose and yield to my own 
essential curiosity as a teacher and as a human.  
  
Heartfelt thanks go to my brother and sisters, for their love and friendship throughout this 
long process. Thanks to my mother, Anne Brophy, for encouraging a nascent 
appreciation of “the Word” in her young son, and for her continued support when that 
interest took a very different turn than we’d both expected. To Donald Brophy, whose 
love has made “father” the most vital and stirring word I can pronounce, and my dear son 
Oliver, whose own rendition has renewed that pledge with its unaccountable tenderness. 
 
Finally, thanks to Dana, who was the first to teach me how to ask difficult questions, and 
my first true partner in pursuing the answers with honesty and care. Thank you for 
wrestling with these chapters in their most confused and tangled forms, and for grappling 
with me when I find myself in the same shape. 
 
 vi 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Page 
 
Certificate of Examination ii 
Abstract & Keywords iii 
Acknowledgements v 
Table of Contents vii 
List of Figures 
 
ix 
Introduction  1 
Bare Writing  7 
Apprehending Bodies   
 
14 
Chapter One. Graphomania and the Graphical Method  30 
  
“The irresistible itch to write”   32 
Étienne-Jules Marey and the Language of Phenomena Themselves  43 
The Victorian Scriptural Economy: Subjects and Characters   
 
50 
Chapter Two. Unauthorized Autobiographies:  
Reading and Writing by Hand in Stevenson’s Strange Case  
66 
 
  
Hyde’s Hand: The Undead Metaphor 83 
Jekyll’s “Guest”: Handwriting Analysis in Victorian England  
 
94 
Chapter Three. Entranced:  
Richard Marsh’s The Beetle and Literature of the Impressionable Mind 
120 
 
  
Vital Signs: Photography and the Gothic  125 
“Everything is just as wrong as it can be”: The Development of the Negative  139 
The Optogram: “Fleshing Out” the Negative 147 
Chapter Four. “Cruelly true”: 
Media, Immediacy and Fidelity in Bram Stoker’s Dracula  
165 
 
 
Writing to the Moment: Gender, Fidelity, Inscription 172 
Graphomania: Speed, Machinery, Distraction  184 
The Uncanny Return of Technology   
The Phonographic Imagination: Indexing Bodies 
201 
214 
 
Conclusion 
  
228 
Bibliography 
Vita 
234 
253 
 
 vii 
List of Figures 
 
 
Fig. 3.1   “Elephans Photographicus.” Punch 44 (1863): 249.                               135         
 
Fig. 3.2  Wilhelm Friedrich Kühne. “Retinal Photograph.” 1878.        146
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Introduction 
 
 This dissertation explores the varied phenomena of “automatic writing” in 
Victorian Gothic fiction, reading the genre’s fascination with irrepressible signifying 
practices of the body in light of the medical, criminological and scientific discourses that 
underwrite the “scriptural economy” (de Certeau) of the late nineteenth century with their 
own arsenal of automatic writing machines. I have titled the project Graphomania, and I 
consider the term a keyword of late-Victorian culture—one that names a distinctly 
Victorian pathology, but that alludes also to the widespread epistemic hope that writing 
was capable of rendering objectively the internal and subjective experiences of 
individuals.  
 Asserting the centrality of representation-machines in the construction of modern 
bodies and subjectivities, this dissertation analyzes the Gothic novel within the context of 
other nineteenth-century technologies of inscription, machines that embody and enact 
“theories of language” and of the subject (Gitelman 4).  In conversation with recent 
studies of the body-machine complex (Kittler, Rabinbach, Seltzer), this project draws 
upon the natural sciences, psychology, the occult and literature (as well as many curious 
hybrids of these discourses), to develop a heterogeneous conception of “automatic 
writing,” the contours of which provide a kind of exoskeleton of the modern subject. For 
the Victorians, graphomania named a pathological compulsion to write, and this study 
examines the culture’s newfound fascination with this concept of “symptomatic” and 
indexical writing that rendered visible the invisible idiosyncrasies of a profusion of 
deviant bodies. This species of writing, not the imprint of deliberate expression, but the 
trace of unconscious gestures, opened up a significant gap between writing and authoring. 
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To the trained experts produced by the Victorian age of science, this gap granted un-
authorized admittance to the subject. In a study of Victorian graphomania and the three 
Gothic readings that follow (graphology in Jekyll and Hyde, retinal photography in The 
Beetle, and phonography in Dracula), the project is particularly interested in 
convergences and correspondences between graphical machines and human bodies, and 
the uncanny capacity of the former to capture the automatic and unconscious gestures of 
the latter as a means of securing “direct” access to latent truths of the mind and body. 
 Perhaps the most cited source within recent discussions of the nineteenth 
century’s body-machine complex is Friedrich Kittler’s Discourse Networks 1800/1900. If 
discourse, in its Foucauldian acceptation, determines the preconditions of who may speak 
and the limits of what can be said, Kittler’s analysis takes another step back to consider 
the technological networks responsible for the material production of these cultural 
communications. Kittler pursues the post-humanist trajectory traced out elliptically in the 
closing lines of The Order of Things, where Foucault imagines the concept of man 
“erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea” (422). As unsentimental as 
Foucault’s position may be, its organic imagery (one might even call it Romantic) grants 
his statement an undeniable poetic flourish. By contrast, the severity of Kittler’s thought 
and prose methodically purges such materially imprecise imagery from his history of the 
human, strictly charting out the specific technologies responsible for the inscription and 
erasure of the subject “drowned out” by the static of physiological and psychical “noise.”  
 This assiduous technologist perspective also serves to temper overly capacious 
post-structuralist theories of “writing” that tacitly endorse the neutrality of recording 
devices through habitual critical neglect of the historically-situated means and media of 
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inscription. In Kittler’s reading, for example, the typewriter (the linchpin of his 1900 
discourse network) produces a very particular style of writing. Its impersonal, 
standardized type converts the personal expression connected with handwritten script into 
anonymous bureaucratic information. Embodied in the operations of its composition, the 
typewriter presents a challenge to the holographic fallacy: the romantic notion of 
immediacy enabled by the uninterrupted circularity that penmanship physically suggests. 
The material practice of typewriting displaces the hand from the scene of discursive 
production, while subtracting the mind from the equation entirely (195). The automatic 
discourse-production made possible by the typewriter “designates the turning point at 
which communications technologies can no longer be related back to humans. Instead, 
the former have formed the latter” (211). In this dark vision of the modern technosphere, 
humans serve as channels for mechanical expression, not vice versa. 
 Kittler has noted that Aufschreibesysteme 1800/1900, the original German title of 
his Discourse Networks, alludes to the fearful visions of Judge Daniel Paul Schreber, the 
successful German judge who furnished Sigmund Freud with his case on paranoia, and 
who suffered from delusions that included being persecuted by a god who penetrated his 
body with writing (Armitage 18). Hidden away in the belly of Kittler’s discourse 
machine (not unlike Walter Benjamin’s dwarf, crouching inside Maelzel’s automaton 
chess-player), Schreber’s paranoid philosophy endows modern inscription machines with 
fantastic power and efficacy.1 In the opening words of Kittler’s Gramophone, Film, 
Typewriter: “Media determine our situation” (xxxix). One might be tempted to 
characterize Kittler’s position as technophobic, if not for the undeniable pleasure he takes 
in this submission that is the inheritance of Schreber’s passivity. We find in these pages a 
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strange reversal of Freud’s fort / da scenario, where satisfaction is derived from the 
fantasy that we are completely at the mercy of the toys we are playing with (BPP 12-17). 
This masochism marks Kittler as a gothic writer in his own right, and makes every 
encounter with technology a fixed match. 
 In the manner of his forebears Nietzsche and McLuhan, Kittler’s emphatic 
rhetoric reproduces stylistically the power of the technologies being described with its 
own ballistic, aphoristic argumentation of unequivocal thought. Among English scholars 
of nineteenth-century technology, the measured response to Kittler’s arguments has been 
fairly consistent, attempting to harness the ingenuity and power of his insights while 
reining in its rhetorical excesses. For instance, Lisa Gitelman’s Scripts, Grooves, and 
Writing Machines: Representing Technology in the Age of Edison (1999) resists Kittler’s 
determinism with “a ‘thick’ description of culture” (6) that takes into account the 
vagaries of use and consumption. Her subtle account of the pre-conditions of emergence 
for Edison’s phonograph emphasizes the broad-based cultural negotiation of 
technological change over “Big Bang” theories of technology that single out individual 
inventors and inventions as epoch-defining polestars. Accordingly, though Gitelman’s 
somewhat equivocal argument that “new inscriptions signal new subjectivities” may 
sacrifice some of the potency of Kittler’s maxims, this “softer determinism” (7) advances 
a nuanced, decentralized understanding of technological networks that recognizes the 
mutually dependent forces of technology and culture, scientific innovation and popular 
opinion.2 
 The past decade of Victorian scholarship has produced a number of important 
studies of the correspondences established between nineteenth-century technologies and 
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bodies. First among these would be Laura Otis’ Networking: Communicating With Bodies 
and Machines in the Nineteenth Century (2001). Bridging the discourses of physiology, 
technology, and literature, her impressive interdisciplinary study centres on the network 
of the telegraph (5), an object that Otis reads at once as a technological device for the 
electrical transmission of signals and a metaphorical device for the communication of 
conceptual linkages and analogies. Quoting James W. Carey, Otis announces her 
intention to employ the telegraph, as the Victorians did, as “a thing to think with” (2). 
The principle thrust of Victorian thinking on the matter, Otis argues, was devoted to 
establishing metaphoric correspondences between telegraphic networks and the human 
nervous system. This metaphor furnished many insights into the complex workings of 
each, but also inspired a great deal of anxiety about where ‘we’ end and our networks 
begin (10). 
 In what follows, I concern myself primarily with this latter consequence; perhaps 
the most direct means of signaling my divergent interests with regard to the 
human/machine networks described by Otis would be to remark that these “thing[s] to 
think with” were just as often employed by the Victorians as tools for the abdication of 
thought. I am interested here in the special lure automatic writing technologies held for 
the Victorian unconscious. In their enlightening history of the emergence of objectivity as 
a paramount scientific virtue, Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison make the compelling 
assertion that: “instead of freedom of will, machines offered freedom from will – from 
the willful interventions that had come to be seen as the most dangerous aspects of 
subjectivity” (123). Scientific rhetoric employs this “negative ideal” (Daston 123) of 
nonintervention, intending to cancel out subjectivity with objectivity in a neat equation 
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with no remainder. Gothic fiction, alongside the range of pseudo-sciences explored in this 
dissertation, turns its gaze upon the residue of this evacuated and automatized subject, 
divorced from the scene of inquiry, but also from herself. These uncanny discourses 
inhabit and investigate the space within that has been hollowed out by this newly 
emergent ideal of mechanical empiricism. They find the correlative production of the 
objective examiner is the objectified subject of examination, one whose internal life has 
been externalized and instrumentalized. 
 As Lacan suggests, self-identification is impossible without compulsive reference 
to external technologies of representation. The child requires the mirror’s external (and 
essentially alienated) perspective in order to translate a sequence of fragmentary close-
ups of limbs into the gestalt of the body. For their part, the Victorians were especially 
preoccupied with devising a variety of mirrors that could permit glimpses of internal life. 
They were driven to invent machines that re-enact, transcribe, and otherwise mimic 
hidden processes of physiology, emotion, consciousness, and the unconscious. The 
uncanny dimension of this mimicry arises out of the troubled relation between 
identification and objectification that technology instates. After the fashion of the Gothic, 
these machines made possible radically exteriorized practices of introspection. It is this 
paradoxical exteriority of the subject’s interiority that prompts Zizek to return to “the 
fundamental Lacanian proposition that psychoanalysis is not a psychology” (SO 34), a 
disclaimer that rejects stringently subjectivized or individualized economizations of the 
psyche. 
These techniques of externalization render technology uncanny, and make Gothic fiction 
a rewarding lens through which to view technology. Nineteenth-century representational 
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technologies engineered a phantasmagoria of the human body, materializing and 
projecting internal reality upon external surfaces, and putting on public display the 
unsettling vitality of the flesh.  
 
Bare Writing 
Writing in blood, writing in flesh—even when the formulas are figurative, they 
represent a special access to the authoritative, inalienable, and immediate; the 
writing of flesh and blood never lies. What the writing gains in immediacy, 
though, it loses in denotative range, since writing that cannot lie is only barely 
writing. The marks traced out in earth, flesh, paper, architecture, and landscape 
are often not part of any language but, rather, circles, blots, a cross, a person’s 
image, furrows, and folds. Whether stamps of authenticity or brands of shame, 
and however rich in symbolism, they act as pointers and labels to their material 
ground and not as elements in a syntactic chain that could mean something else. 
(154) 
This crucial passage from Sedgwick’s The Coherence of Gothic Conventions delineates 
Gothic as a mode of writing marked by its peculiar techniques of inscription. The 
semantic content of Gothic literature is inseparable from (and often secondary to) its 
material basis. Though critics tend to describe Gothic as genre, I argue in what follows 
that the fundamental distinctiveness of gothic inscription is derived from the pronounced 
and often dramatic relation enacted between script and medium. While genre nominates 
formal and stylistic criteria as paramount, characterizing Gothic as medium helps call 
attention to crucial questions of materiality given prominence within Gothic fiction. The 
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Gothic hysterically insists upon an embodied, phenomenological poetics: to “conceive” 
an idea, we must pass through the flesh, with all of its noise and distortions.   
It is this accentuation of materiality that inspires Anne Williams’s alignment of 
Gothic with poetic rather than novelistic traditions. “As narratives of ‘otherness’ distant 
in time and space,” Williams notes that: “Gothic fictions necessarily emphasize writing 
rather than speech” (66). The two most common figurations of this writing within the 
Gothic are the fragment and the found manuscript. Both of these forms of inscription 
present readers with singular texts that are subject to contingency, loss, and even 
mortality, exploiting a contemporary fascination with architectural ruins by transposing 
the aura of decay to the text. Disturbing mimesis with the physical residue of the text, 
Gothic writers direct readings toward the apparatus that palpably brings text into texture, 
and writing into being.  
Such conceits reveal the surprising extent to which the Gothic novel manifests 
anxiety over its own textual body. With the infamous introduction to his Gothic Romance 
The Castle of Otranto, Horace Walpole introduces a new kind of novel, uniquely troubled 
by its material existence, and nervously reiterating the Gothic trope of illegitimacy at the 
level of the text. While Otranto’s narrative concerns the violent correction of a perverted 
patrilineal inheritance, the novel’s paratext finds Walpole himself constructing a false 
genealogy of the text, employing the found manuscript conceit that would become the 
generic standard for gothic authors seeking to confer upon their narratives the aura of 
authenticity. Over a century later, Dracula’s Jonathan Harker will sift through the “mass 
of material of which the record is composed” to find “there is hardly one authentic 
document; nothing but a mass of typewriting” (419). Most novels implicitly request a 
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kind of automatic reading: we open the text and the voice simply begins speaking, no 
questions asked. The weight of the book disappears from our hands as we drift into the 
fiction. By contrast, the Gothic novel resists the sublimation of the book and, 
consequently, often finds itself struggling with a problem that few literary texts feel they 
need to account for: how did this writing come to be inscribed upon this body?  This is 
uncanny mimesis: literature trembling before its own mirror.  
 The uncanny quality of this textual “doubling” finds succinct expression in the 
“monstrous text,” a peculiarly persistent metaphor within Gothic fiction that induces a 
hallucination of reading that reincarnates the word as flesh. In her introduction to the 
1831 version of Frankenstein, Mary Shelley beckons her “hideous progeny” to “go forth 
and prosper” (358), proposing a metaphor that imagines publication not as a matter of 
paper and ink, but flesh and blood. We might turn as well to Stevenson’s description of 
The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde as “a Gothic Gnome” (Works 66), a 
fantastic designation that captures something of the awkward and even unsettling position 
of the novella (and particularly the “shilling shocker”) within literature by framing the 
question as one not of literary form, but of physical deformity.3  
This analogy between text and flesh represents a figural innovation that is also a 
critical history of inscription. If, as Michel de Certeau argues, “books are only metaphors 
of the body,” Gothic fiction stages the collapse of the literary into the corporeal. “In times 
of crisis,” de Certeau claims, “paper is no longer enough for the law, and it writes itself 
again on the bodies themselves” (140). The crises most commonly introduced within 
Gothic narrative serve as pretexts for the reversion to an archaic scriptural economy that 
indelibly marks its authority through the conscription of bodies. From De Quincey’s 
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restless nocturnal struggle under the compositor’s blocks in Suspiria de Profundis to the 
harrow that inscribes its “death sentence” upon the enthusiastic commandant in Franz 
Kafka’s “Penal Colony,” the Gothic rehearses endlessly this primal scene of writing. In 
positioning bodies under the mechanisms of inscription and interpretation, the genre 
comes to terms with the gravity of writing through sympathetic consultation of the 
surfaces that have yielded under its weight. In other words, the Gothic has much to tell us 
about writing, but possibly more about the experience of being written.  
The recurrent enactment of violent scenes of writing within Gothic narrative 
grants imaginative substance to the theoretical connotations of “inscription.” Employed 
critically, the term “inscription” signals a figural strategy intended to make readers wince, 
by calling attention to the corporeal embodiment of cultural signs. This term disrupts the 
metaphysics of writing by revealing its physics, desublimating the process of writing in 
order to communicate the force as well as the sense of this material cultural practice. In 
doing so, it exposes the “will to knowledge” as a “will to power.” 
It is this genealogical position that grounds Friedrich A. Kittler’s Discourse 
Networks, even if the author requires an interlocutor to elucidate the latent sympathies 
that motivate his intellectual project. In his disarming foreword to Kittler’s thorny text, 
David E. Wellbery explains: “Whoever would look for the bonds of solidarity that orient 
Kittler’s investigation will find them here: in its unmistakable compassion for the pathos 
of the body in pain” (xv). If Kittler’s affinities are difficult to discern, perhaps this 
confusion is owing to his anti-humanist orientation: the fate of the subject is a fairly 
indifferent matter to him. Rather, following Nietzsche and Foucault, Kittler attends to the 
surface of the body, where the disparate scripts of subjection are inscribed. This body, 
  
11 
which constitutes the text of genealogy, is “a volume in perpetual disintegration” 
(Foucault, “Nietzsche” 375).  This is so because the subject’s composition requires the 
body’s decomposition. 
Even if, as Penelope Deutscher argues, the metaphor of inscription has become a 
post-structural “habit,” its emphasis on the material basis of signification registers a tacit 
resistance to the ways in which bodies are “incorporated” into systems of meaning. 
Indeed, Mary Ann Doane locates the possibility of a “politics of the medium” (146) 
through an understanding of the medium as “a material or technical means of aesthetic 
expression . . . which harbors both constraints and possibilities, the second arguably 
emerging as a consequence of the first ” (130). Recognizing this possibility for resistance 
forestalls the deterministic conclusions about the inevitable fate of victimized bodies as 
configured within Kittler’s thinking.  
 In one enduring strain of the Gothic mode, machinery is nearly synonymous with 
the violence we find in Kittler’s account of technology. It is an external force, the 
crushing weight of which looms over the subject. This gothic vision of the technosphere 
is articulated in Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus, where Diogenes Teufelsdröckh depicts the 
world as “one huge, dead, immeasurable Steam-engine, rolling on, in its dead 
indifference, to grind me limb from limb” (127). It is difficult not to be reminded of 
Carlyle’s “immeasurable Steam-engine” when Charles Maturin has one of his characters 
write, in the midst of an institutional conspiracy against him: “I was like one who sees an 
enormous machine (whose operation is to crush him to atoms) put in motion, and, 
stupefied with horror, gazes on it with a calmness that might be mistaken for that of one 
who was coolly analyzing the complication of its machinery, and calculating the 
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resistless crush of its blow” (Melmoth 91). We will find the machine characterized in like 
manner within the writings of Karl Marx, perhaps the source that has the most profound 
impact on critical theories concerning Victorian attitudes towards technology. It is the 
“automatic system of machinery” that effectuates the objectification and alienation of 
labour, installing workers as “no more than the conscious limbs of the automaton” 
(Grundisse 132). The indifferent machine is cast as “something alien and exterior to” the 
workers, threatening to render them “superfluous” (135). 
 However, Maturin’s Melmoth (along with Shelley’s Frankenstein) helped to 
develop a more nuanced and troubling understanding of gothic machinery in 1820s 
fiction. Machinery becomes truly uncanny at the moment we recognize that its inorganic 
(or unfamiliar) gears and processes are already at work within us. True to the prevailing 
emotional tenor of the Gothic mode, each of the fictional texts discussed within this study 
are marked by suspicion concerning emergent technologies and techniques of writing and 
reading, a distrust that frequently escalates into outright paranoia. But these fears are 
tinged with an unmistakable technophilia. These texts betray industrial England’s 
distinctive fascination with the awesome spectacle and power of technology, “the 
Victorian sense of machine beauty” that Herbert Sussman identifies as “the dominant 
energy of the nineteenth century” (198). As Sussman argues, this drive has too often been 
eclipsed by negative assessments (whose primary appeal may be that they appear more 
closely aligned with the prejudices of modern humanism). At root, this Victorian 
fascination was sustained by a deep sense of affinity with machinery. The mechanist 
philosophy of the human was being realized through an array of instruments that 
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mirrored every organ and function of the human body, suggesting in their analogical 
relation kinship as well as compatibility. 
 If nineteenth-century debate often hinged on the question of whether such 
technologies clarified or distorted our vision of the human, recent theories of technology 
have highlighted the “posthuman” hybridity of Victorian understandings of the body 
(Ketabgian), imagining the self as a site of constant re-invention, rather than gradual 
discovery. In this vein, Terry Castle’s designation of the uncanny as an “invention” 
(understood in a broad cultural sense that encompasses, but is not limited to, technology) 
prompts us to explore the history and conditions of the “uncanny’s” emergence, as well 
as imagining the possibility of its eventual disappearance.4 This dissertation makes 
another step toward that work. Exploring automatism as a synonym for mechanism, it 
aims to situate historically and materially the experience of the uncanny in the nineteenth 
century. The analysis of historically-situated technologies allows us to make use of the 
valuable insights psychoanalysis has to offer, while resisting the notion that it is capable 
of delineating a stable, generalized vision of “the” subject. This kind of approach stresses 
the fact that these theoretical concepts emerge out of a shared social reality as well as 
individual psychic histories. While I investigate a number of questions typically 
understood to be the province of psychoanalysis, references to Freud situate his writing as 
a dependent variable rather than an outside authority on the culture it inhabited. 
Throughout, I have sought to read the dream-logic of Gothic narrative in the half-light of 
a culture that Carlyle felt had been cast into “magnetic sleep” (“Signs” 64) by machinery. 
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Apprehending Bodies 
Carlyle’s account of the mesmerizing powers of machinery provides an essential critique 
of the repetitive choreographies of bodies and minds set in motion by technological 
culture. One might reasonably expect a thesis on Victorian automatism to reiterate 
Carlyle’s position on the anesthetizing effects of technology. However, one of the most 
striking and consistent revelations of my research has been the tendency of technological 
innovation to stimulate renewed consciousness of bodies. To say that technology 
“awakens” us to a new awareness of ourselves is perhaps insufficiently critical. We can at 
least remark that, in their interface with bodies, communications technologies made 
visible many aspects of physical existence that had theretofore gone “un-remarked,” if 
not entirely unnoticed. Rather than simply suppressing consciousness, automatic writing 
technologies were often thought to produce the unconscious graphically. 
 The Victorians were attuned to many faint tremblings and pulsations that have 
long since stopped disturbing our minds and bodies. In Daniel Deronda, George Eliot 
describes her cultural moment as “a time when the soul of man was waking to pulses 
which had for centuries been beating in him unheard” (124).5 This calibration of the 
social nervous system—not necessarily “more precise,” but distinctly different from our 
own—allows for divergent qualities of feeling and makes bodies visible in unfamiliar 
ways. Sensitivity was as much a culturally constructed value as it was a physical 
experience. We can deduce a sense of the high esteem in which Victorians held 
sensitivity from the manner in which “insensitivity” served as an all-purpose epithet for 
an array of othered bodies, from criminals (Lombroso) to “idiots” (Galton), and 
“savages” (Felkin) to women (Ellis).6 In the nineteenth century, one could speak of the 
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“nobility” of the nerves (Lombroso, qtd. in Horn 88), as if feeling were a matter of 
principle.    
 The critical commonplace of Victorian cultural “anxiety” toys with a mere 
caricature of the extraordinarily acute physical sensitivity cultivated within the Victorian 
era. Describing this period as a time of great “apprehension” brings us nearer to the truth 
of the matter, as it better communicates the ambivalent responses (excitement and 
anticipation mixed with prejudice and dread) of a cultural sensorium opening itself up to 
an unknown world. From the séance table to the sanitarium to the laboratory, Victorian 
consciousness was tuning in to the subtle influence of other bodies. Sensation fiction, 
with its bundle of exposed nerves trembling at the slightest stimulation, might seem the 
most obvious expression of this heightened sensibility, but one finds the same 
hypersensitivity in a text such as The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, in which Charles 
Babbage imagines a phonographic universe where “every atom” has been “impressed 
with good and with ill” by even the most seemingly inconsequential of our words and 
actions (112).7  
The term apprehension also conveys the perceived importance of capturing these 
impressions, the faith that the traces of events and emotions grant us some power over 
them by transmuting subjective experience into objective evidence. This desire not only 
to touch, but to dispassionately understand what one touches, brought about one of the 
most striking developments within this widespread attunement: the culture’s systematic 
deployment of devices designed to feel and communicate on behalf of bodies. Within a 
fledgling medical establishment, graphing instruments such as the sphygmograph (or 
pulse-writer) and the cardiograph interrupted the contiguity of bodies in order to correct 
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the vagaries of manual palpation and direct auscultation performed by fallible human 
physicians. Telegraphs, phonographs, and other communications media interceded on 
behalf of distant correspondents, capturing and transmitting “sounds hitherto fugitive” 
(Edison, “Future” 527). In like manner, fugitive bodies were apprehended through 
photographic databases and other taxonomical systems that allowed the law to 
superimpose categories and composites of distinctive physical traces over an 
undifferentiated mass of individuals.8 The criterion of understanding for the Victorians 
was empirical and objectively verifiable evidence. Within emergent Victorian discourses 
such as medicine, communications, and criminology, this evidence typically took the 
form of indexical inscription, the truth-value of which lay in an automatic performance 
that deferred mental work to mechanical notation.   
 In Telling Flesh: The Substance of the Corporeal, Vicki Kirby argues that: “we 
must theorise the possibility that ‘nature scribbles,’ that ‘flesh reads’” (127). Her thesis, 
along with those of Gothic critics such as Kelly Hurley and Anne Williams, provides a 
necessary addendum to Sedgwick’s theory of gothic inscription. Both critics explore the 
productive capacity of gothic bodies, along with their ability to disturb humanist and 
symbolic structures of meaning. For Kelly Hurley, the “gothicity of matter” lies in its 
unsettling vitality; when the Gothic lures its reader outside the sterile confines of 
humanist discourse, we find that bodies are “not mute and stolid, but rather clamorous 
and active” (33). Williams’s Art of Darkness explores the Gothic as a revolutionary 
female counter-tradition to Romanticism. The representative figure of this movement is 
“a woman speaking to women” (7), and her manifesto could be Julia Kristeva’s 
Revolution in Poetic Language.  Interrupting symbolic narrative with the “non-expressive 
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totality” of the semiotic, gothic figures enact a hysterical “embodiment” of meaning, 
where symptoms “literalize” unconscious feelings (Williams 70).  
 Together, Hurley and Williams lend critical credence to distinctly gothic 
premonitions concerning the eloquence and legibility of bodies. Gothic epistemology 
upholds the validity of embodied experience and knowledge. Its narratives implore us to 
listen to the testimony of our own bodies. When the mere sight of a man makes our skin 
crawl, when a child’s touch sends shivers up our spine, when we just have a feeling in 
our bones, we must not let an inability to articulate our suspicions prevent us from 
following our instincts. The apprehension of this deeply personal, embedded knowledge 
accounts only for the milder side of gothic paranoia, however. There is also the more 
pressing threat that others are listening to our bodies just as intently, waiting for it to 
betray our secrets with the telltale signs of a racing pulse, a blushing cheek, or a 
trembling hand.   
 This dissertation reads such gothic fears in light of the array of graphing machines 
that literalize and externalize internal phenomena (whether conceived as physiological, 
spiritual, or mental), thereby literally making the body present outside itself. “Reading 
flesh” alongside Stevenson, Marsh, Stoker and the other authors addressed within this 
dissertation means taking seriously “gothic paranoia,” as well as its twin condition of 
“Victorian anxiety,” thereby relinquishing two of the favourite talking points of 
modernity, and foils for our own incredulity. The Victorians, we must remember, also 
went to great lengths in realizing these theories as a legitimately scientific corporeal 
hermeneutic. If machinery served in early Gothic as a poignant and philosophically rich 
metaphor for the automatisms of the self, the resurgence of the genre a century later 
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would find the Gothic in explicit conversation with new technologies capable of 
literalizing and materializing these anxieties. 
 Richard Menke’s Telegraphic Realism: Victorian Fiction and Other Information 
Systems (2008) provides an exceptional model for rethinking the Victorian novel as one 
relay point in dynamic exchange with Victorian information networks. Menke 
encourages readers to “think of Victorian realism itself as an exploration of the power 
and the limits of written textuality in an age busy producing alternatives to it” (11). 
Particularly captivating is Menke’s examination of the indexical technologies that compel 
the novel to re-imagine itself as “an analog cultural form” (26). At first glance, Menke’s 
basic orientation towards realist fiction may not seem particularly radical: “we might 
think of realism,” he suggests, “not so much in terms of transparency as of translucence - 
not of a simple desire to disregard mediation but of an emphasis on the way in which 
mediations make certain real aspects of represented things shine through” (104). Perhaps, 
as Gitelman has written in her response to Menke’s book, “it would be difficult […] to 
find readers who do not see literary realism as a sort of mediation” (163). However, it is 
equally difficult to think of a reader as keenly perceptive to the material dimension of 
this mediation. Menke’s careful textual dissections present us with a visceral experience 
of technology that more strictly discursive analyses of linguistic mediation leave largely 
untouched. It is not only language, but bodies that interpose themselves between 
information and its transmission. In asking: “what was information in an analog epoch?” 
(23), Menke communicates what we might call, borrowing from Jonathan Crary, the 
“carnal density” (150) of fiction.  
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 In this respect, Menke’s chapter on Eliot, “Information Unveiled,” resonates most 
strongly with the work attempted in these pages. In Menke’s reading, Eliot’s novella 
“The Lifted Veil,” which relates the tortured perspective of a man besieged by unasked-
for gifts of premonition and clairvoyance, reflects upon “fiction’s power to capture 
something of the complexity of life in alienated, repeatable form” (137), giving voice to 
the fear that “fiction may cast our most intimate knowledge—of places, of individuals, of 
embodied life—as information” (147). Menke’s text commits itself to a productively 
“analogic” (and, I would argue, frequently gothic) perspective on realism, while my study 
turns squarely to the Gothic, finding there a uniquely powerful perspective on the fate of 
embodied information within the Victorian scriptural economy. The dreadful vision of 
“objectified subjectivity” (137) that Menke glimpses in Eliot’s novella and in the cultural 
moment that inspired its composition gains fullest figural and critical expression through 
the uncanny externalizations of gothic tropology. 
 In this study, Victorian technology and Gothic literature emerge as twin registers 
of the divided self, joined in their shared strategy of externalizing conflicts traditionally 
understood as invisible processes, but also in the consequent tendency of each uncanny 
text to expose its ghostly remainders and excesses in the process of trying to contain 
them. In her reading of James Hogg’s Confessions of a Justified Sinner, Sedgwick makes 
the crucial observation that the novel “literalizes and externalizes, for instance as murder 
or demonic temptation, conflicts that are usually seen as internal” (BM 96). This 
representational strategy is quintessentially Gothic, but in the nineteenth century it was 
hardly understood to be the unique prerogative of fiction to invert its subjects in this 
manner. We find this logic just as clearly at work in Francis Galton’s “Measurement of 
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Character.” Here, Galton imagines a “great ruler” (an unwitting pun that links regal 
power with the ability to “measur[e] man in his entirety”) questioning a duplicitous 
subject. This wise man “contrives, by a few minutes’ questioning, temptation, and show 
of displeasure, to turn his character inside out” (182). With the assistance of graphical 
devices for the detection and recording of internal physiological processes, the 
hallucinogenic nightmare experienced by Poe’s villain in “The Tell-Tale Heart” becomes 
an objective reality. The paranoid fear that private and immaterial emotions such as guilt 
could manifest themselves somatically and reverberate outside the confines of the body 
finds confirmation in instruments of modern medicine and science that prove capable of 
“turn[ing] … character inside out.” Galton delights that, thanks to the cardiograph, 
“palpitations of the heart . . . cannot be shunned or repressed, and they are visible” 
(“Measurement” 183). It is this paradoxical desire to know subjects by objectifying 
them—translating private inner realities as publicly exterior ones—that marks the 
Victorian period as a particularly gothic age.  
 Galton’s irrepressible palpitations echo Sedgwick’s “writing that cannot lie.” This 
is human expression stripped bare of its capacity for deferral, prevarication, or outright 
deception (or, as Sedgwick has it, writing that is “barely writing” at all). The graphing 
instruments that capture and inscribe these involuntary stirrings present us with the 
register of a life that writes itself, even against our own wishes. Of course, these devices 
were not intended for anything so idiosyncratic as personal expression; they existed to 
facilitate a strictly institutional dialogue between examiners and scientific subjects. Every 
prosthesis extends a particular thesis about the body, concretizing in its design a specific 
idea about what our bodies should or could be made to perform, feel, look, and sound 
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like. Automatic technologies of inscription suggested that the body was a volume of 
writing that solicited reading and needed only to be properly transcribed in order to make 
itself understood.   
 In its examination of Victorian culture’s rewriting of subjects according to the 
principles of a newly automatized scriptural economy, this study takes a page from 
Anson Rabinbach’s The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins of Modernity. 
Rabinbach’s expansive analysis of the transformative effects of the industrial 
supplementation of manual labour centres on the cultural work performed by the 
metaphor of the “human motor.” This comparison helped to reify the labour of human 
bodies as “labour power,” and defined that commodity according to “the expenditure and 
deployment of energy as opposed to human will, moral purpose, or even technical skill” 
(4). It is my contention that the emergent ways of thinking about laboring bodies 
described by Rabinbach had a comparable effect upon conceptions of reading and writing 
as well. The concepts of “will,” “purpose” and “skill” upon which humanist models of 
labour depended prove just as crucial to humanist theories of authorship and reception. 
Outside the precincts of the properly literary (a space delimited by genre, gender, and a 
host of criteria to be explored in what follows), where writing could still be primarily be 
theorized as a conscious act of the will, the emergence of new scientific and 
communications media provoked the Victorians to consider writing as an unconscious 
process of the body, akin to energy. Victorian bodies came to be understood not just as 
sources of labor-power, but of knowledge/power as well; they were not only 
industrialized, but informationalized. If the latter term still has an inelegant ring, the 
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ungainly approach language makes toward this concept might signify a deficit of thinking 
on the matter. 
  If the modern factory furnishes the stage upon which we witness the conversion 
of human labour into mechanical energy, the transcription of bodies into information 
transpires within the space of the Victorian archive. It is this codification of human 
subjects under the mechanisms of the nineteenth-century state that constitutes Allan 
Sekula’s primary concern within “The Body and the Archive.” Interpreting the practice 
of archiving and circulating criminal “identification” as a technological extension of 
Bentham’s panoptical principle of surveillance, Sekula’s history of photography 
reconciles the practice and theory of a positivist agenda to rectify social deviance through 
an exhaustive empiricism of criminal bodies. Criminology’s practical aspect required an 
intricate indexicality of bodies within the archive. The most punctilious undertaking of 
this encyclopedic project was Alphonse Bertillon’s modern system of criminal 
identification, a method that found its iconic figure in the “mug shot.” Sekula turns to 
Francis Galton’s composite portraits as emblematic of criminological positivism’s 
theoretical pole, which attempts, conversely, to discover the archive within the body.  
Signaled by the rise of phrenology and physiognomy, this scientific development 
intended to render criminality physically legible, accessing the social and genealogical 
histories inscribed within particular bodies to identify biologically determined traces of 
criminality. 
 All such identificatory systems depended upon the general acceptance of a 
systematic equivalence between bodies and signs, but it is Galton’s proposal that signals 
the most audacious assertion of the Victorian archive. For if Bertillon deposited bodies 
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into an archive, Galton believed that the body itself was an archive, holding the secret 
traces of its bearer’s history as well as the promise of its future. Consequently, the law 
had no need to mark (or stigmatize) its subjects into order to catalogue them. Through 
databases such as the “British Register of Distinctive Marks” that was included within 
1869’s Habitual Criminals Act, the state had merely to recognize and systematize the 
inscriptive work (such as scarring and tattooing) already being undertaken by and upon 
delinquent bodies (Cole 29). 
    My use of the term graphomania marks an attempt to isolate a strain of “archive 
fever” specific to the Victorians, one driven by this conviction that bodies involuntarily 
produced the legible signs of their identity and character (particularly when those bodies 
deviated from cultural norms).9 Chapter One explores graphomania as a fundamental 
Victorian hypothesis, and provides the historical and theoretical framework for the 
project by situating the uncanny phenomenon of automatic writing in the context of the 
“scriptural economy” of the late-nineteenth century. This graphical system is remarkable 
for its unprecedented expansion of what ought to be considered as “writing.” Brokered by 
an arsenal of mechanical recording devices, from the cardiograph, to the telegraph, to the 
phonograph, the Victorians discovered that a surprisingly broad range of ephemeral and 
invisible phenomena could be apprehended as permanent and visible inscriptions. The 
graphical method of scientific inquiry instates a quintessentially Victorian articulation of 
automatic writing, one that “recognizes” bodies are always inscribing themselves. Given 
the proper receptive devices, these bodies render interior states objectively legible, 
conscripting subjects according to the indexical logic that so strongly informs nineteenth-
century discourse. 
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  The automatic writing machines that underwrite the “graphical method” are 
responsible for the discursive production of the “graphomaniac,” a human body that 
replicates the automatic production of the machine. Unsurprisingly, the automatic 
function considered a virtue in the machine was held to be a grave defect in the human, 
whose heedless writing was a pathological disturbance of the general economy of 
writing. Max Nordau’s use of the term graphomaniac to describe one who cannot help 
but write serves as a point of departure for a broader analysis of the particular 
epistemological constructs and institutions responsible for producing this “insatiable 
writer” as a subject of knowledge. 
 Chapter Two nominates Stevenson’s Dr. Jekyll as an exemplary specimen of the 
graphomaniac, examining Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll & Mr. Hyde—an 
autobiography overrun by automatism—as a paranoid critique of the Victorian regime of 
self-registration. Autobiography articulates formally each subject’s obligation within an 
economy of writing: to render the self as legible to others, and account for one’s life. My 
reading centres on the uncanny homophone of the “hand”—signifying both bodily 
appendage and manual inscription—as the synecdoche that links Jekyll’s body to the 
scriptural economy. In most cultural analyses of writing, the shift from human to 
mechanical activity is indicated by the disappearance or dislocation of the hand. Whether 
observed nostalgically (as in Heidegger’s “Parmenides”) or dispassionately (Kittler 195), 
this rift signals an estrangement between the writer and the written (which can no longer 
be read simply as a means of expressive personal communication). Contrary to these 
readings, I argue that, far from usurping the role of the hand in inscription, nineteenth-
century technology apprehends the entire body as a writing machine.  
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  The Victorians codified this physiological hermeneutic through physiognomy and 
graphology, two pseudo-sciences that, I argue, reciprocally imagine the body as legible, 
and handwriting as an embodied practice. Both attempt to breach the gap between 
“impressions” (premonition, intuition, superstition, and other irrational but instinctive 
gothic ways of knowing that are “felt in one’s bones” rather than conceived in the mind) 
and “expression” as objective, legitimate epistemologies. Within Stevenson’s novel, 
disembodiment is the prerequisite of autonomous writing, and is the prerogative of the 
healthy, professional males whose writing circulates through the text. By contrast, 
Jekyll’s handwriting is encumbered by the residue of his body, which imposes its 
addictive needs and involuntary, repetitive gestures.  
 Developing the Gothic distinction between expression and inexpressible 
impressions introduced within the previous chapter, Chapter Three pursues the theme of 
embodied communication in Richard Marsh’s The Beetle. This chapter explores trance-
literature through its literalized understanding of the mind’s impressionability, asking 
how incipient writing technologies allowed the Victorians to imagine traumatic 
experience visually. In Techniques of the Observer, Jonathan Crary argues that the 
nineteenth-century study of optics was distinguished by an essential revision in 
understandings of human vision. Geometrical theories of the phenomenon (where sight 
organized objects in space) gave way to physiological experimentation (where the world 
impressed itself upon the retina). I submit the Gothic novel as an ideal site to examine the 
psychological implications of this discursive shift. From Nathaniel’s Hawthorne’s 
Holgrave to George du Maurier’s Svengali, the Gothic has persistently associated 
hypnosis with photography, a pattern that impels us to consider the contemporaneous 
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development of “the negative” within photographic and psychoanalytic discourse. In the 
“urban legend” of the optogram (the speculation that external objects can be fixed upon 
the retina, and even surgically extracted after death) as imagined by Marsh, we find a 
particularly rich popular expression of traumatic understandings of visuality. Rather than 
consolidating visual mastery (as one might expect technology to do), photography 
provides Marsh with a means of conceiving the receptive vulnerability of the perceiving 
subject, a thesis that haunts technological realism with the possibility that its “look” 
might fail to assure the dominance of the subject thereby enlightened. 
 My fourth chapter continues with the theme of observer as index through a 
reading of Bram Stoker’s Dracula as a “retrofit” of the novelistic technique of “writing to 
the moment,” one that mobilizes the arsenal of cutting-edge writing technologies 
currently at its disposal in order to present writing that is also unmistakably “of its 
moment.” A textbook case of Victorian graphomania, Stoker’s novel is propelled by a 
feverish obsession with providing accurate and immediate documentation. “There is 
throughout,” Stoker promises us from the outset, “no statement of past things wherein 
memory may err, for all the records chosen are exactly contemporary” (29). I consider 
this pledge of fidelity to the reader in light of the rampant infidelity between characters in 
the novel. Stoker’s concerns, I argue, are at once textual and sexual, and his novel offers 
a unique glimpse into the intersections of indexical and sexual reproduction in the Gothic. 
 Nascent tensions between technological and human models of faithfulness exert a 
strain upon Stoker’s subjects, and precipitate the conspicuous infidelity that peppers his 
narrative. Kittler’s influential interpretations of the novel in “Dracula’s Legacy” and 
Discourse Networks downplay these liaisons, enlisting Mina’s typewriter—the token of 
  
27 
her chaste commitment to take dictation from her husband—as emblematic of 
technology’s tendency to discipline libidinal energies. My reading intends to restore the 
vital presence of bodies within Stoker’s text by exploring the desire it betrays for 
unmediated, tactile experience of the other, a drive that finds technological expression in 
the phonographic register of the text, and gothic embodiment in the figure of the vampire. 
Both phonographic and vampiric techniques of inscription correspond to a gothic 
conception of immediacy, attained not through the absence of mediation, but the presence 
of bodies. The physical intimacy between signifier and signified captured by indexical 
recording machines subjects all communication to innuendo; as a result, the scientific 
authority of these technologies is subverted by the libidinal undercurrents of immediate 
correspondence as play between bodies. The scandal of this physical intimacy is only 
intensified by the “indiscriminate recording” of analog technologies. This indexical 
correlation between signifier and signified will be reframed as a disquietingly 
indeterminate relation between self and other when Mina serves as the instrumental 
medium of vampiric communications. Mina’s mediumship indulges an enduring gothic 
fascination with the receptive properties and testimonial authority of impressionable 
bodies, but it does something more radical as well, by demonstrating how writing 
technologies activate and give concrete expression to the productive graphomaniacal 
tendencies of the human. If fidelity in Stoker’s text names the mechanical refusal of any 
subjective or sentimental view of the subject, it also characterizes Mina’s extraordinary 
ability to perceive herself in such a manner, transforming her body into the medium and 
objective correlative of the other.  
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 From Nordau’s diagnosis of “those semi-insane persons who feel a strong impulse 
to write” (18), to Milan Kundera’s definition of graphomania as the compulsion “to 
impose one's self on […] a public audience of unknown readers” (127), the derogatory 
and disciplinary weight of the term interprets this modern phenomenon as a deluge of 
unsolicited intimacies forced upon readers by graphically incontinent individuals. In the 
Gothic novels examined here, graphomania indexes less the imposing over-extension of 
the self than the intensive mark of the other—not only inscribed upon us, but wildly 
composing and discomposing from within. 
 
                                                
1 Benjamin. “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 253. 
 
2 In his own incisive reading of nineteenth-century communications technology, Richard 
Menke (discussed below) has similarly called for an “intermediate understanding” (9) 
that tempers Kittler’s categorical statements concerning the cultural impact of single 
technologies. 
 
3 Stevenson uses this phrase in a letter written to his friend William H. Low on the 2nd of 
January, 1886.  
 
4 See Castle, Female Thermometer. 
 
5 Eliot’s last novel, published in 1876, Daniel Deronda was her only narrative to feature a 
(relatively) contemporary setting of 1865. 
 
6 See Criminal Man, 206-211; Galton, commenting on the “discriminative faculty of 
idiots,” remarks that: “their sense of pain is so obtuse that some of the more idiotic seem 
hardly to know what it is. In their dull lives, such pain as can be excited in them may 
literally be accepted with a welcome surprise” (“Inquiries” 28); Robert William Felkin 
(medical missionary, explorer, and early anthropologist, 1858-1922) studied “differences 
of sensibility between Europeans and Negroes” (Horn 95). Horn also notes that the 1888 
Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits included studies of sensibility 
(95). For an account of women’s higher tolerance for pain, see Ellis. Man and Woman: A 
Study of Secondary Sexual Characteristics. 
 
7 The extended quotation of this passage within both John Picker’s Victorian 
Soundscapes and Richard Menke’s Telegraphic Realism signals the affinities between my 
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project and those of both writers. Each understands technology as an index of cultural 
sensitivity, as well as a material indication of the desire to assess the interconnectedness 
of bodies within the phenomenal world. 
 
8 On the “apprehending” of criminal bodies within Victorian criminological discourse, 
see Leps (1992). I discuss her use of the term on pages 75-77 of this dissertation. 
 
9 On “archive fever,” see Derrida (1995). In particular, see “Exergue,” where Derrida 
traces the convergence of two correlative archival gestures: one is typographical, while 
the other (ritual circumcision) conscripts the body into the archive through a violent act 
of corporeal inscription. 
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1 
Graphomania and the Graphical Method 
 
  
Writing in 1872, Oliver Wendell Holmes quipped:  “So many foolish persons are rushing 
into print, that it requires a kind of literary police to hold them back and keep them in 
order” (Poet 226). Twenty years later, in his book Degeneration, Max Simon Nordau 
would warn: “The police cannot aid us. The public prosecutor and criminal judge are not 
the proper protectors of society against crime committed with pen and crayon” (557-58). 
Each in their own fashion, Holmes and Nordau were responding to an overwhelming 
proliferation of writing with the invocation of a specialized branch of “literary police-
work.” One is mischievously playful and the other deadly serious; together they suggest 
both the light-hearted and heavy-handed ways in which nineteenth-century aesthetic 
criticism blended rather seamlessly into moral, medical, and criminological discourse. 
 This chapter traces the emergence of the “graphomaniac,” a figure that bridges 
these diverse but—for the Victorians—complementary ways of talking about writing, 
asking what its sudden appearance in the nineteenth century reveals about incipient 
Victorian rationales of interpretation. Reading the graphomaniac as a broadly 
representative rather than culturally marginal figure, I employ this diagnosis to examine a 
widespread cultural tendency to imagine “graphically” an expansive spectrum of 
phenomena never before considered as writing. Brokered by an arsenal of mechanical 
recording devices, from the cardiograph, to the telegraph, to the phonograph, the 
Victorians discovered that a surprisingly broad range of invisible and ephemeral 
phenomena could be apprehended graphically. This desire to see everything “set down in 
writing” gives rise to a surfeit of graphing machines thought capable of grasping the 
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world through a diligent recording and deciphering of its traces. It is this fervent 
graphological faith that marks the Victorian period as the age of graphomania. 
 One of the central premises of this dissertation is that every alteration in the 
system of signs heralds a corresponding transformation of our understanding of the 
subject. Anticipating the three studies that follow, this chapter is particularly concerned 
with the interface between these new machines of inscription and human bodies that 
cannot help but write. My aim here is to forge links between the distinctly Victorian 
pathology of graphomania and the epistemic hope that writing might be capable of 
rendering objectively the internal and subjective experiences of individuals.  In so doing, 
I identify nineteenth-century graphical technologies as part of a rethinking of how 
subjects and characters are made anew in the Victorian scriptural economy, the rhetoric 
of which is expressive rather than repressive. Foregoing the marking of deviant and 
criminal bodies, as delineated within most recent theories of cultural inscription, the law 
“merely” attends to the identifying marks that different bodies carry upon themselves, 
betraying their own histories. It is in the context of this new scriptural economy with its 
fantasies of comprehensive legibility that Nordau’s graphomaniac appears, conscripted as 
representative of a world that, beyond merely submitting to interpretation, automatically 
offers itself up as a text that silently solicits our reading. 
 The late nineteenth century’s fascination with the symptomatic value of automatic 
writing corresponds closely to Sedgwick’s theory of Gothic inscription. This essentially 
indexical writing of flesh and blood, revered for its “special access to the authoritative, 
inalienable, and immediate” (Coherence 154), is considered within Sedgwick’s study as a 
generic rather than historical phenomenon. Conversely, the preliminary sketch of the 
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graphomaniac that follows proceeds largely outside the generic bounds of the Gothic. It 
explores the broader cultural power and legitimacy held by this fantasy of unmediated or 
“bare” writing, primarily through examining the range of nineteenth-century graphical 
machines that dramatically altered the discursive production of the subject in vaunting the 
truth-value of indexical inscription. 
 
“The irresistible itch to write” 
Nordau’s most audacious contribution to Darwinian discourse, outlined in his 
Degeneration (1892), was his extension of evolutionary theory’s scope beyond the 
boundaries of the evolving body and into the field of culture.1 Responding to those who 
understood evolution as synonymous with the progress of the human species, Nordau 
maintained, following men such as British zoologist Edwin Ray Lankester, that being 
subject to “the general laws of evolution” made humankind “as likely to degenerate as to 
progress” (60).2 For Nordau, adaptation to one’s environment—particularly when those 
surroundings resembled those of modern urban life—was just as likely to produce 
“regressive” traits and behavior.3 These traits Nordau found in abundance within the 
modern artist. Nearly every tendency in modern art and thought, from the Pre-Raphaelites 
to the decadents, from Nietzsche to Zola, exhibited signs “of more or less pronounced 
moral insanity, imbecility, and dementia” (viii). “High culture,” for Nordau, was a polite 
circumlocution for describing the scum that had risen to the surface of a society. These 
works held a symptomatic correspondence with society; they were exemplary without 
being exceptional.  
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Nordau’s Degeneration begins with a number of questions concerning method, 
addressing in particular the difficulty of obtaining direct access to the artist’s body, in 
order to properly determine the “anatomical phenomena of degeneracy” (17). For 
Nordau, however, it is hardly “necessary to measure the cranium of an author, or to see 
the lobe of a painter’s ear, in order to recognize the fact that he belongs to the class of 
degenerates” (17). This obstacle could be circumvented by the anatomical inspection of 
aesthetic objects. Nordau characterized the cultural productions of the vast majority of 
modern artists as “intellectual stigmata” (19). Reversing the trajectory of cultural 
dissemination, this rhetorical move returns aesthetic “markings” to recoil upon their 
putative source, repositioning them upon the surface of the body. The term “stigmata” 
frames such markings as signs of disease and disgrace, but the analogy also has the effect 
of translating culture into biology. If writing is an exteriorized part of the body, aesthetics 
falls under the jurisdiction of science. Accordingly, a new criterion must replace the 
conventional means of reading artistic productions. These were no longer to be 
understood as free gestures of the mind, but as instinctive and involuntary discharges or 
secretions of the body. Nordau’s project amounts to a systematic denial of culture 
through deposition of the artist’s autonomy.  
The surface of the body was a site heavily contested between nineteenth-century 
science and aesthetics, a point upon which the practices, discourses, and lines of 
interpretation of each camp regularly made their violent convergence. Situated at the 
physical threshold of the divide between self and other, between biological function and 
symbolic activity, this exterior, yet liminal space was typically understood as a pre-
symbolic facade. For instance, Nordau’s rhetorical deployment of stigmata draws upon 
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precedents set by anthropological consideration of the tattoo as a marker of natural 
difference. Darwin himself had blurred the line between bodies and material culture in his 
consideration of the savage’s “notorious” “passion for ornament” (DM 574). Determining 
certain affinities between “the lower and barbarous races” and the “higher animals” 
regarding “their taste for the beautiful” (211), Darwin proposes a rather skewed analogy 
between the two: “as negroes and savages in many parts of the world paint their faces 
with red, blue, white, or black bars, — so the male mandrill of Africa appears to have 
acquired his deeply-furrowed and gaudily-coloured face from having been thus rendered 
attractive to the female” (DM 541). This rather superficial appraisal of surfaces seizes 
upon a relation of appearance while neglecting the process of these distinct phenomena of 
bodily decoration. Most significantly, Darwin’s comparison depends upon the leveling of 
any distinction between biological function and symbolic activity. Natural pigmentation, 
it should perhaps go without saying, is not the same as the deliberate application of 
pigment. The latter is a performance, a reflexive and deliberate operation upon the self 
that incorporates the body into culture (if not as a ‘work of art,’ at least more generally or 
as symbolic marker). Darwin’s work reverses this trajectory to rewrite culture under the 
sign of the body. This organicist conception of society apprehends culture as the exterior 
index of the body’s internal workings. Nordau’s stigmata participate in this practice by 
translating cultural expressions as symptomatic marks that index the artist’s interior state: 
‘vital signs’ that bind body and text in an uncomfortably intimate manner. 
 This denial of culture’s relative autonomy from nature finds one of its clearest 
expressions in Nordau’s conception of “graphomania.” Diagnoses and discussions of the 
“condition” throughout the fin-de-siecle tended to defer to Nordau’s definition of 
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graphomaniacs as “those semi-insane persons who feel a strong impulse to write” (18).4 
Nordau saw these tireless and tiresome scribblers, along with their “critical body-guard,” 
as “dominat[ing] nearly the entire press” (vii). They poured out upon the page a style of 
“pure literary insanity” (136) characterized by “incoherence, fugitive ideation, and a 
tendency to idiotic punning” (171). Attributing the term to the Italian criminologist 
Cesare Lombroso (18), Nordau defines this type of degenerate as a being “with an 
insatiable desire to write, though he has nothing to write about except his own mental and 
moral ailments” (qtd. in “Melancholy” 765). Two aspects of this description strike me as 
worthy of note here. First, in his characterization of the graphomaniac’s desire to write as 
“insatiable,” Nordau recasts production as consumption. This species of writing cannot 
“feed” or edify the culture at large; its growth is cancerous, and threatens the general 
economy of writing. At the level of the individual, the incontinence of graphomania 
disintegrates the author’s “body of work,” insofar as this figure is intended to 
communicate a gestalt of the corpus as a unified whole. Charcot gave the name “les 
hommes de petit papier” to patients who would compulsively come to him with 
symptoms written on little scraps of paper.5 This is what the graphomaniac presents us 
with: scraps and fragments, a scattered puzzle of writing that frustrates the sublimated 
“idea” of the body. The study of graphomania turns our attention to more deeply 
ambivalent experiences of Victorian self-writing that serve as “graphic” depictions of an 
internal struggle between autonomy and automatism. The previous century’s “Man of 
Letters” was now being crowded out by Charcot’s “hommes de petit papier,” a 
designation that seemed at once to literalize the graphic composition of the writing 
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subject, and to suggest that these inscriptions provided legible evidence of an internal 
character hidden even to its writer. 
The term “mania,” like hysteria, tended to function more broadly as metaphor for 
the uncanny aspects of culture—namely, its contagious and compulsive nature. Many 
exploited the elasticity of the term “mania” to diagnose widespread cultural phenomena 
in an attempt to come to terms with, and discipline, the century’s unprecedented 
proliferation of writing. At the level of culture, then, this mania produces writing that is 
nothing more than books. It brings about the decadence of print culture: a kind of archive 
fever, where evolution doubles back on itself. Emblems of enlightenment such as the 
library—once thought of as sites for the ordered structuring of knowledge—collapse 
under the exhausting weight of the expansion, production, and commodification of texts. 
George Gissing’s New Grub Street (1891) anticipates the bibliophobia of Borges’ 
“Library of Babel” when the author has his alienated publishing employee Marian Yule 
describe the British Library as: “growing into unwieldiness, threatening to become a 
trackless desert of print – how intolerably it weighed upon the spirit!” (138). This 
exhaustive and exhausting production and consumption of writing, an “obsessive circle” 
that Lennard J. Davis has recently traced back to nineteenth-century print culture (106), 
was diagnosed in the correlative disorders of graphomania and bibliomania. We find the 
rapid increase in print consumption described as “mania” in Isaac Disraeli’s Curiosities 
of Literature, which devotes a chapter to the recent phenomenon of “Bibliomania.” Those 
afflicted with this condition obsessively collect the forms of knowledge (in particular, 
books) without grasping, or even concerning themselves with, matters of substance. 6  
Disraeli imagines the public library as a madhouse, institutionalizing both text and reader 
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by contending that this meaningless accumulation of “enormous heap[s] of books” has 
infected weak minds, who imagine that they acquire knowledge when they keep it on 
their shelves” (9).  
Disraeli’s particular concern over public libraries suggests the epidemic 
dimension of the problem. Graphomania is not merely a personal pathology, suffered by 
the few. One would almost have to extend this diagnosis to the whole of modern culture 
to account for the century’s unprecedented proliferation of writing. Indeed, this is 
precisely what Davis has done in his recent history of obsessive-compulsive disorders 
(2008). Davis characterizes nineteenth-century novelists as “obsessives in the cause of 
letters” (105), attributing their extraordinary output to a “graphomania[cal]” (107) drive 
that was for novelists, journalists, and critics alike a professional obligation. “The great 
novelists of that century,” he tells us, ”were engaged in a single-minded work project that 
had no precedent—the continuous, cumulative production of words” (105). 
Writing from America in 1890, Oliver Wendell Holmes’ satirical poem 
“Cacoethes Scribendi” (the irresistible urge to write) imagines this proliferation of 
writing as a global and ecological concern:  
 If all the trees in all the woods were men;  
 And each and every blade of grass a pen;  
 If every leaf on every shrub and tree  
 Turned to a sheet of foolscap; every sea  
 Were changed to ink, and all earth's living tribes  
 Had nothing else to do but act as scribes,  
 And for ten thousand ages, day and night,  
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 The human race should write, and write, and write,  
 Till all the pens and paper were used up,  
 And the huge inkstand was an empty cup,  
 Still would the scribblers clustered round its brink  
 Call for more pens, more paper, and more ink.7 
Though he casts the ecological question as a purely hypothetical one (the trees are not 
pulped for paper, but magically transform into men), Holmes characterizes writing as a 
form of expenditure by imagining the world’s materials translated textually. The earth is 
a dwindling resource, pillaged by “scribblers” who have failed to count the material costs 
of writing not worth the paper it has been written upon. A critique of writing as 
informational “pollution” would have to remain similarly metaphorical, as this ecological 
scenario is primarily concerned with granting figural expression to a criticism of readerly 
exhaustion. More than the deterioration of the earth, it was the erosion of the human body 
under flows of information that seemed the most pressing for critics of the excesses of 
nineteenth-century print culture. Questioning the necessity of this superfluous and 
wearying expenditure, Holmes’s poem anticipates the bleak milieu inhabited by Gissing’s 
Marian, who “exhaust[s]” herself “in the manufacture of printed stuff which no one even 
pretended to be more than a commodity for the day's market” (137). Thourougly 
dispirited and dehumanized by this process, Marian comes to see herself “not [as] a 
woman, but a mere machine for reading and writing” (137). Through the stifling 
monotony of her working hours, “she [does] her best […] to convert herself into the 
literary machine which it was her hope would some day be invented for construction in a 
less sensitive material than human tissue” (505). Nordau is similarly concerned with the 
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effects of printed matter on sensitive human tissue; he suggests that graphomania might 
be the result of print over-saturation, connecting this graphic incontinence to radical 
increases in the consumption of writing. He charges the increased circulation of letters 
and newspapers in the nineteenth century with the deterioration of the modern 
individual’s physical constitution: writing and reading are activities that “involve an 
effort of the nervous system and a wearing of tissue. Every time we read or write, every 
human face we see, every conversation we carry on, every scene we perceive through the 
window of the flying express, sets in activity our sensory nerves and our brain centres” 
(39). Though most possess the resilience necessary to weather this barrage of modern 
urban experience, abnormal types such as the “hysteric” and “degenerate” exhibit a 
“disproportionate impressionability of their psychic centres” (25). This impressionable, 
susceptible nature leads to “irresistible passion for imitation,” and eager submission “to 
all the suggestions of writers and artists” (26). Such impressionable minds find 
themselves locked in a vicious cycle, where immoderate reading leads to overindulgent 
writing, which in turn perpetuates this problem of excess for other readers. 
Though it eventually came to be codified within degenerative theories of 
criminality and pathology, these earliest usages of graphomania found the term only 
facetiously employed as a specialized medical classification, employed in ironic styles 
that recognized the audacity of imagining literary critique as medical diagnosis. Often, it 
seems to have been adopted as a self-deprecating term by those who recognized in 
themselves a tendency towards the loquacious.  For example, the subtitle of Edinburgh’s 
1827 journal of medical satire, The Cheilead, or University Coterie; being violent 
ebullitions of graphomaniacs, affected by cacoethes scirbendi, and famæ sacra fames, 
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suggests an ironic self-awareness seldom displayed by Nordau within his own work.8 
Medical discourse, we find in this self-diagnosis, is a form of writing prone to its own 
obsessive tendencies. George Bernard Shaw’s dispassionate critique of Nordau in The 
Sanity of Art argues for a similarly reflexive reading of Nordau’s Degeneration: 
 If you want an example of echolalia [symptomatic of degeneration, according to 
 Nordau], can you find a more shocking one than this gentleman who, when you 
 say “mania,” immediately begins to gabble Egomania, Graphomania, 
 Megalomania, Onomatomania, Pyromania, Kleptomania, Dipsomania, 
 Erotomania, Arithmomania, Oniomania, and is started off by the termination 
 “phobia” with a string of Agoraphobia, Claustrophobia, Rupophobia, Iophobia, 
 Nosophobia, Aichmophobia, Belenophobia, Cremnophobia, and Trichophobia? 
 (80). 
Critiques such as Shaw’s suggest that, while the term “graphomania” purports to tell us 
something about aberrant practices of writing, its sudden appearance in the nineteenth 
century reveals more to us today about newly emergent rationales of reading.9 The most 
significant changes in the nineteenth century had less to do with the sheer quantities of 
writing produced and consumed than the extraordinary expansion of what counted as 
writing in the first place. The crucial distinction between these two modern developments 
can be illuminated with reference to Heidegger’s “Age of the World Picture.” This 
“world picture” names something more than a visual representation of the world; it refers 
to a distinctly modern understanding of our world as essentially pictorial—as something 
that can be adequately enframed and expressed as an image. Heidegger is concerned less 
with pictures than with the primary tendency to visualize; it is this mentality that explains 
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how it is “that the world becomes a picture at all” (129). Analogously, nineteenth-century 
inscription technologies seek not to expand an already-existing archive of writing, but to 
fundamentally alter the ontological relation between writing and the phenomenal world. 
These technologies signaled not that the world was a surface and a subject upon and 
about which one might write, but that its nature was innately graphic.  
 This distinction can be further clarified through a comparison of Holmes’ 
“Cacoethes Scribendi” with an extraordinary passage from the father of modern 
computing, Charles Babbage, in his Ninth Bridgewater Treatise (1838). Speculating upon 
“The Permanent Impression of Our Words and Actions on the Globe We Inhabit,” 
Babbage provides us with an alternate vision of global inscription. Reasoning that “the 
pulsations of the air, once set in motion by the human voice, cease not to exist with the 
sounds to which they gave rise” (109), Babbage envisions the boundless spatial and 
temporal ramifications of these atmospheric undulations: 
 Thus considered, what a strange chaos is this wide atmosphere we breathe! Every 
 atom, impressed with good and with ill, retains at once the motions which 
 philosophers and sages have imparted to it, mixed and combined in ten thousand 
 ways with all that is worthless and base. The air itself is one vast library, on 
 whose pages are for ever written all that man has ever said or woman whispered. 
 There, in their mutable but unerring characters, mixed with the earliest, as well as 
 with the latest sighs of mortality, stand for ever recorded, vows unredeemed, 
 promises unfulfilled, perpetuating in the united movements of each particle, the 
 testimony of man's changeful will. But if the air we breathe is the never-failing 
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 historian of the sentiments we have uttered, earth, air, and ocean, are the eternal 
 witnesses of the acts we have done. (111-112, emphasis added) 
The contrast here with Holmes’ “Cacoethes Scribendi” is striking: rather than a “natural 
world” that has been pulped for the writing materials required to satisfy an excessive 
human desire to write, Babbage’s world is itself tirelessly engaged in interminable acts of 
composition (the majority of these unfolding beneath the threshold of our perception). 
The globe is not a blank surface placed, to its detriment, under the knife of inscription. 
Instead, this world is endlessly expressive, always writing and being written. The sea 
would hardly need to be “changed to ink,” as Holmes imagines, once one realizes that 
“the ripple on the ocean's surface caused by a gentle breeze, or the still water which 
marks the more immediate track of a ponderous vessel gliding with scarcely expanded 
sails over its bosom, are equally indelible” (Babbage 114). Water, the image of traceless 
writing in the Phaedrus and in Derrida’s model of dissemination, is here recognized as an 
exemplary inscriptive surface, one that visually exhibits the invisible processes of action 
and reaction within our atmosphere.  The air as well is thick with writing: a “vast library” 
that recalls Borges’ dizzying archival fantasy. The density of this ethereal registry 
accumulates constantly because everything we do is a form of writing. Careless words 
and fleeting gestures are no less “indelible” than our most deliberate attempts at self-
expression; the earth bears “enduring testimony” (115) to both with equal diligence. 
Doubtless some forms of inscription are more readily accessible to our understanding 
than others, but it was the task of nineteenth-century science to radically expand the 
margins of the legible world.  
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 It is this discursive revolution, I argue, that brought about a new indexical 
understanding of the relations between subjects and writing. Commenting on Renfield’s 
graphomania in his reading of Stoker’s Dracula, Mark Seltzer argues that: “maladies of 
energy, motive and agency were in effect understood, around 1900, as maladies of 
mimesis, representation, and writing” (Serial 74). In what follows, I explore the machines 
responsible for facilitating such improbable conversions of physiological and psychical 
activity into graphical information.  
 
Étienne-Jules Marey and the Language of Phenomena Themselves 
The Victorian period’s shifting discursive paradigm was signaled by the arrival of a “new 
species” of scientific measuring and recording instruments that, beginning around 1800, 
found their way into “the cabinets of natural philosophers, betokened by a new semantic 
marker” (Brain, 159). Designated as writing or drawing instruments by the suffix “-
graph,” these machines elevated writing as the privileged means of collecting objective 
information about the natural world, and they were intended to produce that writing 
automatically. Because they were neither apprehended “by eye,” nor inscribed “by hand,” 
these mechanically produced transcriptions possessed the sheen of objectivity.10 
Ironically, we could trust them chiefly because we had no hand in them. 
We find the clearest expression of the association between mechanical process 
and the emergent epistemological ideal of scientific objectivity in Étienne-Jules Marey’s 
La méthode graphique (1874). Marey’s studies of animal movement led to his 
development of a wide array of physiographic instruments capable of recording minute 
measurements of delicate and complex physical gestures. The “graphical method” 
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required a host of different technologies (many of them invented by Marey himself), but 
each technique was premised upon the replacement of human perception with mechanical 
observation, and consequently upon the substitution of human notation systems with 
“unmediated” transcription. Marey identified two principal hindrances to the 
development of the empirical sciences: “first, the defectiveness of our senses for 
discovering the truth, and, second, the inadequacy of language to express and transmit 
those truths that we have acquired” (i, all translations by the author). As machines for 
both input and output, bodies were not only inadequate (malfunctioning after a certain 
threshold of speed or volume had been crossed), but fundamentally untrustworthy 
(tending to distort results with their own inclinations and idiosyncrasies). For these 
reasons, Marey was fervently confident about the possibilities of this supersession of the 
observer’s responsibilities, marveling that: “When the eye can no longer see, the ear 
cannot hear, and touch cannot feel, or even when our senses deceive us, these machines 
perform like new senses with astonishing precision” (108). In Marey’s technological 
vision, the body is overridden rather than upgraded. Imaginatively disabled, its senses are 
switched off one by one as they are pressed to their limits. The role of these machines, for 
Marey, appears to be less supplementary than substitutive. It is better that the eye cannot 
see and the ear cannot hear, for this blind and deaf subject does less to interpose its own 
habits of perception. 
Marey advises scientists to “keep for other needs the insinuations of eloquence 
and the flowers of language” (vi). For the purposes of scientific observation, only a hard 
and unflinching mechanical fidelity will serve, one that strips away the conventions of 
language and its symbolic embellishments. Marey’s machines translate “with a clarity 
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that language does not possess” (i) because their inscriptions exchange literary figures for 
those of the human body; they “trace the curves of phenomena” alone (vi). This assertion 
underwrites one of the nineteenth century’s most beguiling fantasies of communication: 
that the turn to graphical notation charted an escape from the artificial and arbitrary 
nature of human language and brokered direct commerce, through an unerring fidelity to 
bodies, with the world it described. Specifically, we find in Marey’s disavowal of “the 
flowers of language” a desire to institute a new species of writing, one through which it 
finally becomes possible to distinguish the literal from the literary, or figurative.  
Other physiologists proposed that the language of science, rather than standing in 
opposition to figural expression, promised its sublation. It occurred to Francis Galton that 
“poetical metaphors of ordinary language suggest many possibilities of measurement” 
(“Measurement” 184). Noting that two people who have “an ‘inclination’ to one another” 
tend to physically “incline or slope together when sitting side by side,” he imagines 
hosting a dinner party where his guests’ chairs have been rigged with hidden weights and 
pressure gauges that would determine the exact degrees of their preferences regarding 
each other (184). Popular expression is littered with dead metaphors that Galton was 
convinced science could revive. Through careful empirical study, he believed, the 
intuitive but indistinct truths encoded within language could be translated into genuinely 
useful information. Nineteenth-century physiology was driven by this desire to 
systematically dislodge the “scare quotes” that blocked language’s access to the 
phenomena it struggled to describe. This distance was bridged through writing that was 
not linguistic in nature, but graphically replicated the body’s own idiom. 
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For many of the inventors and proponents of these machines, it would seem, these 
inscriptions did not constitute a language at all. For instance, in “Some Account of the 
Art of Photogenic Drawing,” presented to the Royal Society in 1839, William H. Fox 
Talbot describes his photograph of Lacock Abbey in such terms: “this building I believe 
to be the first that was ever yet known to have drawn its own picture” (46). Similarly, in 
Edison’s comparison of his phonograph’s wax cylinders with the cuneiform characters of 
Babylonian cylinders, he marks “the great and progressive difference that our wax 
cylinders speak for themselves, and will not have to wait centuries to be deciphered” 
(“Perfected Phonograph” 645). Of interest here is Edison’s trust that the machine will 
keep running and be conversant with future machines and parts, but more fundamentally, 
this confidence that such writings “speak for themselves.” Edison imagines these signs as 
transculturally and transhistorically legible, demonstrating his inability to recognize these 
markings as cultural. These cylinders will not fall prey to a future of mistranslation, 
because the universal orality to which they grant expression circumvents interpretation 
and translation (whether on the linguistic register or the conceptual). 
We recognize in Marey’s writings as well this faith in the machine’s ability to 
transcribe “natural graphics” (Méthode iv), markings that would serve as a lingua franca 
of science. These machines underpin the conviction, identified by Foucault as a 
quintessentially nineteenth-century belief, “that mute gestures, that illnesses, that all the 
tumult around us can also speak” (“Nietzsche, Freud, Marx” 270). “More than ever,” 
Foucault argues, “we are listening in on all this possible language, trying to intercept, 
beneath the words, a discourse that would be more essential” (270). For Marey, the key to 
unlocking this essential discourse lies in apprehending “the language of the phenomena 
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themselves” (Méthode iii). Drawing their focus upon the langue inconnue of involuntarily 
expressive human bodies, Marey’s machines show us for the first time “languages issuing 
from matter, automatized bodies writing themselves” (Seltzer 74). The remarkably 
sympathetic ear of the machine does not presume to speak on behalf of bodies, but simply 
channels the langue inconnue, or ‘unknown language’ of the body (Mouvement 24). 
These bodies had been communicating with us all along, but it took the correct machine 
to recognize this fact.   
Aided by their new amanuenses, a host of phenomena acquired a surprising 
coherence. If the phonograph suggested speech was merely a name for writing yet to find 
a properly receptive surface, photography would imply that light had simply to fall upon 
the correct materials to be recognized as writing. With the aid of these instruments, it was 
as if the sensual world had come suddenly into focus. In this graphomaniacal view, the 
world was always and everywhere inscribing itself upon itself. And writing-instruments 
provided the lens that gathered these disparate phenomena, the pinhole through which 
each had to pass in order to gain definition (that is, both ‘focus’ and ‘meaning’). In turn, 
the “graph” metamorphosed and expanded the capacities of writing, attuning it to the 
spectrum of what François Dagognet, in his superb study of Marey’s life-work, refers to 
as “nature’s own expression” (63).  
 This attribution of ownership—and even the agency of authorship—to the closed 
conversation between nature and machine was a crucial step in establishing the 
authenticity and objectivity of these writings. The evidential and forensic values of such 
inscriptions hinged upon the eradication of human interference. Laying out his principles 
of experimental procedure, Marey insists that: “it is of immense importance that graphic 
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records should be automatically registered, in order that the phenomenon should give on 
paper its own record of duration, and of the moment of production” (Mouvement 3, 
emphasis added).  
The familiar proposition that graphing instruments “spoke for themselves” 
appealed to a culture already saturated with writing by reasoning that the proliferation of 
signs need not be accompanied by the burden of interpretation. This “writing that reads 
itself” presents us with an intriguing paradox: media that aspire to immediacy. If this is a 
contradiction in terms, it is one that names an enduring modern dilemma. How does one 
exercise the deliberate and conscious act of writing in service of spontaneous and unself-
conscious expression? Most broadly, the question has to do with how is it that we might 
recuperate a lost immediacy by bypassing the conventions of representation. The 
graphical method stands as one of the most sophisticated attempts to grapple with this 
quandary, attempting to short-circuit the conventions of representation, to silence 
language with writing, to transliterate figures of speech into those of the body. 
The rhetoric of automaticity always promises that complexity must be borne in 
the ultimate service of simplicity. It frames technology not as the proliferation of 
machines, but the subtraction of the inessential (whether this be achieved by means of 
delegation or eradication of function). The suspension of mental faculties in particular 
promises to bring about a reconciliation: the creation of a mirror that allows for reflection 
without prompting self-consciousness and the consequent doubling effect or splitting of 
this awareness. This is possible only when it is the mirror that looks at you, not the other 
way around. Such a machine eliminates the feedback of self-consciousness by 
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circumventing the self, demoting the agent of self-inspection to a passive operator of 
machinery.  
 Sorting through the automatic recording instruments employed by “mechanically 
objective” scientific inquiry in the nineteenth century, Daston and Galison argue that 
“these new methods aimed at automatism” (42). The fallible examiner’s deference to the 
automatic functioning of machinery was an essential step in the renunciation and 
“policing of subjectivity” (Daston 161, 147) demanded within properly objective science. 
However, if the rhetoric of the graphical method espoused a (highly paradoxical) 
“disciplined automaticity” (Daston 185) in the body of the examiner, it also incited and 
gave explicit representation to the automatic behaviours of bodies under examination. On 
the side of the examiner, then, these machines embodied a “passionate commitment to 
suppress the will” (Daston 143). On that of the examined, they offered a rather different 
picture of the subject’s “freedom from will” (Daston 123), one characterized by maniacal 
bodily excess rather than methodical mental discipline. 
 The graphical method advocates the benign abdication of human judgment to 
mechanical registration. Guided by the “negative ideal” (Daston 123) of nonintervention, 
this mechanical practice is intended to subtract the distorting lens of subjective reality 
from the hard kernel of objective truth. The Victorian graphomaniac complicates the 
conservative logic of this negative ideal, asserting the productive capacity of automatic 
writing. The methodical examiner exemplifies the neutralization of subjectivity under the 
conditions of machinery, while the graphomaniac embodies the production of a new 
subject. One figure employs machinery to grapple with the persistent problems of 
“subjectified” objectivity; the other grants involuntary expression to what Richard Menke 
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has named “objectified subjectivity” (137). Automatic writing machines that incite and 
cite the automatic operations of the body broker this exposure and estrangement of the 
self from itself.  
 The semiotic register of this automatic writing is the index, with its promise of 
perfect fidelity resulting from direct commerce with natural phenomena. Charles Sanders 
Peirce contends that indices “direct the attention to their objects by blind compulsion,” a 
phrase that captures the subtle, yet insistent theme of his index: that of force without 
understanding. In fact, it is difficult to find instances where Peirce’s consideration of 
indices does not prompt him to use the term “force.”11 Acting under this influence, the 
index exhibits a kind of involuntary fidelity, “forced by blind fact to correspond to its 
object” (“Telepathy” 373). These indexical signs are not expressive, but impressive. That 
is, their communicative power is derived from their susceptibility to impressions. The 
footprint endows the ground with no special powers of eloquence. The object has 
stomped on our representamen, and this surface’s legibility is the direct result of its 
vulnerability. Or, if that is too leading, its malleability—the capacity “of being really 
affected by that Object” (“Nomenclature” 291). Crucially, for Peirce, “it is not the mere 
resemblance of its Object, even in these respects which makes it a sign, but it is the actual 
modification of it by the Object” (“Valencies” 143). The index is vulnerable to the object, 
and yields involuntarily to its whim. It is this vulnerability that will be exploited by a 
Victorian scriptural economy that recruits the human body as the involuntary index of the 
individual hidden within. 
     
The Victorian Scriptural Economy: Subjects and Characters 
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Operating under the logic of the index’s neutral receptivity, these mechanisms of 
transcription and conscription underwrite a new scriptural economy. Its central rhetorical 
or ideological innovation is the reasoning that the stigmata they “register” are not 
imposed upon the subject from outside, but expressed from within. These inscriptions, 
apprehended by graphological techniques and technologies, were understood to express 
an indexical and transparent relation between objective, written characters and the 
internal “character” of subjects. This understanding of the Victorian “scriptural 
economy” is adapted from The Practice of Everyday Life, wherein Michel de Certeau 
provides an account of the intersection between bodies and the Law in modern Western 
culture that in turn recalls Nietzsche’s mnemotechnics.12 From Nietzsche, de Certeau also 
inherits his empathy for the flesh that has been tortured into conformity with the Law, 
and it is this concern that prompts his (speculative) act of remembrance. Nietzsche’s 
Genealogy of Morals anticipates the eradication of “bad conscience” cultivated through 
suffering, but glances over its shoulder with a shudder. How is it that this forgetful beast 
was brought to account, reformed as a responsible individual?  Nietzsche assures us: “the 
answers and methods for solving this primeval problem were not precisely gentle; 
perhaps indeed there was nothing more fearful and uncanny in the whole prehistory of 
man than his mnemotechnics” (61, emphasis original). If this statement seems to possess 
a hyperbolic ring to it, this sense is no doubt owing to the assumption that devices to aid 
the memory are benign. We do not flinch at the string tied round an index finger, failing 
to recall the long history of this binding of the body. We have long since forgotten what it 
means to remember.  
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This “fearful and uncanny” aspect of remembering, as evoked by Nietzsche, is the 
toll it has taken upon the bodies that have borne, or buckled under, its weight:  
Man could never do without blood, torture, and sacrifices when he felt the need to 
create a memory for himself; the most dreadful sacrifices and pledges (sacrifices 
of the first-born among them), the most repulsive mutilations (castration, for 
example), the cruelest rites of all the religious cults (and all religions are at the 
deepest level systems of cruelties)—all this has its origin in the instinct that 
realized that pain is the most powerful aid to mnemonics. (Genealogy 61) 
It is this archaic—and largely forgotten—primal textuality, where wounds upon the 
surface of the body were the seal of sovereign violence carved into the parchment, that is 
unearthed within de Certeau’s analysis. “Every power,” he insists, “including the power 
of law, is written first of all on the backs of its subjects” (140). At present there may seem 
to be nothing but a neutral, white, unresisting space, devoid of history; de Certeau 
provides a palimpsest of the law, the translucence of which brings to light the force that 
underwrites written law. Modern states have replaced wounding with writing, markings 
that encourage us to imagine ourselves as subjects of the law, not just subject to its 
dictates. But these books, de Certeau reminds us, “are only metaphors of the body” (140).  
Their ‘civility’ is a provisional luxury. The human parchment we find beneath this 
screen, or ‘cover-story,’ is not only the embodiment of textual history, but also its 
present-day basis. Times of crisis tend very quickly to convince the law of the 
fundamental inadequacy of rules made of paper, and so “it writes itself again on the 
bodies themselves” (140). Of course, it is only in extraordinary cases that modern society 
permits the law to assert itself through explicit marking of bodies.   
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In the “practice of everyday life,” then, what is it that renders this wounding 
painless and unrecognizable, thus making necessary de Certeau’s critical act of 
transliteration?  To begin with (invoking Marx and Althusser), we have been numbed. 
These markings are administered with the “anesthetic” of an ideological “significance” 
that dulls the pain by offering the consolation of meaning. “From birth to mourning after 
death,” bodies are never subjected to senseless suffering. “Through all sorts of initiations 
(in rituals, at school, etc.), it [the law] transforms them into tables of the law, into living 
tableaux of rules and customs, into actors in the drama organized by a social order” (de 
Certeau 139). De Certeau’s schema emphasizes the multiplicity of forms and rhetorics 
employed in everyday acts of cultural inscription. “The law” is not a monolithic, 
oppressive inscriptive device, imposing foreign names from outside and above and 
issuing directives that one can either obey or ignore at one’s peril. Rather, it writes a 
language we participate within, our flesh giving substance to the law, as the law in turn 
grants significance to our newly constituted “bodies.” 
Readings of cultural inscription that ignore this complicity advance “repressive 
hypotheses” concerning the Victorian state, an approach that finds its most incisive 
critique in Lauren M. E. Goodlad’s Victorian Literature and the Victorian State (2003). 
Goodlad marks a distinction between the genealogical project undertaken in Foucault’s 
early work on disciplinary institutions and the concept of “governmentality”—or the 
organized production of governable subjects—that organizes later texts. It is Goodlad’s 
contention that Foucault’s latter, relatively unexplored notion is pertinent to the 
Victorianist, while the former only interposes a “distorting lens through which to peer at 
the modernization of Britain’s idiosyncratic, self-consciously liberal, decentralized, and 
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‘self-governing’ society” (7-8). These distinctively British traits ought to complicate any 
attempt to directly transpose Foucault’s insights into the context of nineteenth-century 
Victorian culture. In Goodlad’s estimation, “we have yet to fully document the 
differences between the disciplinary subject of Foucault’s Franco-oriented and presentist 
genealogy, and the modes of character idealized by and produced in Britain’s self-
consciously liberal society over the course of the nineteenth century” (x).  
Goodlad’s designation of Victorian Britain as a “liberal society” is chiefly 
intended to communicate the culture’s general “antipathy toward statist interference” 
(viii). The reach of centralized government, many prominent Victorians believed, must be 
curtailed if England was “to preserve the ‘self-governing’ liberties of individuals and 
local communities” (vii-viii). Alongside this negative conception of freedom, however, 
Goodlad asserts that Victorian liberalism was driven by a “positive” (and in many ways 
contradictory) “impulse to build character and promote social betterment by collective 
means” (viii). Goodlad’s book provides one of the most comprehensive critical studies of 
this uniquely Victorian concern with the formation of “character,” a term that enframes 
individuation within a distinctly moral understanding. The prescriptive value of 
Goodlad’s opening chapter, “Beyond the Panopticon”—particularly its call for a more 
careful historicizing of Victorian criticism’s longstanding dialogue with Foucault—is 
attested to by the exemplary demonstration of method that follows: a critical reading of 
Victorian “pastorship” as a political configuration of governmentality.13  
Along with Andrea Henderson’s Romantic Identities (1996) and, in an earlier 
historical context, Diedre Shauna Lynch’s The Economy of Character (1998), Goodlad’s 
study has emerged as one of the most discerning recent historical analyses of character, 
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though I would temper her contention that “in its liberal meanings character was the 
antithesis of Foucault’s disciplinary individual” (24). Rather than substituting one critical 
term for another, I would argue, the concept of character affords us an opportunity to 
rethink discipline in light of Foucault’s later work on governmentality. Governmentality 
eschews centralized regimes of discipline, favouring instead personal techniques of self-
discipline. This strategic relocation of the ostensible locus of control corresponds to what 
David Wayne Thomas has identified as Victorian “liberalism’s distinctive commitment to 
rational autonomy” (ix). The Victorian pursuit of character formation was typically 
couched in terms of self-governance and self-improvement, strategies that Foucault 
would come to name “technologies of the self” in his later work.14 In a 1982 seminar that 
borrows its title from this concept, Foucault identifies the “meticulous concern” of self-
writing as a new experience of the self, wherein “introspection becomes more and more 
detailed” (28). Through this activity, a “relation developed between writing and 
vigilance. Attention was paid to nuances of life, mood, and reading, and the experience of 
oneself was intensified and widened by virtue of this act of writing” (28). This dutiful 
recording of the self makes the journal a model of self-surveillance; governmental 
structures delegate to their subjects the tasks of observation and discipline, closing down 
the impersonal panopticon and opening up the personal diary.   
 Insofar as it orients itself towards the ideal of the autonomous individual, the 
Victorian scriptural economy rejects the overtly oppressive connotations of the Old 
French “caractere” (derived from the Greek word for ‘stamping tool’). This stamping tool 
is the heraldic device of Foucault’s earlier genealogical project, the task of which is: “to 
expose a body totally imprinted by history and the process of history’s destruction of the 
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body” (“Nietzsche” 367). Foucault’s turn to individual (and individualizing) practices of 
self-writing complicates this central preoccupation with inscription, signaling a deeper 
recognition of the reflexive and ambivalent relations between writing, subjectivity and 
power.     
 A key figure in the history of this convergence, the graphomaniac pinpoints two 
basic premises of the Victorian rhetoric concerning “character.” The first of these arises 
from the conviction that not all individuals possess character. The pursuit of this elusive 
and distinctive mark of “rational autonomy” required subjects to first identify and 
apprehend the irrational automatisms of the self. For many, it seemed the forces of 
culture were diametrically opposed to this project of independent character-building. 
John Stuart Mill’s enduring preoccupation with character throughout On Liberty affords a 
representative Victorian articulation of the selective nature of this coveted designation: 
“A person whose desires and impulses are his own—are the expression of his own 
nature—is said to have a character. One whose desires and impulses are not his own, has 
no character, no more than a steam-engine has a character” (77).15 The mechanical nature 
of Mill’s “steam-engine” image is typical of a period wherein machinery served as a 
compelling metaphor for the cultural forces that compromised the individual’s self-
assertion.   
 The second, and more peculiar premise of Victorian character follows from the 
widespread belief that, not only is there “character—or the want of it—in everything, 
animate or inanimate” (Weston 64), but that this character takes on literal and legible 
forms that render as external, objective signs the private truths of the individual. The 
conjectural correspondences between graphological and moral character that are the focus 
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of this study find expression in texts such as Curiosities of Literature, where Isaac 
Disraeli decries the plight of handwriting instruction within Victorian schools, 
complaining that the pen is “regulated […] now too often by a mechanical process, which 
the present race of writing-masters seem to have contrived for their own convenience.” 
Students “are forced in their automatic motions, as if acted on by the pressure of a steam-
engine,” a process that quashes the distinctive personality of signatures, so that they “all 
[appear] to have come from the same rolling-press” (207). Such studies of manifest 
character present the signature as a conflicted sign of enculturation, indexing the 
automatisms of culture as well as the autonomous gestures of the individual. Moreover, 
the belief that this struggle could be objectively rendered on the surface of the page 
through the involuntary but indelible traces of bodily gesture, meant individual 
“character” was outwardly legible, and thus accountable, to others. If the Victorians 
understood character to be a personal quality, it was also a publicly visible trait that 
indexed one’s interior for any who could read the signs. 
 In an 1884 article on the “Measurement of Character” written for the Fortnightly 
Review, Francis Galton explores the epistemological consequences of this emergent 
belief in the objective reality of character: “the character which shapes our conduct is a 
definite and durable ‘something,’” he argues, “and therefore […] it is reasonable to 
attempt to measure it” (181). The range of characterological projects inspired by the 
premise of manifest character were dependent not upon programmes of repressive 
inscription, but on physiologically-directed incitements to discourse. Provoking the 
langue inconnue of individuals, they sought to instigate the automatic reflexes of the 
body, rather than initiate conversations with subjects.  
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The late Victorian scriptural economy ventures the wholesale registration of 
bodies (from Galton’s composite photography to the Society for Psychical Research’s 
experiments with weighing and measuring spiritual manifestations), but does so under the 
aegis of a widespread technological “discovery” that writing emanates from things 
themselves (and constitutes a solicitation to be read). By contrast with the intrusive model 
of inscription outlined with social construction, this law depends fundamentally upon the 
activity of bodies: the subject spells out her own sentence, and the law merely takes 
dictation. Proper interpretation is no longer the responsibility of a subject who must learn 
the letter of the law. Nature, we now realize, has been writing all along, and it is the duty 
of the law (or culture) simply to passively record, listen, and strive to faithfully interpret 
what has been laid down.   
In this manner, the madness of graphical method is displaced onto its necessary 
corollary—the figure of the graphomaniac, whose body cannot help but write. We find a 
striking representation of this logic of self-registration in The Criminal, Havelock Ellis’ 
1890 study of criminal anthropology and physiognomy.16 Ellis was responsible for 
introducing the work of Lombroso to a wider English audience through his translation of 
L'uomo di genio in rapporto alla psichiatria (1889; Eng. Trans. The Man of 
Genius, 1891), and the content of The Criminal borrows much from Lombroso’s L'uomo 
delinquente (1876) and Palimsesti del Carcere (1888). The work devotes a handful of 
chapters to the semiotic and aesthetic productions of criminal culture: specimens of 
criminal slang, philosophy, literature, and pictorial art are examined for their 
psychological and forensic significance. Ellis’ chapter on prison inscriptions benefits 
from the specimens compiled within Lombroso’s study, as well as British research 
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documented within Michael Davitt’s Leaves From a Prison Diary (1885), and John 
William Horsley’s Jottings From Jail: Notes and Papers on Prison Matters (1886). In 
each of these sources, criminal “character” consistently finds objective reality through 
impulsive graphical expression. 
Ellis’ own examination of prison inscriptions does not set out to mark certain 
bodies as different, but merely to remark upon how they inscribe themselves into the 
system. It is the subject and not the law that has revived primitive techniques of writing 
on the body. Observing that the “child loves to speak to himself,” Ellis notes that “the 
negro, and especially the negress, think aloud; and if from restraint or distrust the 
criminal keeps silent his most private thoughts, he feels himself compelled to fix them 
wherever he may find himself, on the walls of his prison, or on the books that are lent to 
him” (Criminal 212). A thoroughly familiar Victorian condensation of various 
unresolved bodies, this amalgam combines child, negro, and criminal together in their 
shared tendency to automatically submit themselves for inspection. Ellis recognizes that 
the impulse to write in experiences of extended seclusion “is an instinct from which no 
individual, no matter what his degree of culture, is exempt” (211), but proposes as a 
general rule that “the lower the order of culture the more complete and trustworthy is the 
inscription as an expression of individual peculiarities” (212).  
 Along these lines, Lombroso discovers an atavistic throwback to the tribal 
warrior’s hieroglyphic tradition in the modern criminal’s tendency to commemorate his 
crimes through bodily adornment. Observing that the “tattooing on pederasts usually 
consists of portraits of those with whom they have had unnatural commerce, or phrases of 
an affectionate nature addressed to them,” Lombroso notes as well a man convicted of 
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rape who “was covered with pictorial representations of his obscene adventures” 
(Criminal 232). Of course, such fortuitous discoveries were dependent upon the 
criminal’s decision to represent the scene of the crime through declarations and 
portraiture engraved upon his body. Text and image render the body a cryptic, yet 
decipherable site of confession. These tales of criminal transparency, more anecdotal than 
statistical, represent a relatively small number of cases. Their mention within Criminal 
Man evinces a desire on the part of the examiner that the criminal’s own body would bear 
witness to the crime, an early apprehension of the body as a textual archive of traumatic 
events. For Ellis, tattooing was an innately “impulsive” act; even the painful nature of 
these inscriptions was not enough to bring the criminal to his senses (Criminal 200). 
Lombroso as well would have us believe this was a natural tendency: those who commit 
the vilest of crimes must also commit them to writing. 
 The uncultured hold nothing back: the repression of instinct is a special 
prerogative of properly socialized persons. The fact that Ellis and Lombroso pinpoint 
members of their society with the least agency impels us to note the way in which the 
statement pathologizes expression, while normalizing silence for these bodies. This 
essential context of disenfranchisement is significantly absent from the scope of The 
Criminal’s analysis; in Ellis’ narrative, the prison cell is considered less as a site of 
repression than one of expression.17 In the seclusion of this room, the criminal “writes 
what he cannot or dare not say” (120). 
In the criminal’s makeshift “studio,” where he suddenly finds the time and space 
to communicate his true self, everything comes to the surface: “His desires and lusts, his 
aspirations, his coarse satires and imprecations, his bitter reflections, his judgments of 
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life, are all recorded in these prison inscriptions on whitewashed walls, cell doors, 
margins of books, tin knives, and the bottoms of skilly cans and dinner tins” (213). 
Through his incessant writing, the prisoner collaborates in his own surveillance. The 
carceral gaze extends to incorporate the practice of reading, exploiting not only the 
enforced physical visibility of the cell, but an interior gaze that accesses truths of the 
subject, beyond apprehending any explicitly criminal action. Ellis’ inventory of writing 
surfaces displays the increasing ingenuity (framed as perversity) in the criminal’s 
understanding of what can be modified as text when one lacks any proper avenue for 
expression. Horsley reports that cacoethes scribendi is thankfully rare among artisans, 
labourers, and women, but “the males of the lower middle class who are unfortunately (in 
this respect, at any rate) a very numerous, ubiquitous, and irrepressible body” (Jottings 
20). The dissemination of these criminal inscriptions demonstrate the impossibility of 
ever truly confining the criminal, who remains heedless of the state’s benevolent attempts 
to inculcate restraint, the civilized art of keeping things bottled up.18 
Of course, one could answer that the criminologist displays a similar ingenuity in 
interpreting these acts, upturning dinner plates and poring over walls, assigning value to 
them as texts worthy of study. This expansion of the scope of culturally significant 
writing pushes inscription beyond the bounds of “authorized” works (where 
consciousness, mastery, order, and deliberation are defining characteristics), into 
unauthorized texts (unconscious and graphomaniacal). Graphomania named writing that 
could not be counted as ‘culture’ in the most exclusive sense of the term. It instead called 
for different criteria, new methodologies of reading, and innovative techniques of literary 
police-work.  
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Perhaps the most charged site of graphic ingenuity and perversity was the body 
itself, and though Ellis’ commentary concerning the encounter between the ethnographer 
and his tattooed subjects is brief, it is highly suggestive. “The men,” he tells us, “always 
seemed rather ashamed of being tattooed, and wondered why the professor wished to 
study ‘these stupidities’” (Criminal 200). This snapshot captures, without quite 
deciphering, the enigmatic and disconcerting force of the examiner’s desire. Confronted 
with this unsolicited and unaccountable enthusiasm and attention their bodies have 
attracted, these men suddenly find themselves embarrassed by their own skin. To what 
can we ascribe the surprising modesty of these sailors and prison inmates?  
What is it that has been laid bare here?  If the tattooed subject suddenly finds 
himself searching about for a fig leaf, it is not his body that he seeks to conceal. In the 
professor’s attentive gaze, we find a desire for “naked” writing, caught unawares. A 
voyeur at the periphery of the scene of writing, she steals a glance at writing that does not 
know it is being read. (The professor, outside the criminal networks or heterosexual 
exchanges for which these signs were the intended audience, intercepts the signal.)  The 
dismissal of these markings as “stupidities” signals an attempt to render these bodily 
inscriptions insignificant, to resist the sense of the examiner. But these marks are 
indelible, and there is no possibility of retraction or revision. The sailor’s anchor has been 
anchored in his flesh; writing and the body are bound to each other. And this is what 
excites the professor: neither writing nor flesh in themselves, but the scene of their 
entanglement—a zone of indistinction between flesh and writing, nature and culture. The 
professor is interested in something more than writing, though to the subject under 
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examination it feels like something less: writing that he cannot help, and that cannot help 
him. 
“Graphomania” characterizes the exhaustive project of the Victorian scriptural 
economy to render all surfaces legible. The central proposition of this epistemological 
fantasy is the concept of “bare writing,” produced by the irrepressible signifying practices 
of the body. The lure of Marey’s langue inconnue, it would seem, was not simply the 
promise of a language that had heretofore eluded our attention, but a language that 
remained fundamentally unknown to itself. The thought of such guileless and unequivocal 
writing would have been irresistible to a culture at once enthralled by the expanding 
empire of signs, yet daunted by the operations of deliberation, distance, and deferral that 
threatened an endless proliferation of writing.   
 Over the course of the next three chapters, I turn to the Gothic as an exceptional 
archive of deviant and criminal subjects whose difference is increasingly understood in 
graphical terms. If the graphical method normalizes the process of the subject’s 
objectification and entrusts the law to economize the erratic expressions of bodies, gothic 
fiction observes such operations from a distinctly paranoid and resistant position.  
 
                                                
1 The second edition of Nordau’s German text was translated into English by D. Appleton 
of New York in 1895. 
 
2 After reading Darwin, Bénédict Augustine Morel formulates the theory of 
“degeneration” in his second edition of Traité des maladies mentales (1860), though his 
ideas are equally dependent on pre-Darwinian theories of evolution such as Lamarck’s.  
 
3 This argument had been proposed in Henry Maudsley’s Body and Will (1883), where he 
cautioned: “Survival of the fittest does not mean always survival of the best in the sense 
of the highest organism; it means only the survival of that which is best suited to the 
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circumstances […] in which it is placed – the survival of a savage in a savage social 
medium, of a rogue among rogues, of a parasite where only a parasite can live” (237). 
 
4 See, for instance, Hutton 2.  
 
5 Clyde Partin notes that while “no specific reference to petit papier can be found in 
Charcot’s works,” the diagnosis “was probably transmitted via an oral tradition in his 
famous Tuesday Lessons.” Partin traces the idea to Charcot’s student Henry Meige, who 
describes a patient in his Le Juif Errant a la Salpetriere (1893) thusly: “In a voluminous 
batch of filthy scraps of papers that never leaves him, he shows us prescriptions from all 
the universities of Europe and signed by the most illustrious names.” 
 
6 On the dilation and escalation of reading practices, and the “democracy of print” that 
followed a widespread growth in literacy within Victorian culture, see Altick. On the 
early nineteenth-century construction of “bibliomania,” see Connell.   
 
7 Holmes’s title references the seventh of Juvenal’s Satires: “An incurable itch for 
scribbling [cacoethes scribendi] takes possession of many, and grows inveterate in their 
insane breast.” In 1932, W.H. Auden’s peculiar essay “Writing” would borrow Holmes’ 
imagery to complain that, “More and more books are written by more and more people, 
most of them with little or no talent. Forests are cut down, rivers of ink absorbed, but the 
lust to write is still unsatisfied . . . If it were only a question of writing it wouldn't matter; 
but it is an index of our health. It's not only books, but our lives, that are going to pot” 
(Auden 312). 
 
8 For a similarly self-deprecating work from the field of literature, see Ireland’s 
Scribbleomania; or, The Printer’s Devil’s Polichronicon, A Sublime Poem (1815). 
 
9 For an earlier critique of Nordau proceeding along the same lines as Shaw’s, see George 
Saintsbury’s 1895 review of Degeneration’s English translation in The Bookman. 
 
10 On the rise of mechanical objectivity as a scientific virtue, see Daston and Galison. 
 
11 Indices also communicate their message with the qualities of a physical force. Often, 
bodies are called in to demonstrate the way in which this sign finds its strength not in the 
nuances of speech but the power of bodies—the pointing finger, the stomping foot, the 
exclamatory human figure. 
 
12 “The Scriptural Economy,” 131-153. 
 
13 For Foucault’s reading of “pastoral power,” see “The Subject and Power” 332-336. 
 
14 For a recent critical account of the Victorian project of self-improvement, see Miller, 
The Burdens of Perfection. 
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15 For a broader consideration of the significance of character for Mill and his 
contemporaries, see Collini. 
 
16 The Criminal was featured in an extremely successful Contemporary Science Series. 
Edited by Ellis, these books were “intended principally for the intelligent layman” 
(Grosskurth 114). Ellis also contributed Man and Woman to the series in 1894. 
 
17 Structural causes are not wholly absent from Ellis’ study. Ellis cites Quetelet’s quip 
that “society prepares criminals,” while “the criminal is the instrument that executes 
them” (24). However, as his title suggests, Ellis looks first to the individual, and the chief 
interest of his research is the “anatomical, physiological, and psychological nature” of the 
criminal type (25). 
 
18 On the problem of discursive restraint and containment, see Stewart’s Crimes of 
Writing.  
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2 
Unauthorized Autobiographies:  
Reading and Writing by Hand in Stevenson’s Strange Case 
 
“Nothing now is done directly, or by hand.”  
(Carlyle, “Signs of the Times” 64) 
 
“la main se mène”1  
(Nordau, Degeneration 65) 
 
“my heart sinks and my hand trembles”  
(Stevenson, The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde 70) 
 
In his first installment on automatic writing for 1884’s Proceedings of the Society for 
Psychical Research, Frederic W.H. Myers pointed to handwriting as “a kind of summary 
expression of man’s being” (“Telepathic” 222). This information was never Myers’ 
primary interest; his experiments with automatic writing were chiefly intended to uncover 
evidence of the survival of consciousness after death. But while the spiritualist mediums 
he examined were reaching outward, straining to capture transmissions from beyond the 
grave, Myers detected their bodies were drawing upon something else, gathered from 
deep within. Their distracted handwriting provided an involuntary subtext that disclosed 
the subterranean struggles of the writer. Myers believed that the act of handwriting was 
“one of the best instances of an aptitude at once acquired and hereditary: of a manual 
dexterity which obeys limitations of idiosyncrasy as well as of will” (222). Writing gave 
objective expression to such internal conflicts among the individual, her ingrained habits 
and inherited tendencies. Laid open and exposed on the surface of the page, handwriting 
was nonetheless “a deep-seated thing,” and thus “likely to have secrets to tell us” (222).  
 Myers’ letters to Robert Louis Stevenson following the publication of The 
Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde reveal that the two had differing opinions on the 
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strict mechanics of such correspondences between self and script, but the plotting of 
Stevenson’s romance makes it abundantly clear that he too felt handwriting had “secrets 
to tell.” If Jekyll’s astonishing metamorphosis from staid gentleman to monstrous fiend 
provides the central attraction of Stevenson’s narrative, this chapter addresses the one 
fixed and abiding trait that yokes the two together: their handwriting. Jekyll’s 
experiments transform him so completely that his closest acquaintances can no longer 
recognize him. And yet, Hyde finds “that of my original character, one part remained to 
me: I could write my own hand” (87). After every other vestige of Jekyll has been either 
effaced or disfigured beyond recognition, this indelible trace of his individuality endures. 
This chapter investigates what sort of currency such holographic fantasies of the 
individual—dependent on transparent analogies between orthographic and moral 
“character”—held for the Victorians, asking how Stevenson’s tale explores, exploits and 
troubles such associations. To this end, I situate Jekyll and Hyde within the broader 
context of late-Victorian tales of crime and detection that stage the apprehension of 
criminal bodies through a meticulous deciphering of their legibility. In such narratives, 
the authorities compulsively return to a “scene of the crime” that is suggestively rendered 
as a  “scene of writing.” 
In Stevenson’s romance, Jekyll’s “Hyde” (i.e., both his new skin and his new 
signature) is apprehended by the pseudo-sciences of physiognomy and graphology, 
speculative modes of reading that present two reciprocal theses: one contends that the 
body is a kind of writing, while the other claims that writing is a kind of body. These 
intertwined registers form a mobius script, signified emphatically by the homologous 
(and ubiquitous) reference to Hyde’s “hand” as both appendage and inscription. The 
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duplicity of this hand engenders a confusion that suggests writing has yet to properly 
dissociate itself from the body’s clutches. In tracing the involuntary drift of this unruly 
member, this chapter does not limit itself to a rhetorical analysis of Jekyll and Hyde (a 
cabinet of curious hands), but employs the figure to facilitate a more general study of the 
body in its apprehension as the material support of writing.  
A number of critics have touched upon the questions of textuality provoked by 
Stevenson’s narrative as an invitation to reconsider the formative role of the writing-act 
in the construction of the subject. In these largely poststructuralist interpretations, 
Jekyll’s character runs no deeper than the letters on the surface of the page. Drawing 
upon Barthes’ claim concerning autobiography, that “the I which writes the text, it too, is 
never more than a paper-I” (161), Ronald R. Thomas relieves much of the tragedy of 
Hyde’s demise by interpreting it as an allegory of the “death or disappearance of the 
author” (“Strange Voices” 75). Conversely, Jodey Castricano understands the text as an 
allegory of reading. Her interest lies in how the text resists appropriation through the 
staging of an “uncanny scene of transference and mutual resistance” (4). To this end, 
Castricano applies the Derridean trope of reading as “counter-signing . . . as one might 
validate a check or document” (6) to illustrate how Stevenson’s text folds the reader into 
its pages, “put[ting her] in place of the other as a reading-effect” (4). 
 My sense is that the kind of sophisticated theoretical analysis offered by 
Castricano in particular can only be further enriched through consideration of 
historically-situated theories of writing, and not only those latently present in literature, 
but those explicitly circulating through culture. In what follows, I hope to provide a more 
precise estimation of the importance of writing to Stevenson’s novella, chiefly by paying 
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particular attention to handwriting as an embodied practice of expression. Hands (and, by 
extension, bodies) tend to disappear in the many of the most compelling analyses of 
writing in Jekyll and Hyde. Even Castricano’s “Much Ado About Handwriting” turns out 
to have surprisingly little to do with writing by hand, per se. The insistent and troubling 
presence of this inscribing and inscribed body frustrates incorporeal theorizations of 
inscription that prescribe writing as a means of emancipation from the body and the self. 
For instance, though Thomas has argued that Jekyll and Hyde “enacts the withdrawal of 
the articulating self from the text” (75), I maintain that Stevenson’s text narrates a 
process not of “withdrawal” but of addiction.2 That is to say, it is not a fantasy of 
dissociation and dissemination, but a nightmare brought on by the violent collision of 
contradictory positions and identities, each forced to inhabit a body contaminated by the 
other. In this sense, my argument affirms G.K. Chesterton’s assertion that: “The real stab 
of the story is not in the discovery that the one man is two men; but in the discovery that 
the two men are one man” (“RLS” 67). Within Gothic narrative, estrangement is only 
ever the exhilarating prelude to the uncanny return of disavowed and abjected bits of the 
self. 
 Stevenson imagines the hand as the linchpin of this disagreeable union. The initial 
significance of this shared trait is that it allows a social deviant to exploit the cultural 
capital encoded within the male professional’s signature. Hyde’s observation that “I 
could write my own hand” (87), written from an estranged perspective that seems to 
hover just outside the bounds of a body it inhabits and impersonates, advances a radically 
impersonal mode of self-understanding. The subversive social mobility made possible by 
this counterfeit writing is represented as a kind of graphic violence, prompting Patrick 
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Brantlinger to contend that: “Hyde’s ability to write in Jekyll’s ‘hand’ renders him 
dangerous in a more insidious way than his violence” (179). As his self-alienation 
deepens into antagonism, however, Jekyll finds himself increasingly at the mercy of this 
manual, yet automatic action. As the narrrative’s many scenes of physiognomic and 
graphological interpretation suggest, the crucial revelation is that Hyde cannot help but 
write in his own hand. His attempts at communication are bound to, and disturbed by, his 
wildly expressive body: its habitual and tempestuous gestures continually disrupt his 
sense of autonomy. 
 It is this cramped and contradictory contiguity between self and signature that 
prompts the central irony hinted at within this chapter’s title. Though the critical 
treatment of Stevenson’s Strange Case as fictional autobiography is not without critical 
precedent, the novella is not an autobiography in any straightforward sense of the term.3 
Indeed, one of the more salient points of resemblance among the three novels that anchor 
this dissertation is that—in a representational strategy that David Punter has identified as 
quintessentially gothic—none offer their titular character much of an opportunity to air 
their case (5). If, however, these monsters never participate willingly in their 
narrativization, they cannot help but communicate, and gothic narrative is uniquely 
devoted to training its readers to recognize and decipher signs that lie outside the margins 
of conventional language. Neither Hyde, the Beetle, nor the Count contribute to the 
collaborative narratives they inhabit, but in each case their stories are transmitted by their 
own “telling bodies.” Reading alongside Gothic detectives such as Stevenson’s Utterson, 
Marsh’s Atherton, and Stoker’s Van Helsing, we find the monster’s narrative spelled out 
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in tracks and traces of the body, accidental markings that betray what the subject would 
never willingly divulge.  
This chapter examines Stevenson’s Jekyll and Hyde as a paranoid critique of 
modern regimes of self-registration. Autobiography articulates formally the subject’s 
obligation within an economy of writing: to render the self as legible to others, and 
account for one’s life. Hyde is torn by a deep-seated ambivalence towards this gesture, 
one hand submitting its confession while the other scratches and scrawls from the 
margins to which it has been exiled. Ironically, it is Hyde’s very resistance to the dictates 
of legibility that produces his “unauthorized autobiography” and subjects him to the law. 
Hyde’s “odd hand” (53), like and yet unlike that of Jekyll’s, involuntarily produces an 
uncanny autobiography—an automatic movement of the body that undermines the 
evenhanded and autonomous gestures of the subject. Rather than the self-conscious self-
representation one normally associates with the form, this “auto-bio-graph” submits to 
various representatives of the law writings performed automatically by the body. 
 If, as Jerome Hamilton Buckley claims in The Turning Key: Autobiography and 
the Subjective Impulse Since 1800, autobiography was “a comparatively new word in the 
1830s” (18), by the time of Jekyll and Hyde’s publication the autobiographical impulse 
had become a significant cultural force within Victorian Britain’s scriptural economy. A 
pervasive Victorian form, it surfaced in popular autobiographies of John Henry Newman 
(1864), John Stuart Mill (1873), Harriet Martineau (1877) and other prominent 
Victorians, but also within hybrid forms such as the fictional autobiography (Carlyle’s 
Sartor Resartus) and the autobiographical novel (Dickens’ David Copperfield). Indeed, it 
would be difficult to overestimate the extent to which the historically coincident and 
  
72 
extremely popular form of the nineteenth-century bildungsroman—typically structured 
around the development of an exemplary individual within society—benefited from 
widespread interest in the project of autobiography.4   
 Critical response to Victorian autobiography has tended to expend much of its 
energies exploring this hybridity of autobiographical form—the ways in which it borrows 
from other genres, while troubling most generic attempts to delimit its own boundaries 
(Spengemann 1980, Fleischman 1983, Peterson 1986). Beginning in the late 1970s, a 
wave of autobiographical studies turned critical attention to the hybridity of the 
autobiographer herself, probing the fissures and duplicities that open up as soon as the 
author-subject sets pen to paper.5 In Sidonie Smith’s reading of autobiography studies’ 
linguistic turn, “the autobiographical text becomes a narrative artifice, privileging a 
presence, or identity, that does not exist outside language. Given the very nature of 
language, embedded in the text lie alternative or deferred identities that constantly 
subvert any pretensions of truthfulness” (5). Paul de Man’s “Autobiography as De-
facement” (1979) stands as the definitive statement on the constitutive role of language in 
the construction of the autobiographical subject. He maintains the “specular moment” 
proffered within autobiography “is not primarily a situation or an event that can be 
located in a history, but that it is the manifestation, on the level of the referent, of a 
linguistic structure” (922).  
 The paradoxical nature of the phrase “unauthorized autobiography” signals my 
shared interest in the de-centred agency made so readily apparent in the act of self-
writing. It does so in part by unfolding the ambivalence of the concept of autobiography, 
a form devoted to the articulation of the self, and the identity of the individual (Danahay). 
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Auto-bio-graphy names the convergence of mechanisms of selfhood, biology and writing. 
How then does each of these components relate to the others? The Victorian genre of 
self-writing tended to imagine the first of these mechanisms as the determinant factor, 
subordinating body and writing to the expression of its will. For their part, recent critics 
of Victorian autobiography have tended to foreground writing as the primary variable in 
the composition of the “literary self.” This chapter isolates autobiography’s indeterminate 
medial term, exploring the role bios plays in the inscription of Jekyll’s life-narrative. If 
autobiography imagines an autonomous ego at the wheel (or the stylus), and the canon of 
autobiographical theory grants linguistic structures precedence, Gothic narrative hands 
the reins to the erratic and ungovernable body. This latter genre examines all that 
emerges from the individual, but cannot be reduced to that singularity. How does the act 
of writing de-compose this individual, it asks, producing something that ‘I’ could never 
grasp? 
 What if, for instance, the body came before the self, and it called the shots? 
Darwinian evolutionary theory gave scientific validity to this theory of uncanny 
precedence, suggesting that the body and the self did not enter the world together. Our 
bodies had a history; they were not our own, but the inheritance of something 
incalculably older and radically other, under which humankind must struggle. Maudsley’s 
contention that post-Darwinian “man . . . is living his forefathers essentially all over 
again” presents us with an unmistakably Gothic vision of the subject who knows “that the 
vicious or virtuous ancestral quality, imbued as silent memory in his nature may leap to 
light on the occasion of fit stimulus” (Organic 267).6 
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The pseudo-science of physiognomy, which exerts such a profound fascination 
over the gothic imagination, offered a corporeal hermeneutic for the deciphering of 
legible markings of this inheritance. The “will” of our ancestors, in proper gothic fashion, 
has been inscribed upon our bodies. In Walpole’s Castle of Otranto, Theodore’s tattoo is 
revealed as the meaningful sign that returns law to the castle by proving filiation beyond 
doubt. Here the bodily sign is presented as legible and indisputable evidence capable of 
rendering unnecessary other, potentially duplicitous forms of writing. These inscriptions 
are aligned with a higher law, and “corroborate [Theodore’s] evidence beyond a thousand 
parchments” (164). Physiognomy imagines this bodily marking as a natural law rather 
than a paternal prerogative; hence, the trace it leaves behind is just as likely to be borne 
as a stigma of shame as a badge of honour. 
One of the first texts to offer a wide-ranging critical consideration of the 
conversation between Victorian literature and the cultural discourse of physiognomy was 
Daniel Pick’s Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder (1993). Pick’s reading of 
Jekyll and Hyde remarks that, although the latter has “no narrative of his own,” he 
“continually erupts in the body of the doctor” (166). This “eruption” names the focus of 
my inquiry in this chapter, though in my characterization of the automatic nature of 
autobiography I intend to shift the emphasis from corporeal inscription to the ways in 
which the body erupts through the various acts of writing into which Hyde is conscripted. 
Because the concerns I have for these processes of conscription, or bodily 
registration, belong to a specific history of  writing (as opposed to being intrinsic to all 
 forms of writing), I have attempted to immerse my interpretation of Stevenson’s 
romance within the particular understandings of writing and reading at hand within 
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Victorian culture, while holding in check appeals to the authority of “outside” texts of 
theory. It is not only that Victorian graphology is less familiar to most Victorianists than 
the version of “psychoanalytic graphology” introduced by Derrida in “Freud and the 
Scene of Writing.”7 My goal is not to arrive at the kind of interpretation of history that 
the latter methodology tends to provide, but to sketch out a “history of interpretation.” 
 This reversal of the common critical trajectory of reading takes its cue from 
Foucault’s genealogical project, as articulated within “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” 
Another strength of the genealogical approach is its implicit critique of the tendency for 
theoretical discussions of writing to paper over concerns about the fate of the body. 
Stevenson’s text is interested in the various ways in which, within the form of 
autobiography, subjects, bodies and texts are incorporated into each other. He presents 
Jekyll and Hyde’s story as a species of “bio-text,” interleaving flesh and paper, mingling 
blood and ink, and carefully calibrating the novella’s conclusion so as to synchronize the 
act of putting down the pen and “pulling the plug,” thereby bringing Jekyll’s life and 
writing to an end in one gesture. 
This unconscious insinuation of the body within writing—imparted here through 
the hand of Hyde—prompts consideration of automatic writing as a significant recurrent 
trope within the gothic, one that gives voice to the genre’s paranoia at the level of 
language (that is, the fear that signs actually “follow” their referents, and that writing is a 
motivated, rather than arbitrary, system of signification). The intent here is not, as is 
usually the case with studies of graphology, to assess the validity of the method as a 
science.8 I would prefer to consider its cultural significance as a hypothesis, asking what 
its currency within nineteenth-century popular thinking reveals about perceived 
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relationships between bodies and writing, particularly in light of a modern scriptural 
economy founded on the notion of self-registration, and the insistence that bodies write 
themselves through forms of “unauthorized autobiography.”  
Gothic characterization depends essentially upon the reading of external stigmata 
as reliable indices of internal qualities and tendencies, from the tattoo that reveals 
Theodore’s true parentage in The Castle of Otranto (136), to the much more 
comprehensive legibility of the body deduced by Wilde’s Basil Hallward when he states 
that: “Sin is a thing that writes itself across a man's face. It cannot be concealed. People 
talk sometimes of secret vices. There are no such things. If a wretched man has a vice, it 
shows itself in the lines of his mouth, the droop of his eyelids, the moulding of his hands 
even” (Dorian 181). Honouring this Gothic convention, the descriptions we receive of 
Hyde—for instance, that he moves “like a monkey” (64), and tends to “cry out like a rat” 
(62)—are clearly conversant with the animalistic associations of degeneration theory. 
Physiognomic readings inform many of the scenes of textual and bodily interpretation 
that compose the novella. While Hyde’s “imprint of deformity” (79) renders his debased 
morality superficially evident to all, it is Utterson who recites physiognomic rhetoric to 
the letter, remarking of Hyde: “if I ever read Satan’s signature upon a face, it is on that of 
your new friend” (42). Moreover, when Utterson recalls Lanyon “had his death-warrant 
written legibly upon his face” (55), we find that the lawyer’s abilities allow him to read 
physical as well as spiritual health. Each is plainly legible on the body’s surfaces. 
According to a code of reading that is distinctly Gothic, every body is visibly and 
determinably branded by its essential character, as well as affiliations of class, sexuality, 
and race. 
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 But physiognomy presented a corporeal hermeneutic the bold promise of which 
was in many ways a rather conflicted one. “Close readings” of bodily fragments might 
yield satisfyingly unequivocal correlations between trait and tendency, but actual 
application of these principles to real bodies tended to reveal only the radical 
overdetermination of the body’s semiotic productivity. The simplicity of the sign is 
perpetually undone by the complexity of the body. This troublesome tendency of the 
body disrupts the analyses of Swiss physiognomist Johann Caspar Lavater, whose 
Physiognomy was one of the most influential texts on the subject in England. Published 
in German in 1775, this study had gone through fifty-five editions by 1810, at least 
twenty of which were available in England.9 Lavater’s exhaustive work postulates a 
comprehensive expressivity of the body, outlining the “variety of expression [by which 
man] makes himself known to his fellow creatures” (Whole Works, 4:170). In relating his 
hope that “man” would some day come to realize “how many languages he speaks at 
once, in how many forms he exhibits himself at the same instant” (170), Lavater calls 
attention to the uncharted range of the body’s expressive qualities. Between promise and 
practice, however, most examiners could discern only the cacophony of the body. 
Speaking “many languages . . . at once,” the body stands, like the tower of Babel, as both 
a monument to the advancement of human knowledge, and the ruin of this pursuit. This 
polysemic communications machine can only produce so much weighty noise before 
meaning begins to collapse in upon itself.  
 Addressing this perplexing overdetermination of the body, Stephen Arata has 
written: “Degeneration touched the body, saturated and transfigured it, but the thing itself 
could be located nowhere” (21). Borrowing from physiognomy as degeneration theories 
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would, Gothic characterization is similarly troubled by this paradoxical admixture of 
unequivocal certainty and disconcerting ambiguity. As Anne Radcliffe remarks of the 
nefarious but discreet Schedoni: “There was something in his physiognomy extremely 
singular, and that cannot easily be defined” (Italian 34). Similarly, upon first meeting 
Count Dracula, Jonathan Harker might claim his host has “a very marked physiognomy” 
(48), but if we want to know what exactly these marks signify, we have another two 
hundred pages of reading to mull over. All is laid open to view, and yet this body’s 
“truth” remains fundamentally unintelligible. For Henry Maudsley, one of England’s 
foremost alienists, there was no doubt that  “the character of every mind is written in the 
features, gestures, gait, and carriage of the body.” Each of these signs, he pledged, would 
be translated “when, if ever, the extremely fine and difficult language is fully and 
accurately learnt” (LMC 54).  
The law as well held a tenuous grasp on this nebulous science of bodies. In his 
1890 study The Criminal, Havelock Ellis acknowledges the inexact nature of the science 
of “modern criminal anthropology,” averring that: “the more criminal amongst us may 
still find consolation in the reflection that there are no unfailing criteria by which our 
crimes may be read upon our faces” (94). For Victorians, the “body-language” of others 
communicated itself forcefully, but enigmatically. Physiognomy makes of these bodies 
strange hieroglyphs inscribed in a foreign language. The writing is on the wall; like 
Belshazzar, we have only to find someone to interpret for us.10  
Stevenson’s characters are thrown back upon such indirect strategies of 
interpretation because of the peculiar and oblique ways in which Hyde’s perversity 
communicates itself to them. Hyde’s body incites sensations that are cryptically referred 
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to within Gothic literature and criticism as “unspeakable.” All who encounter him are 
marked deeply by an experience that they cannot articulate or give vent to. One of 
Stevenson’s characters, struggling vainly to describe Mr. Hyde, speaks of  “the haunting 
sense of unexpressed deformity with which the fugitive impressed his beholders” (49). 
The encounter with Hyde’s body is one of unidirectional transmission: the knowledge of 
his strangeness creeps under our skin, but cannot find its back way out. Hyde makes a 
singular impression, peculiar in that it paralyzes one’s capacity to express his deformity. 
 Derrida’s characteristic attunement to the many valences of the “impression” 
leads us to the consideration of writing as something that is already upon us, rather than 
merely yet to come (as it is characteristically understood in Derrida’s thought). These are 
the impressions we bear upon us without comprehension, a sense Derrida describes as 
“having been marked in advance” by an “unknowable weight that imprints itself” (30). It 
is this marking that Utterson grants oblique expression to when he remarks that Hyde’s 
body gives the “impression of deformity without any nameable malformation” (41). 
Similarly, Jekyll’s friend Richard Enfield marvels that he “can’t describe” Hyde, and 
insists: “it’s not want of memory; for I declare I can see him this moment” (36). This 
indelible after-image haunts the mind, a living memory buried within the viewer. Like the 
vampire at the mirror, Hyde has an uncanny ability to evade the traps of representation. 
Stevenson tells us that Hyde “had never been photographed, and the few who could 
describe him differed widely” (49). His body surfaces in radically subjective accounts 
alone, skewed testimonies provided by witnesses who bear the weight of their experience 
without knowing how to relieve themselves of a burden they cannot name. Though a 
number of critics have delineated the underlying conversations between Stevenson’s text 
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and the physiognomic, phrenological and degeneration theories of its time, we ought to 
consider the novella’s more radical intimations concerning bodily inscription. We might 
begin to account for the “unspeakable” nature of physiological signs by tracing this 
strange and dimly understood migration of signs from one body to another. 
Jekyll’s butler Poole conveys the power of this inexpressible apprehension when 
he attempts to substantiate his conviction that there is “something queer” about Hyde: “I 
don’t know rightly how to say it, sir, beyond this: that you felt it in your marrow kind of 
cold and thin” (64). Though Arata finds the trace can be “located nowhere,” Poole’s 
testimony suggests we may have been searching the wrong body all along. The mark is 
already lodged within ourselves, more in us than the other who “incites” us. If the verb 
“to express” suggests a mode of direct conveyance (whether the content be thought or 
some other freight), the “impress” is its opposite—backwards, belated, indirect, these 
encrypted inscriptions are found upon ourselves in a mirror, and can only be read in 
reverse.  
 As his name suggests, Utterson will be the character that works most 
industriously to give “utterance” to Hyde’s indefinably abhorrent nature. If gothic 
narrative is propelled and pressured by its encounter with “the unspeakable,” this 
inexpressible kernel is given oblique form through such counter-agents (doctors, 
detectives, lawyers, etc.). As a lawyer, Utterson is responsible for ushering his clients into 
the contractual and unequivocal terms of discourse. He translates fugitive impulses into a 
sanctioned and binding will, codifying and giving legal force to his client’s 
unaccountable desires. Utterson is one of the key figures responsible for the discursive 
work explored in Marie-Christine Leps’ Apprehending the Criminal: The Production of 
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Deviance in Nineteenth-Century Discourse (1992). Her fine analysis of Jekyll and Hyde 
catches on a particularly revealing assertion of the lawyer’s. Clutching at, but not quite 
grasping Hyde’s enigma, Utterson avows: “There is something more, if I could find a 
name for it” (41). Leps develops an extraordinarily close reading of this statement that 
pays scrupulous (one could say lawyerly) attention to the conditions and dependencies of 
Utterson’s statement and diligently illuminates the labour involved in the discursive 
production of truth. 
 My own attunement to the equivocal significance of the term “apprehension” 
owes a debt to Leps’ book, primarily for the means by which her Foucauldian analysis 
traces the subtle links between power and knowledge in the nineteenth century’s 
discursive construction of the criminal. In Leps’ text, to apprehend is not merely to 
comprehend: her methodical deployment of the former verb calls attention to the vested 
interests in any purportedly benign act of “understanding” deviance, and underlines the 
arresting tendency of categorical legal distinctions derived from this enterprise. My use 
of the term “apprehension” further complicates this dynamic between power and 
knowledge by bringing anxiety to the fore. In many ways a commonplace of Victorian 
criticism, anxiety nonetheless takes on a special resonance within the Gothic. If 
comprehension describes mental understanding, apprehension suggests the indefinite and 
intractable embodied awareness cultivated within Gothic narrative.   
 In neglecting to account for the irresolvable gap between impression and 
expression, Leps exaggerates the efficacy of the law within the gothic imagination. She 
encourages us to read the unspeakable as merely a categorical term for that which 
commonly “goes without saying,” a variety of discursive a priori (220). In Stevenson’s 
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text, this includes the tacit negotiations through which professional men operate, 
voluntarily submitting to various (self-serving) bonds of secrecy entrenched as discursive 
laws of professional practice and social etiquette (Leps 209). This silence permeates the 
confidential discussions between client and barrister, but also the unsavory financial 
agreement struck, in the story’s opening pages, between Hyde and the parents of a young 
girl he has assaulted (34). Listening for silence as the sound of power attunes readers to 
the implicit significance of such charged moments. And yet, a reading of the deliberate 
manipulation of silence cannot neglect the more fundamental, helpless struggle with the 
unspeakable that is compulsively staged within Gothic narrative. Stevenson’s text 
vacillates between confidence and despair concerning the challenge of putting bodies into 
discourse, troubled by how silence distorts the said, and how the involuntary and 
inarticulate actions of bodies erupt within and disfigure expression. While in Leps’ 
reading, the law “apprehends the criminal” by utilizing language to grasp the body, I have 
to this point concerned myself with how Stevenson’s engagement with physiognomy 
unfurls the essential contradictions of any such bodily hermeneutic. In what follows, I 
will explore the correlative possibility of apprehension, considering the ways in which 
language finds itself in the clutches of the body. Beginning with the strangely palpable 
presence of the body manifest within Stevenson’s “figures of speech,” and turning to the 
animate holographic “figures of writing” that emerge in what Isaac Disraeli has named 
the “physiognomy of writing,” I read Stevenson’s text as a critically resistant statement 
on the conscription of bodies into language within nineteenth-century discourse. 
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Hyde’s Hand: The Undead Metaphor 
The body of Hyde presents a troubling enigma to all who behold it, and none can 
approach the man without betraying “a visible misgiving of the flesh” (79). The body has 
its doubts, then, but none can put a finger on precisely what disturbs. Jekyll’s old friend 
Enfield is certain that Hyde “must be deformed somewhere,” insisting “he gives a strong 
feeling of deformity, although I couldn’t specify the point . . . No, sir; I can make no hand 
of it; I can’t describe him” (36, emphasis mine). Enfield’s indistinct apprehension has 
him reaching for description, but grasping only the figure of the hand. In doing so, he 
unwittingly chances upon the central motif of Stevenson’s text. Hands, appearing 
everywhere in Stevenson’s novella, subtly disturb the text’s diegesis. By Richard Dury’s 
count, the noun ‘hand’ occurs sixty-six times in Stevenson’s slim volume; after ‘lawyer’ 
(regularly used to identify Jekyll’s friend Utterson), hands are the most frequently evoked 
common nouns in the text (Dury 113). Like Hyde’s foreign body, which flourishes as its 
host atrophies, this supplementary figure gets out of hand—the perversely 
disproportionate growth of one element threatens to take over the whole. Under the 
influence of much exercise and nourishment, the body of Hyde, at first underdeveloped 
(79), seems to Jekyll to have “grown in stature, as though (when I wore that form) I were 
conscious of a more generous tide of blood” (83). At the textual level, we might suggest 
that the blood-flow is channeled toward the appendage of the hand, and the effect is a 
kind of “hypertrophying” of the member, the excessive and disproportionate growth of 
the figure. 
The result of this unchecked growth is the erratic proliferation of catachreses, 
forced figures such as the one that opens Jekyll’s narrative. Here, Jekyll’s description of 
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“the days of childhood, when I had walked with my father’s hand” (85) infuses his 
nostalgic sentiment with a touch of the macabre. The industrious reader quickly 
straightens out this odd turn of phrase, reasoning that the author intends to say he walked 
hand-in-hand with his father, or, more figuratively, that his father’s hand guided him 
through his youth. Perhaps it is only for a moment that one glimpses here the 
disembodied hand so prominently featured within gothic horror, from the disjecta 
membra of Walpole’s Castle of Otranto to “the Thing” that acts as hand-servant to The 
Addams Family.11 Of course, Stevenson does not send Hyde’s hand creeping about in the 
moonlight along the outsides of windowsills. It does, however, enjoy an uncanny 
mobility within the text. The figure is unconstrained by any proper body. It goes 
everywhere, prying its way in and out of conventional, or anatomically “correct,” 
contexts. An insistent figure of speech, the hand begins to take on a life of its own: not, in 
the most straightforward Gothic convention, as an emblem or prop within the narrative, 
but at the level of writing or representation. It is never properly sublimated by language, 
withering away into the placid legibility of a dead metaphor. Rather, it haunts the text as 
an “undead metaphor,” warping figures of speech through a compulsive return that 
signals an insistent preoccupation with the body.  
In light of this obsessive quality of the text, Lanyon’s curious admission that he 
has “often remarked” on Jekyll’s “large, firm, white and comely” hands (82) takes on the 
quality of a fetish. Careful readers cannot nod assent when, in dismissing the significance 
of the discomposure evident in Jekyll’s handwritten note, Jekyll’s servant asks: “But 
what matters hand of write?” (62). Needless to say, it matters much within this text. The 
mobility and malleability of the ambiguous term “hand” emerges from its homologous 
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denotation as appendage and inscription. When Jekyll, stranded in Soho—and, what is 
more troubling, stranded inside Hyde’s body—panics over how Lanyon is “to be 
reached,” he sees that he “must employ another hand” (87). Jekyll finds his solution when 
he remembers that “of my original character, one part remained to me: I could write my 
own hand” (87). In passages such as this, Stevenson’s text is concerned not only with the 
metamorphosis, but the extension of the human body, and he imagines the hand as its 
principal emissary, its characters corroborating Jekyll’s character. The hand is the 
distinguishing mark of individual identity, its seal and synecdoche. The end of 
Stevenson’s narrative sees this principle realized absolutely, replacing Jekyll’s body with 
“nothing but papers, and a closed door” (61). Extended and disincarnated through 
writing, the hand promises to facilitate discreet communication, keeping correspondents 
“in touch” without any touching per se.  
From the very first page, which presents us with the dreary spectacle of Enfield 
and Utterson’s silent “Sunday walks” (31), Jekyll and Hyde furnishes a poignant 
depiction, if not an outright indictment, of the meager pleasures of culturally sanctioned 
male intimacy. Its palpable anxiety about physical contact (centering on, but hardly 
limited to, the perplexing and unsavory congress between Jekyll and his young friend) 
inspires Elaine Showalter’s queer reading of the novella, which designates homosexuality 
as the spectre that haunts the homosocial world, disciplining straight behaviour and 
determining the bounds of its relations. Jekyll’s employment of “another hand” invites us 
to consider how these limits are textually managed within the novella. Throughout the 
history of the novel, the epistolary genre has provided the most direct opportunity to 
analyze the formative role of writing in inter-subjective relations. By contrast with this 
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mode, Stevenson’s exclusively male novel of correspondence eschews the prevailing tone 
of intimacy and sentiment normally associated with epistolary fiction, delimiting 
communications with a professional rhetoric characterized by discretion and 
detachment.12 The story places a premium on silence (literally in the actual and suspected 
cases of blackmail). The first case of blackmail, which sets Stevenson’s narrative in 
motion, demonstrates the chilling potential for writing to obscure male violence. The 
private exchange of Jekyll’s name, and the capital it stands as security for, sidesteps the 
threat of putting it in general circulation by its scandalous publication. That letters are 
referred to throughout the narrative as “enclosures” (68) and not disclosures suggests, in 
keeping with the standard rhetoric of business, the defensive and secretive tendency of 
writing.  
Professional and authorized acts of writing serve to encrypt the secrets of 
Stevenson’s network of male professionals; in their hands, writing is “not a guise for 
language but a disguise” (Saussure 30). The cultural practice of writing, as it is bound 
neither to spontaneity nor fidelity, allows for the sort of dissimulation required to 
synchronize idiosyncratic individuals within civilized society. The ambiguity of writing 
diffuses otherwise intolerably stark contradictions of living, while its arbitrary nature 
stifles or sublimates visceral, impulsive or unconscious response.  
It is this alignment of writing with silence and secrecy that Martin Danahay’s A 
Community of One: Masculine Autobiography and Autonomy in Nineteenth-Century 
Britain critiques, interpreting Stevenson’s tale as an allegory of autobiographical method 
that provides a stark portrayal of the practice’s “antisocial potential” (138). This self-
centred writing requires of one “to exclude a wider social horizon and thus to evade one’s 
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social responsibility” (138). In Danahay’s view, Hyde personifies this autobiographical 
gesture, an intense reminiscence indulged in to the point of total immersion, where one’s 
past overtakes life and its responsibilities. Jekyll’s transformation represents the 
supernatural realization of the autobiographer’s desire to withdraw into “his past and the 
freedom and exuberance of his youth” (138). However, Danahay maintains, this freedom 
“is not entirely innocent” (138). Hyde is one of civilization’s discontents, and his 
intemperate pleasures are incompatible with Jekyll’s world. For Danahay, autobiography 
is an assertion of autonomy, a socially disruptive force hedonistic in nature and 
monologic in form. 
Victorian autobiography, according to Danahay’s reading, is a text of composure 
and a means of concealing the self. This strategy of concealment is most explicit in his 
consideration of Edmund Gosse’s Father and Son, where the autobiographical impulse is 
imagined as a sanctuary from the father’s gaze, and associated with a calculated duplicity 
of the subject. “I had found a companion and a confidant in myself,” writes Gosse’s 
persona. “There was a secret in this world and it belonged to me and to a somebody who 
lived in the same body with me. There were two of us, and we could talk with one 
another” (30). Ostensibly the transcription of a life, autobiography is also the means of its 
encryption, a defensive act that preserves one’s secrets by deepening “the inward space of 
the writing subject” (Danahay 145).  And yet, Gosse’s exposure of this encryption reveals 
monologism to be nothing more than the mask of a more essential duplicity between 
“me” and this “somebody who lived in the same body.” Stevenson’s dialogism tears the 
mask away entirely. 
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 While I find Danahay’s allegorical reading persuasive, I prefer to see the story as 
a tragedy in which Hyde, rather than Jekyll’s circle of bachelor-friends (or even the wider 
society they selectively represent), is the victim. Stevenson’s text is a dramatization of 
Jekyll’s autobiography, staging its coercion and eventual, fatal emergence. To my mind, 
autobiography’s tendency is centrifugal, not centripetal; though anchored in the self, its 
orientation and movement pulls the subject towards the outside. The genre is a formalized 
articulation of one’s primary social obligations: those of rendering oneself legible to 
others and accounting for one’s life. The act of reflection, as Jekyll describes it, requires 
of him that he “look around me and take stock of my progress and position in the world” 
(76). Autobiography is the demand of the other, calling individuals to account and 
conscripting bodies into the subjection of subjecthood.  
Everywhere in Stevenson’s novella is the problem of accountability, and most 
especially, the subject’s relations and responsibilities to discourse. Jekyll, “wrestling 
against the approaches of hysteria,” is ordered by his friend Lanyon (whose tone can 
barely disguise his disgust over the appetites of his repulsive guest) to “compose” himself 
(73). Perhaps Lanyon employs this word innocently, but Hyde’s response, a “dreadful 
smile,” suggests a grimly ironic appreciation of the work involved in constructing the 
self. As for Stevenson’s readers, we have already seen this strategy of concealment fail 
Hyde, in the discomposure that flares up within his letter to the chemist. Against the 
“composure” reading (the text requested by Lanyon), I am interested in how Hyde’s 
writing betrays his discomposure, the telling passages in which writing breaks down, de-
composes, and fails to secure the distance that Stevenson’s professional male friends 
expect it to.  
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Stevenson’s resistance to this lure of the autonomous subject is total. In the 
chaotic power of Hyde’s body, we find something more anarchical than the “sovereign 
subject,” an individual’s secession from the bonds of civilization. Indeed, we might turn 
to any one of the text’s bachelors as an illustration of “the individualizing influence of 
modern democracy” (Wedgewood 595) that The Contemporary Review understood 
Stevenson to be commenting on. Freed from romantic attachments, unencumbered by 
parental obligations, and abstaining from addictive diversions, these sober-minded, single 
male members of the Victorian professional class share the “heartless independence” 
(James 170) of their author.13 Even allegiances between members of Jekyll’s fraternity 
are distinctly chilled by Utterson’s avowed “inclination to Cain’s heresy” (31). 
Remarkably, Utterson reads the biblical story as a paean to the virtues of discretion, of 
letting one’s “brother go to the devil in his own way” (31). In fact, it is the second act of 
humanity’s fall, the violent severance of the fraternal bond. Cain’s plea was negligence, 
but his sin was murder. 
By contrast with his associates, Jekyll finds himself subject first to “the perennial 
war among [his] members” (76). Preoccupied with the mutiny on his own hands, he 
cannot obtain the internal consensus that would make any coherent resistance against the 
outside world possible. Stevenson’s tale deepens and radically de-territorializes the 
fantasy of autonomy beyond the prerogatives and the jurisdiction of the self-determining 
individual. Though its actions are typically represented as malicious, the double is not the 
antithesis of the individual, but merely its prosthesis, demonstrating the ease with which 
the drives can be dislodged from the agency of the subject.  
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This dis-organization of the body’s independence realizes Derrida’s contention 
that “autonomy is no more than the mask of automatism” (Spectres 153). Autonomy is a 
logic that attempts to recuperate the volatility of the drives by incorporating and 
domesticating these forces within the confines of the individual. It is a performance in 
front of the mirror, a studied rehearsal that is intended to discipline a thoroughly 
fragmented collection of partial objects and contradictory impulses. Hyde scandalizes the 
humanist fantasy of the free individual by presenting autonomy as a prerogative of the id, 
not the ego. Life goes on, unaccountably, without the subject’s authority or consent. If 
autobiography generically inscribes the sovereignty of its subject, the sinister “other 
hand” of Hyde defaces this text, rending the mask of autonomy.  
Returning to Saussure’s critique of writing as “not a garment, but a disguise” of 
language (29), we might say that Stevenson’s novella is centrally concerned with the 
failure of this disguise, as signaled incisively by the name of its protagonist. In a text 
renowned for its trenchant power, Jekyll’s pseudonym functions as a pithy condensation 
of gothic paranoia, the panic brought on by the uncontrollable reversal of interior and 
exterior realities. This irony haunts fin-de-siècle gothic characters such as H.G. Wells’ 
Invisible Man (1897). The success of his experiments only renders him more visible, 
bringing to light as surfaces deeper interiors, and making his churning insides 
increasingly more difficult to conceal. The attempt to free oneself from the body only 
brings about its uncanny, and grotesque return. A powerful personification of this 
paradox, Hyde’s name suggests the inherent futility of concealment, threatening that 
every attempt to “hide” merely submits another sign or surface “hide” to be investigated. 
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Every concoction of a lie erects its own truth, and indeed the peculiar deformation 
one chooses is often judged to be that truth. Psychoanalysis, realizing this gothic fear as a 
science, mobilizes this principle in its analysis of the “dream-work,” where distortion is 
seized upon as the key to the dreamer’s desire. As Zizek explains, when subjects “seek to 
find the essence of dreams in their latent content … they overlook the distinction between 
the latent dream-thoughts and the dream work” (SO 14). We are looking not for “the 
secret behind the form but the secret of this form itself” (15). Repression, read correctly, 
becomes in itself a confession. 
Utterson, Jekyll’s friend and Hyde’s nemesis, is no psychoanalyst, but his 
instincts regarding the cryptic signifier exploit a similar wordplay. In what is surely 
Utterson’s most quoted line, the lawyer declares: “If he be Mr. Hyde . . . I shall be Mr. 
Seek” (39).14 Utterson’s pun serves to reify the “proper” name (one that, especially as a 
forged pseudonym without a family history, is intended to function without connotation 
or reference) as a verb. This deliberate and playful misunderstanding of the word refuses 
to grant arbitrary status to the proper name. Objectifying the name, the pun burdens the 
abstract “sense” or conception of the word with meaning. The static name is placed in 
general circulation, set into play in an unintended direction (which Utterson then intends 
to pursue). In both senses of the term, the name becomes a “motivated” sign: that is, set 
in motion, and no longer arbitrary. Utterson’s operation on language engineers a chase 
scenario, expressing the aggressive, and even predatory aspect of the practice of reading.  
 Jekyll’s pseudonym is intended as a free gesture of writing, autonomous and 
anonymous. We find a less “composed” variation of this gesture in Jekyll’s exquisitely 
confused denial of Hyde: “He, I say—I cannot say I” (88). This phrase’s hopeless tangle 
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of pronouns (a more basic displacement of the proper name) thrusts outside the self the 
intolerable dialogism that lies within. The name of Hyde represents a more sophisticated, 
composed dissociation, and the initiation of this pseudonym into the public circulation of 
writing convinces Jekyll of his alibi’s perfect soundness: “when, by sloping my hand 
backward, I had supplied my double with a signature, I thought I sat beyond the reach of 
fate” (82). Though Utterson refers to Jekyll’s act of signing for Hyde as a “forgery” (54), 
the hoax reverses the operation one typically associates with this crime of writing. 
Ordinarily, forgery impersonates an already extent sign, profiting from the unauthorized 
simulation of an established name. Conversely, the creation of Jekyll’s pseudonym is an 
un-naming, a divergent rather than imitative gesture. His desire is to forge a new, 
uncharted name, one that lies outside any archive of public reference. To possess 
“character” is also to be a sign belonging to a system, and made intelligible by the other 
signs that compose that system.15 Having constructed this outside term, Jekyll is no 
longer to be constrained as “the slave . . . of a discourse . . . in which his place is already 
inscribed at birth, if only by virtue of his proper name” (Lacan, “Agency” 148). 
Forfeiting his moral and graphological character in one stroke, Jekyll’s hand strays 
outside the bounds of legible society. 
At the same time, however, Hyde must pay his rent and perform other practical 
matters that require of him to deliver up an identifiable and iterable signature. How to 
fashion a legible sign that others may comprehend without apprehending, a “handle” that 
will not be mishandled? In Mary Elizabeth Braddon’s Lady Audley’s Secret (1862), our 
heroine Helen Talboys (a.k.a. Lucy Graham) finds to her dismay that there are no 
vacancies within a vigilantly guarded symbolic realm. Her attempts to dissociate herself 
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from her past through the adoption of a pseudonym are denied by her relentlessly 
inquisitive brother-in-law, a man committed to the “old worldly wisdom” that “[t]here are 
some things which . . . cannot be hidden” (197)—a statement that echoes Schelling’s 
definition of the uncanny. Robert Audley is a modern skeptic; he will not be taken in by 
superstitious belief “in mandrake, or in blood stains that no time can efface” (170). It is 
not that Robert has lost the faith entirely; his belief has merely been transposed to the 
discourse of forensics, a science that legitimates this abiding desire for unequivocal 
symbols and unanswerable judgments. If these irrefutable signs were once required to 
take the form of supernatural omens of guilt, modern secular faith preferred that they be 
termed within the thoroughly natural register of indexical traces, tracks, and prints. This 
is how forensic science replaces the reverent fear of an all-seeing God with the awesome 
power of the law’s omniscience.  
Directly after hearing of Robert’s avowed skepticism, we find that Lady Audley’s 
“uncommon hand” (171), which “present[s] marked peculiarities” (286) is, for Robert’s 
purposes, as good as a signed confession. The identical hand binds together the identities 
of the two, refusing Lucy her death and Helen her new life by means of the graphical 
evidence of their sham suicide note.16  In Stevenson’s text it is Utterson who reprises 
Robert’s role, presiding over the legal documents and financial transactions that bear 
Hyde’s name and signature, and finding there a new name written, but with the same 
hand. Adapting epistolary form to the plot of a thriller, Stevenson’s “case” binds together 
correspondence between characters. But it is concerned at heart with an interior 
correspondence: not communications between correspondents, but the correlation 
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between inside and out as manifest through handwriting, and grasped through 
graphological analysis.  
 
Jekyll’s “Guest”: Handwriting Analysis in Victorian England 
If the mysterious “transcendental medicine” (74) that brings about Jekyll’s fantastical 
transformation remains, as far as hard science is concerned, a rather vague sketch (hence 
tending to be transplanted to a metaphorical register), the pseudoscience of graphology 
would have been much more familiar to Victorian readers. The first expert testimony on 
handwriting analysis in the British courts was recorded in 1849, in the case of the 
physician and philanthropist Dr. George Parkman’s disappearance. Consulted everywhere 
from the courthouse to the séance (where the Society for Psychical Research employed 
handwriting analysts to determine the origin of Madame Blavatsky’s written messages), 
the practice was intended to measure the claims of suspicious subjects against the silent 
testimony of their bodies. Perhaps the most culturally significant case involving 
handwriting analysis—that of Captain Alfred Dreyfus—occurred a few years after Jekyll 
and Hyde’s publication. In this trial, Alphonse Bertillon, Parisian records clerk and father 
of biometrics, had provided his infamous testimony as a self-described “handwriting 
expert” (entirely without credentials).17 Two years after the publication of Stevenson’s 
crime narrative, Hyde’s pseudonymous strategy was mimicked in the correspondence of 
Jack the Ripper. The killer’s desire to “make a name for himself” had to be tempered by 
obvious concerns about self-exposure, leading him to adopt the pseudonyms "Mr. 
Nobody" and "Mr. Nemo” in communications with the police and the public. Sir Arthur 
Conan Doyle, donning Sherlock’s deerhunter hat not for the first time in his career, 
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suggested to police that they publish the killer’s letters in the major papers. By placing 
“Jack’s” writing in circulation, the police would recruit the general public as deputy 
officers of the law—a mass mobilization of “Baker Street Irregulars” that made the 
populace responsible for their own surveillance.  
In a text featuring a number of allegorical surnames, Stevenson’s choice to 
christen Utterson’s head clerk (and chief confidante) Mr. Guest seems a curious one. 
Though his title confers an established place within the household, Guest’s name 
suggests his contribution to the narrative will introduce an unfamiliar or even foreign 
logic to the text. Stevenson’s plot confirms the latter reading, as the character is ushered 
in midway through the narrative in order to perform a specialized function. Once his role 
as “a great student and critic of handwriting” (53) has been served, the character 
disappears altogether. Charles Reade’s Foul Play, a theatrical production staged at 
Holborn in 1869, includes a similar cameo performance of the graphologist as “external 
examiner.” The play features a minor, yet pivotal character by the name of Edward 
Undercliff. Three of the four times which this character is introduced, his appended 
title—“Undercliff, the expert”—emphasizes his role as the bearer of a specialized 
knowledge that is foreign to the other characters in the play. 
This marginal but significant positioning of handwriting experts within literature 
mirrors the historical development of graphological practice in nineteenth-century 
Britain, a foreign speculative science developed primarily through theories and 
experiments imported from the rest of Europe. The first book-length study of handwriting 
analysis was published in 1622 by Camillo Baldi, an Italian doctor of medicine and 
philosophy.18 However, the most broadly read text within England upon the subject was 
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most likely Lavater’s Physiognomy. Lavater’s analysis is understood to be a primary 
source for two of the earliest English texts on the subject, penned by Thomas Byerley and 
Isaac Disraeli.  
In 1823, Byerley (writing under the pseudonym of Stephen Collett) had made his 
contribution to the topic with his “Characteristic Signatures.” Here he claimed that: “[i]n 
using his pen, a man acts unconsciously, as the current of his blood impels him; and 
there, at all times, nature flows unrestricted and free” (370). A year later, Disraeli had 
devoted a chapter of the second volume of his Curiosities of Literature to the topic of 
“Autographs,” arguing therein that “Nature” has prompted “every individual to have a 
distinct sort of writing, as she has given a countenance—a voice—and a manner. The 
flexibility of the muscles differs with every individual, and the hand will follow the 
direction of the thoughts, and the emotions and the habits of the writers” (208).  
Disraeli’s curiosity is not an idle one. His commentary is prompted by the 
recognition of a cultural transformation that signals a crisis of identity. Copybooks and 
other restrictive, standardized pedagogical methods of “character” formation have 
reduced penmanship to a “mechanical process” of anonymous reproduction: “the pupils 
are forced in their automatic motions, as if acted on by the pressure of a steam-engine.” 
Stamped by an impersonal machine, individuals are rendered unrecognizable, “all 
appearing to have come from the same rolling-press” (207). 
To his dismay, Disraeli finds the institutionally reconfigured “muscular” practice 
of writing has been reduced to a simulation of industrial activity. The transformation calls 
to mind Carlyle’s analysis of the wholesale deposition within modern culture of dynamic 
energies by mechanical force (“Signs of the Times”), but it also suggests that one of the 
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most disconcerting “signs of the times” was the inability of the body to serve as a reliable 
cornerstone of identity and authenticity. In a period where Carlyle lamented that: 
“Nothing now is done directly, or by hand” (“Signs” 64), a hand capable of replicating a 
machine meant that even those actions performed manually were not unequivocal 
evidence of self-directed and autonomous activity. 
In this milieu of industrialized handwriting, the hand takes on an uncertain status, 
positioned at the physical juncture of culture and nature. When properly trained, the hand 
is capable of disguising its true character, and churning out the standardized script of a 
writing machine. Under such conditions, manuscripture is not something that emerges 
from the subject in an expression of pure inwardness.19 The body is written, then writes. 
Francis Galton recognizes this cultural negotiation, arguing that: “handwriting is by no 
means solely dependent on the balance of the muscles of the hand, causing such and such 
strokes to be made with greater facility than others. Handwriting is greatly modified by 
the fashion of the time” (Inquiries 88). The equivocal nature of the term ‘manual’ 
(denoting work “done by hand,” but also a book of instructions—especially for operating 
a machine) expresses laconically this understanding of manuscript as the conflicted token 
of one’s socialization, a mark co-signed by the self and the other. If the “manual” 
suggests a disciplinary mechanism behind the development of one’s character(s), this 
fundamental education of bodies prompts a reappraisal of phenomenological models of 
authenticity that take the hand as their emblem. 
Handwriting instruction requires the choreography of the entire body, which 
pivots upon the point of the stylus. In Foucault’s analysis of the micro-physics of power 
we find this scrupulous attention to the intricacies of bodily gesture expressed in the bio-
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political maxim: a “well-disciplined body forms the operational context of the slightest 
gesture” (DP 152). Proper penmanship involves “a whole routine whose rigorous code 
invests the body in its entirety, from the points of the feet to the tip of the index finger” 
(152). Foucault cites J.B. La Salle’s Conduite des écoles chrétiennes (1783), where pupils 
are instructed to always “hold their bodies erect, somewhat turned and free on the left 
side, slightly inclined, so that, with the elbow placed on the table, the chin can be rested 
upon the hand, unless this were to interfere with the view; the left leg must be somewhat 
more forward under the table than the right” (152). The body is whittled down to this 
graphic extremity, a needle capable of registering the slightest disturbance or 
misalignment in one’s fine psychomotor functions. For the discerning critic of 
handwriting, the entire body is laid bare in these telling gestures. 
Foucault’s portrait of the docile student at work provides a significant point of 
contrast to the spectacle of the Gothic body in the act writing, the contortions of which 
testify to an essential duplicity to be found within the act. The Castle of Otranto’s 
counterfeit “found manuscript” and “fictitious will” (164) establish the Gothic genre as a 
compendium of forgeries, one which consistently blurs the lines between production and 
reproduction in a manner neatly encapsulated in the polysemy of the verb “to forge.”20 
Perhaps more significant, however, are instances where the victim of these forgeries is 
not only (falsely) implicated through simulation, but directly (and physically) entangled 
through anxiety, distraction, possession, addiction, and a range of other altered states. For 
though Walpole’s second preface publicly exposes the hoax behind Otranto’s “editor’s 
narrative,” his private correspondence depicts another “gigantic hand in armour”: one 
which appears to the author in dreams, and from whose dictation Walpole composes 
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Otranto as if in a trance. In such predicaments, the Gothic subject perpetrates upon 
herself a kind of sleight of hand that invalidates any simple alibi. Though Hogg’s 
“justified sinner,” Colwan, may denounce his will as a “false, and forged grant” (181), 
the case is not so simple. The document has been signed with his own hand (179), a fact 
that admits no denial. Such Gothic doppeltexts, or double writings, serve as astonishingly 
sensitive registers of irreconcilable tendencies and personalities warring within the 
subject. In Dracula, agitation or outright possession disfigures the character of Jonathan’s 
correspondence with his fiancée. Mina finds his letters have been written one way, but 
read quite another, insisting: “It does not read like him, and yet it is his writing” (106). 
Similarly, in the context of Victorian spiritualism, mirrored writing suggests the contrary 
nature of alternate personalities; the contrary “inclination” of script that leans in the 
opposite direction is understood to express orthographically a more abstract sense of this 
other’s divergent tendencies. 
Finding Jekyll’s signature attached to Hyde’s cheque, Enfield is struck by the 
same impression of alterity. Rather than the effortless fluidity one expects in such a 
gesture, Jekyll’s signature reveals signs of labour and artifice. As Enfield tells us, “[t]he 
figure was stiff” (34); the hand unwittingly communicates the body’s resistance to this 
conventional sign of identity. Returning to Lanyon’s injunction, we might say that the 
signature’s rigidity bears witness to Hyde’s struggle to “compose himself.” In stating that 
“the whole business looked apocryphal” (34), Enfield divulges his theory that Hyde has 
simply forged the cheque. But the fiend’s duplicity is already too essential and 
internalized to exculpate Jekyll from wrongdoing. His body cannot manage to return to 
its equilibrium, and in doing so outstretch the steady and assured hand capable of signing 
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a convincing pledge of identity.  
Though Victorian critics of handwriting tended not to depict the body’s reversion 
to habitual practices as addiction (they typically traced out resistances to culture along 
more noble lines), the pseudoscience sensitized Victorian readers to dialectical conflicts 
embedded within handwriting by expropriating the peculiarities of an individual’s 
spontaneous style as a resistance to the conformity of cultural conventions. Where before 
there had been only writing upon a blank page, many Victorian thinkers now recognized 
the staging of a contest between bodies and institutions. We find this sense of conflict 
expressed by Henry Maudsley in a letter to handwriting expert Richard Dimsdale 
Stocker:  
There is one lesson which my handwriting teaches, namely, that Nature is 
stronger than art, heredity than acquisition. When I was at school it was resolutely 
and systematically changed. But this conquest of culture (if conquest it was) has 
been gradually effaced, until now, in age, my handwriting has reverted to the 
stock form, and might almost be mistaken for that of my father. If my present 
handwriting then reveal character, it will be a revelation of the character of my 
forefathers. (Stocker 8) 
It is not difficult to detect a note of pride in Maudsley’s self-examination. Handwriting is 
denounced as a lesson in subjection—one at which he has happily failed. Pedagogy has 
been overthrown by pedigree, and the anonymous, conventional sign has been 
overwritten by the family trait. Nature has triumphed over the “conquest of culture,” and 
the hand reverts to its old alliances and affinities. 
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Among those who considered the subject, however, the consensus was that 
modern society exhibited in its script a monotonous regularity of character. Disraeli’s 
entry on autographs traces not the vanishing of a specific individual into the throng (as 
Poe’s unnamed narrator had in “The Man of the Crowd”), but the general disappearance 
of the quality of individuality from British culture.21 Disraeli predicted that the “true 
physiognomy of writing will be lost among our rising generation,” complaining that “it is 
no longer a face that we are looking on, but a beautiful mask of a single pattern” (208). In 
like manner, Byerley laments the rarity of truly unique, or “characteristic signatures” 
(374). For him, the “great mass of people in the world may be said to consist of mere 
negatives; of persons who act as they are desired, think as they are taught, and write after 
copies set before them; and the utmost that you can expect to discover from the 
handwriting of such persons is, that they have no individual character at all” (370-371, 
italics original). This inundation of scriptural production—the corollary of a widespread 
increase in literacy during the nineteenth century—can remain undifferentiated because it 
is understood as a collection of “mere negatives.” All of this is only the noise and rattle of 
everyday, anonymous culture—reproduction rather than production.  
Byerley’s comment signals not just a reluctance to sort through this mass of 
writing, but also to wade through the “mass of people” responsible for its generation. His 
discussion of handwriting submits an exacting criterion of “individuality.” This is not a 
designation to be indiscriminately conferred upon every person; the onus is on the subject 
to earn this title of distinction. In a society increasingly driven by mechanical 
reproduction, “the individual” becomes aligned with singularity, marked by an instinctive 
failure to reproduce the customary signs of culture.  
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Consequently, at the close of the eighteenth century, the “signature” accrues a 
surplus value that inspires the specialized circulation of handwriting for its own sake. 
Fostering reverence for the autograph as an index “of the movements of the mind as well 
as the pen” (Turner 47), autograph hounds such as William Upcott and Dawson Turner 
encouraged the collection, circulation and sale of signatures as commodities.22 This 
market depended upon a distinction between two classes of writing – the stereotype of the 
masses, and the (rarified) autograph of the individual. Founded on this distinction that 
privileged the particular over and against the general, autograph collecting entailed a 
relatively limited conscription of names. The value of a specimen of writing was 
dependent upon its perceived rarity. Few truly “wrote their own hand,” and hence only 
exceptional signs were solicited. The signatures of the great majority only confirm their 
anonymity. Exemplary writers are endowed with autographs; the rest merely transmit 
facsimiles. The term autograph names at once the body of the manuscript and the sign of 
authorship. Once a writer’s “signature” style has been established, every pen stroke 
becomes a forceful assertion of his selfhood; the true individual is always writing his 
name, no matter what the content. (The individual is, at all times, identical only to 
himself.)  Thus, ironically, the cult of the individual pitted one automatism against 
another. “Autograph-hunters” sought the autonomous gesture of one who had risen above 
the automatisms of culture, but also the spontaneous display of an irrepressible 
individuality detectable in automatic, unselfconscious gestures.23   
Turner’s autographic individual was an exemplary figure because s/he employed 
handwriting in a manner that muted the anonymous noise of enculturation typically 
produced by this standard writing prosthesis, performing gestures that registered 
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“movements of the mind as well as the pen.” By contrast with Turner’s rather cerebral 
vision of exemplary handwriting, the monstrous singularity of Hyde’s hand resists 
cultivation because it exhibits the peculiarities of his body within the text. Increasing 
fascination with this de-sublimated understanding of handwriting would crucially alter 
the direction of graphological analysis towards the latter end of century. The hand, it 
occurred to prominent psychologists and physicians such as Havelock Ellis and Max 
Nordau, betrayed not only the exceptional tendencies of those who transcended the norms 
of society, but also those who fell below its standards of respectability and morality. 
Cesare Lombroso’s “autograph collection,” submitted by a motley crew of thieves, 
swindlers, and murderers, stands in stark contrast with that of William Upcott, Dawson 
Turner, or Poe, whose compilations were more likely to include specimens of royalty and 
literati. Turning their attention to “bad subjects” as well as good, graphologists analyzed 
and described handwriting with the aim of determining the “character, disposition, and 
aptitudes” (OED) of individuals through their orthographic tendencies and peculiarities. 
In this sense, graphology is a study of the ways in which the body can be incarnated in 
the text, incorporated into writing, and reflexively inscribed by this text (through the 
conviction that characters inscribed upon the page illuminate the writer’s own character).  
 The forensic study of handwriting heightens the intrigue of Disraeli’s curiosities 
by tracing the link between a hand and its writing, and the apprehension of this particular 
individual is always a demonstration of the ways in which identity can be detected within 
the folds of each and every subject, an inner quality testified to by subtle but unequivocal 
external markings. Sherlock Holmes, who advises his partner Watson to “Always look at 
the hands first” (“Creeping” 612) provides us with Victorian fiction’s most 
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comprehensive fantasy concerning the “transparency” of handwriting. In “The Reigate 
Puzzle,” Sherlock authoritatively informs those who “may not be aware . . . that the 
deduction of a man’s age from his writing is one which has been brought to considerable 
accuracy by experts” (488). The detective pores over the torn corner of an incriminating 
handwritten note, somehow determining from this scrap not only the respective ages of 
the culprits, but their identities, health, disposition, and familial relation to each other. 
Doyle’s fiction instills a paranoid relation to the law that plays upon the notion of a 
perfect “correspondence” between the body and the subject to produce an entirely legible 
criminal. One is bound to the other by way of the hand; in this member’s inadvertent 
gestures are encoded everything short of one’s DNA. 
It is precisely this sort of information that Utterson expects from his “student of 
handwriting” when he solicits Guest’s opinion on a sample of Hyde’s “odd hand” (53). 
While the banker in Enfield’s “Story of the Door” verifies only the identity of the 
cheque’s signatory, Utterson expects Guest to assess his sanity. Presented with the rare 
specimen of a “murderer’s autograph,” Guest’s grim enthusiasm for deviant writings 
aligns his interests with those of Lombroso and Nordau: his “eyes brightened, and he sat 
down at once and studied it with passion” (53). Both presuppose the man to be mad, but 
upon inspection of Hyde’s handwriting, Guest definitively determines this not to be the 
case. The criminal’s sanity is to be measured by his actions, though not by the ones 
readers might expect. It is not how Hyde brandishes Utterson’s cane that concerns Guest, 
but how he wields Jekyll’s pen.24 Hyde’s most emphatically violent conduct offers only 
the coarsest index of his inner state; it is through the slightest, unconscious motor activity 
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involved in handwriting that we find a more exact exterior correspondence with Hyde’s 
intimate secrets.  
 George Mackenzie Bacon’s On the Writing of the Insane (1870), a book-length 
study that followed an 1869 article for The Lancet, evinces a keen attunement to this 
complex embodied gesture: “The act of writing, when once the habit has been acquired, 
seems so easy as to be almost intuitive, and we are apt to forget what combinations are 
necessary to set in motion the pen which runs so glibly over the paper, and what 
complicated processes are involved in so simple an act” (5). For Bacon, the Medical 
Superintendent of the Cambridgeshire County Asylum, these unconscious processes of 
the body rendered “the letters of the insane [worthy of] study—as the most reliable 
evidence of the state of the patient’s mind” (15). Graphological analysis imagines the 
hand operating as a variety of organic polygraph—or, as Bacon would put it, “a sort of 
involuntary photograph” (9)—its automatic movements providing unmediated 
correspondence with hidden truths of the subject’s interior life. “On ordinary cases of 
mania,” Bacon argues, “the patients’ letters are odd and grotesque, exhibiting the same 
want of balance that their actions do” (17). Though Saussure may have understood 
writing as a mode of deliberation and disguise, many Victorians saw things differently. In 
The Art of Judging the Character of Individuals from Their Handwriting and Style 
(1875), for instance, Edward Lumley argues that: “When we speak, it is almost always 
under the influence of volition. It is not the same with gestures, which are frequently 
involuntary. It is for this reason easier to deceive by speech; while the gesture which 
escapes us bears the impress of truth” (2). The graphologist’s true object is that of direct 
commerce with the body and its expressive gestures. Handwriting preserves for its reader 
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an archive of these movements. Graphology recognizes these traces that the body leaves 
in space as a material practice which implicates the body and identifies the subject: 
“unlike the fleeting patterns of speech, voice, and gesture, handwriting has the peculiar 
advantage of fossilizing that expression, leaving a visible record for leisurely, minute 
analysis” (Roman 172).25 This “fossilized expression” is not merely a translation of text 
into image, such as a static series of hieroglyphs, but an animism of the text—the 
characters are alive, imbued with movement captured on the page. They form a 
pictography that is also a physiognomy. 
Bodies are a kind of writing and writings are a kind of body. Each trace their way 
into each other, woven into the sort of “mobius script” depicted within Escher’s 
“Drawing Hands.” In handwriting, representation and expression constitute two sides of 
the same surface, and we traverse along one face of the plane only to find ourselves 
imperceptibly transported to the other side. In the frontispiece to Lavater’s Physiognomy, 
for instance, we find the titular practice described as “reading the handwriting of nature 
upon the human countenance.”  
At the same time, we are prevented from understanding Lavater’s handwriting 
analogy as endorsing the emaciation of the body through a theory of constitutive 
representation. If every text constitutes an allegory of reading, the effects of interpretive 
practices certainly extend beyond the written page. Furthermore, writing itself presents 
Lavater with a kind of body: “the form and exterior of a letter frequently enable us to 
judge whether it was written in a calm or uneasy situation, in haste or at leisure” (201). 
And so, in reading manuscript, the physiognomist must observe “the substance and the 
body of the letters” (202) as an index of the writer’s own mind and body. There is no 
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mark that is not an imprint of the writer’s self, a tracing of his character.26 As God 
created “man” in His likeness, so man cannot help but create after his own image (202). It 
is this apprehension of the scriptive body of writing that leads Isaac Disraeli, in his 
Curiosities of Literature, to speak of “the art of judging of the characters of persons by 
their writing” as a “physiognomy of writing” (208). H.E. Weston, writing for Borderland 
in 1895, discusses the popular pseudo-sciences of phrenology, physiognomy and 
graphology as united by the overarching theory that “there is character—or the want of 
it—in everything, animate or inanimate” (64). Thus, it comes as no surprise that Cesare 
Lombroso, in his study on the handwriting of criminals, should find fingers and figures 
interlocked with each other upon the page. Along with a “slight tremble,” “the writing of 
a certain type of thief—such as Cartouche—has a sort of hook and curvature to 
practically every letter, which reminds us of the particular configuration of their fingers” 
(Criminal 113). Hook and crook are bound together in writing—act, body, and trace. The 
twisted nature of crime, Lombroso insists, is more than just a moralizing figure of speech. 
It is a metaphor that seeps into the body, and its traces can be found in the physical 
“residue” of writing.  
Criminal diagnostics customarily included an analysis of handwriting, ideally 
performed by the subject under some duress. Deviancy disguised by speech would often 
be brought to light through writing; subjects could be trusted to “pour out all their 
insanity on paper” (229). For Lombroso, a few lines of script rarely provided satisfactory 
results, since the criminal could “easily concentrate his attention on them, but he should 
be requested to write a page or two and be exhorted to make haste” (229). The criminal 
might write, but he was careful not to express anything. Given the correct duration and 
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pace, however, an “automatic” writing—unfettered by conscious reservations—would 
emerge. Without the self-censoring defences of conscious interference handwriting 
reveals a spectrum of abnormalities, from the swindler who emblematizes his trade with a 
screed that is “usually indecipherable and enveloped in an infinite number of 
arabesques,” to the murderers who give themselves away with “clumsy but energetic” 
handwriting, as well as their vicious tendency to “cross their t’s with dashing strokes” 
(230). For Lombroso’s subjects, writing can only be a sublimation of deviant desire. The 
dizzying textual performance of the swindler is itself intended to swindle the reader. 
Equally incapable of forbearing his vice, the murderer submits writing marred by 
“graphic” violence. The content of these enforced writings, never commented upon by 
Lombroso, was, in both senses of the word, immaterial. Rather, the legibility of the 
criminal was precisely para-doxical: a writing that was opposed to sense. His script was 
conspicuous—and therefore intelligible—because of its orthographic and morphological 
errancy, its tendency to stray towards illegibility. Writing itself was delinquent, failing to 
assume its proper denotative status. In cases of mania, Bacon suggests that the analyst’s 
attention be guided by a similar indifference to content: “the change in the handwriting 
may be of great value in diagnosis, even without reference to the subject matter” (Lancet 
117). In “the letters of the insane,” manuscript becomes a symptom, “betray[ing] their 
mental condition when they may succeed in concealing it in conversation” (117). 
Forgetting what it ought to say, such writing drifts into a sick, or ill-literacy that 
unintentionally expresses what should have remained hidden. 
Commenting on the rise of studies such as R. Forrer’s “Handwriting of the 
Insane” (1888) within the discourse network of 1900, Friedrich Kittler remarks on the 
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graphological division of literate people into two camps: “on the one hand, those whose 
handwriting was a direct reflection of their unconscious and so could be evaluated 
physiologically or criminologically; on the other, the professional writers, who were 
writing machines, without handwriting” (262).27 Properly considered and “professional” 
writing unswervingly finds its way to its referent. In this way it attains the status of pure 
content, allowing the materiality of the inscription machine to disappear into its own 
equipmentality. The mediality of inscription is once again brought to the fore when 
representation breaks down; the mark of illegibility carried by the spontaneous writing of 
the criminal is a pure sign without referent. 
In like manner, whenever Jekyll writes under duress his hand inevitably serves as 
an uncannily transparent register of his interior state. Confiding in a letter written to 
Lanyon that, at the mere thought of the abject desperation of his situation, “my heart 
sinks and my hand trembles” (70), his aside serves as comment on the correlative 
movements of physiological and graphical agitation. The handwritten letter Jekyll 
addresses to his chemist is similarly marred by the body’s intrusion, a rupture that 
suddenly derails his formal tone of placid indifference: 
Dr. Jekyll presents his compliments to Messrs. Maw. He assures them that their 
last sample is impure and quite useless for his present purpose. In the year 18--, 
Dr. J purchased a somewhat large quantity from Messrs. M. He now begs them to 
search with most sedulous care, and should any of the same quality be left, to 
forward it to him at once. Expense is no consideration. The importance of this to 
Dr. J. can hardly be exaggerated.” So far the letter had run composedly enough; 
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but here with a certain splutter of the pen, the writer’s emotion had broken loose. 
“For God’s sake,” he added, “find me some of the old.” (62, emphasis mine) 
The requirement of self-composure makes possible a self-composition: a performance 
that buries the self within itself. Jekyll’s formal tone briefly allows him to mask his 
appalling appetites, but his deepening sense of urgency overwhelms his composure as 
well as his pen, whose spasms give witness to his internal disorder. The pangs of 
addiction force Jekyll’s hand, as the “certain splutter of the pen” reveals that the stylus is 
just as incapable as the body of sustaining the imposture of these hollow formalities. 
Polite conventions of correspondence are sideswiped by the sudden intrusion of the body 
and the interjection of its needs.28 
 Apprehending the deviant signs produced by these bodily needs, graphology 
emerges as a physiognomy of the letter. Thus, when Foucault speaks of the “turning of 
real lives into writing” (DP 192) under the procedure of the examination, we ought to 
recognize the simultaneous passage of the reverse operation that endows writing with 
life. Letters become ideograms: restless, unsteady, slouching on the page. Writing comes 
to be read as an extension of the self, the writer’s physicality permeating and inhabiting 
the text it writes, so that each alphabetic character assumes the character of its author. In 
this reflexive turn, we find the writer incorporated into his own text; this writing now 
signifies indexically, as the imprint of the body, the history of its charged interactions 
with the medium.  
The interleaving of physiognomy and graphology is particularly seamless in John 
Holt-Schooling’s thought. Writing for Nineteenth Century in 1895, three years after his 
translation of Jules Crepieux-Jamin’s L’Ecriture at le Caractere (as Handwriting and 
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Expression), Schooling explains his ontogenetic theory of physiognomy. Under 
Schooling’s reading, bodily hermeneutics consults not the ancient palimpsest we find in 
Lombroso’s theories (where traces of the subject’s ancestry are the typical “subtext” of 
the criminal body), but proceeds through the “delineation of character through a reading 
of the body’s own history” (478). Physiognomy, for Schooling, is the study of the 
accumulated habitual gestures which have, over time, left their imprint upon the body: 
“those which have been the most frequent have left their mark, it may be in definitely 
trained lines of thought, it may be in the deep chisel-scores of unrestrained passion” 
(478). The body displays an “increasing tendency towards repetition of this or that nerve-
muscular contraction, or gesture, which in time cuts its mark upon the very externals of 
the human body” (478).     
For Schooling, the “delineation” (478) of character entails tracing the history of a 
body that is written upon the flesh (which bears old traces beneath each new one, much 
like the history in wax of Freud’s “Mystic Writing Pad”). In this way, one’s handwritten 
correspondence always refers back to a prior writing, one that has been engraved inside 
the body through ingrained habits of movement (themselves the ripples of emotion and 
mentation that provoke these gestures). Handwriting inscribes in one stroke (upon the 
page) that which may take years to impress itself upon the body, which is a relatively less 
ductile surface of inscription. It provides an exteriorized trace of what is happening 
within the subterranean depths of the body, habits that have yet to manifest themselves as 
“telling” scars upon the surface of the body. The figural relation between rut and routine 
becomes something more than an abstract metaphor in Schooling’s text: each gesture 
“produces a score that is constantly adding up to make a record” (478). The 
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physiognomist will have to wait for these furrows and creases to eventually emerge upon 
the surface of the body, but the advantage of the graphological method is its immediate 
apprehension of internal stigmata. For a reader informed by this arcane bodily literacy, 
writing provides at once the snapshot of a momentary gesture and the deep history of the 
subject imagined by Myers. A very peculiar sort of bodily movement, writing is the “only 
form of gesture which is permanently self-registering at the moment of its expression” 
(479). This act’s permanence makes graphology a prosthetic corrective to vagaries of 
physiognomic interpretation, translating the mutability of bodies into ossified traces of 
legible movement. Writing, a spontaneous and “free gesture” (483), nonetheless turns 
itself in, so to speak, voluntarily bearing “silent witness” (487) against even the most 
recalcitrant of subjects. Whatever you might have to say through writing is undermined 
by all that your writing has to say about you. 
It is this threat of betrayal at one’s own hand that engenders the ambivalent 
relation between writing and the subject within Stevenson’s novella. Writing both 
inscribes the ‘I’ and delimits it, conscripting the body into subjecthood, but also into 
subjection. Just as the Imago beckons to the subject from the other side of the mirror, the 
Ideal I is to be found in one’s copy-book, its perfected character an image that testifies to 
one’s coordination, composure, and control. But both of these images, the mirrored and 
the scriptural, are received by the gothic subject with the same ambivalence, the same 
imperfect recognition tinged with the conviction of an insurmountable asymmetry 
between ideality and reality. 
For all of his atavistic, “savage” (41), and “troglodytic” (41) traits, his 
handwriting is the one aspect of Hyde’s “original character” that refuses to let go (87). In 
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his personal correspondence with Stevenson, Myers had made a series of friendly 
suggestions concerning the narrative, among them the warning that this detail was not 
exactly in keeping with the latest research concerning multiple personalities. “Here,” 
Myers writes, “I think you miss a point for want of familiarity of recent psycho-physical 
discussions. Handwriting in cases of double personality (spontaneous . . . or induced, as 
in hypnotic cases) is not and cannot be the same in two personalities” (qtd. in Maixner 
215). Regardless of what Stevenson might have known about the studies Myers and other 
were performing with the SPR, his choice of “the hand” as the sole vestige of Jekyll’s 
“character” suggests it is a deliberate and significant choice. Jekyll’s discovery that he 
can “write [his] own hand” initiates a strange inversion of the self. The odd way in which 
this sinister other hand dislocates the subject from the body (i.e., the I from the hand), 
proudly presents the signature as a counterfeit, and the self as a forgery. This dislocation 
promises to secure Hyde’s autonomy, but also threatens to betray his secret. From its 
opening pages, where Hyde presents Enfield with a cheque he is certain bears a forgery 
of Jekyll’s hand (34), Stevenson’s tale presents us with a series of scenes of reading, each 
centering on the problem of the written word and question of the I: who can sign it, 
authorize it, and bank on it.  
Though it is centrally concerned with this act of “character building” (i.e., 
inscribing the ‘I’) Jekyll and Hyde is the work of too many hands to be considered a 
proper autobiography. There are, of course, those at the periphery who coax the story into 
being, the lines of interpretation that make their violent convergence on Hyde’s body. But 
our concern here is the duality lodged at the reeling centre of this novella—the “white 
and comely” hand of the professional Jekyll, struggling against the “corded, knuckly” and 
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hairy member that attempts to write against its grain. This duplicitous hand marks the 
unstable alliance between subject and body. As the first sign of involuntary 
transformation (82), it is the earliest suggestion that the subject cannot control the body, 
that Hyde has “gained the upper hand.”29 
The page is the plane on which these two hands touch, their conflict played out 
graphically. The close of Stevenson’s Strange Case finds the good doctor hastily penning 
his suicide note, writing to put an end to all writing. Hyde has been defacing his alter 
ego’s books by “scrawling blasphemies” in Jekyll’s “own hand” (90) and, should he 
awaken to find this writing in process, will most certainly destroy it. Corrupting the 
singularity of Jekyll’s signature, the “proper” sign that functions as a guarantor of 
authenticity, Stevenson interrupts the organic relation between the self and its material 
extension in writing with the sinister introduction of Hyde’s destructive hand, which 
scrawls its panicked opposition against Jekyll’s call to accountability.  
 In Stevenson’s novella, Jekyll will be reduced to “nothing but letters and a closed 
door” (70). A decade later, Stoker’s Dracula will have Jonathan Harker dismiss the text 
he produces and inhabits as “nothing but a mass of typewriting” (419).  This wholesale 
liquidation of narrative and character into writing is viewed by gothic villains such as 
Hyde with abject dread, a horror evoked by the intuition that the construction of the text 
is intimately tied to the destruction of his body. For this reason, Count Dracula will 
attempt to destroy the Crew of Light’s vampire “dossier.” Hyde’s own violent antipathy 
to Jekyll’s text signals the same sense of foreboding. The confession Jekyll’s equanimity 
generates, so hateful to Hyde that he would “tear it in pieces” if he could (90), brings the 
lives of both to an end, with the termination of Jekyll’s narrative and of Hyde’s life 
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perfectly synchronized. Jekyll’s description of these final moments grants a ceremonial 
quality to the scene, where pen and envelope come to resemble body and coffin: “Here 
then, as I lay down the pen and proceed to seal up my confession, I bring the life of that 
unhappy Henry Jekyll to an end” (91). Gazing on the fiend’s body, Utterson verbalizes 
the significance of Hyde’s death, knowing “Hyde is gone to his account” (66). The fatal 
directive of truth – that the self must be accounted for – brings about the death of the 
author in only the most literal sense, as Jekyll signs his own death sentence. This lethal 
equivalence of body and text fervidly resists the benign conscription imagined within 
physiognomic, graphological and criminological discourses of the nineteenth century. 
The knotted relation between flesh and writing envisioned within Stevenson’s novella 
demonstrates that neither substance can be sublimed into the other without resorting to 
graphic, and graphical, violence.  
                                                
 
1 “The hand guides itself”: a sampling of the homophonic play littered throughout the 
writings of Jasno, one of Lombroso’s “graphomaniacs.” Nordau cites this phrase from 
Lombroso’s Genie ind Irsinn 264. 
 
2 Thomas’ reading could be said to invoke what Judith Butler has characterized as the 
“linguistic idealism of poststructuralism,” a mode of critique that [immerses] itself in the 
sort of “textual play” that (falsely, in Butler’s estimation and in mine) “marks the 
dissolution of matter as a contemporary category” (Bodies 27). 
 
3 See Thomas, 239; Danahay, 135-146. 
 
4 See Buckton, who reads autobiography as “a manifestation of the nineteenth-century 
culture of individualism as well as the literary that most directly influences the Victorian 
novel in its exploration of individual origins, identity, experience, and development” (2-
3). 
 
5 See Modern Language Notes’ 1978 special issue, edited by Rodolphe Gasché, on 
“Autobiography and the Problem of the Subject.” Also, see Olney 1980 and Jay 1984. 
More recently, see Folkenflik 1993. 
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6 See also Maudsley’s Body and Will  34. 
 
7 Derrida’s essay closes with an appeal for “what might be called a new psychoanalytic 
graphology.” This chapter does not answer that call. Derrida appropriates graphology as a 
term seemingly without history. Is this merely the bricoleur at work, placing graphology 
under erasure in order “to preserve as an instrument that whose truth-value he criticizes” 
(WD 284)? The “Scene of Writing” finds Derrida inscribing “graphology” upon his own 
Mystic Writing Pad, simply lifting the “thin transparent sheet” and beginning anew with a 
clean slate. But certain questions remain embedded within the history of graphology, 
regardless of whether or not they surface within Derrida’s text. It is not only that the 
application of the graphological method has a history; its fundamental object of study—
that is, script produced by hand as opposed to any other means—is a historically 
contingent technology of writing.  
 
8 One recent example of this tendency would be Driver, et. al. “Should We Write Off 
Graphology?” 
 
9 See Stafford 91; Stemmler 151. 
10 Daniel 5: 5-28. 
 
11 Freud’s study of “The ‘Uncanny’” identifies this trope of dismemberment as one of the 
recurrent conventions of the uncanny: “Dismembered limbs, a severed head, a hand cut 
off at the wrist, as in a fairy tale of Hauff’s feet which dance by themselves […] all of 
them have something peculiarly uncanny about them, especially when, as in the last 
instance, they prove capable of independent activity in addition” (144-45). Freud 
attributes this to a castration complex—all appendages of the body become one. 
 
12 For further discussion of the role silence plays within professional male friendships, 
see Arata, 40-41. Also significant in this regard is Enfield’s “Don’t ask, Don’t tell” 
policy, as explained to Utterson: “the more it looks like Queer Street, the less I ask” (35). 
 
13 To borrow from Henry James, who provides a most insightful contemporary 
assessment of Stevenson’s uncommon abilities, these men “[achieve their] best effects 
without the aid of the ladies” (170).  
 
14 Considering the “id” encrypted within the “He” of Hyde’s name, Utterson’s stated 
objective betrays a strange resemblance to the Freudian maxim: “Where id was, there the 
ego shall be” (Freud, “Dissection” 71).  
 
15 See The Psychic Life of Power, where Butler argues that individuals “enjoy 
intelligibility only to the extent that they are, as it were, first established in language. The 
subject is the linguistic occasion for the individual to achieve and reproduce 
intelligibility, the linguistic condition of its existence and agency” (10–11). 
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16 This method of reading receives an ambivalent introduction into Braddon’s Lady 
Audley’s Secret as well (though it will serve as lynchpin of Robert’s case against his 
antagonist). Here, Robert Audley, the amateur detective, remarks to his cousin upon 
spying Lady Audley’s letter that: “I never believed in those fellows who ask you for 
thirteen postage stamps, and offer to tell you what you have never been able to find out 
for yourself; but upon my word I think that if I had never seen your aunt, I should know 
what she was like by this slip of paper. Yes, here it all is—the feathery, gold-shot, flaxen 
curls, the penciled eyebrows, the tiny straight nose, the winning childish smile, all to be 
guessed in these few graceful up-strokes and down-strokes” (101). The graphological 
depth of Robert’s interpretation transforms the letter into a living portrait, and reading 
into a voyeuristic act. 
 
17 In the Dreyfus case, Bertillon advanced a theory concerning the Dreyfus documents 
that rivaled Gosse’s Omphalos hypothesis for sheer incontestable ingenuity. Bertillon 
accused Dreyfus of “self-forgery,” testifying that Dreyfus had written in a style that 
would resemble another writer’s forgery of his handwriting, retreating to the “citadel of 
graphic rebuses” (Bredin 74) to which spies commonly fled.  
 
18 Graphologists have often made the claim that the consideration of handwriting as 
dating back as far as Aristotle, who notes the individuality of signs as shaped by their 
particular signers in his “On Interpretation”: “Spoken words are the symbols of mental 
experience, and written words the symbol of spoken words. Just as all men have not the 
same speech sounds, so all men have not the same writing.” However, the quotation is a 
fragment, and the remainder of Aristotle’s sentence clarifies the centripetal force of 
Aristotle’s argument here, towards the universality of mental experience: “but the mental 
experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things 
of which our experiences are the images.” Aristotle does not go on to discuss the 
significance of handwriting, choosing instead to move “inward” to the medium of 
thought. 
 
19 Phenomenology has manifest a persistent concern with the hand as the sign of 
internality, individuality and authenticity. In Hegel’s Phenomenology, the idiosyncrasies 
made manifest in one’s “particular style of ‘handwriting’” are seized upon as “an 
expression of the inner.” Set “against the multifarious externality of action and fate, this 
expression again stands in the position of simple externality, plays the part of an inner in 
relation to the externality of action and fate.” (189). For Heidegger, “the typewriter veils 
the essence of writing and of the script. It withdraws from man the essential rank of the 
hand, without man’s experiencing this withdrawal appropriately and recognizing that it 
has transformed the relation of Bring to his essence” (85). 
 
20 On the significance of the counterfeit within the Gothic, see Hogle, “Frankenstein.” 
 
21 Braddon acknowledges this challenge to the handwriting expert in Lady Audley’s 
Secret. Helen tries to hide behind this fact: “A resemblance between the handwriting of 
two women is no very uncommon circumstance now-a-days . . . I could show you the 
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calligraphies of half-a-dozen of my female correspondents, and defy you to discover any 
great differences in them” (286). Unfortunately for Helen, she does not fit this mold. 
Neither seems to write “the usual womanly scrawl” (171). 
 
22 Munby identifies John Thane’s British autography: a collection of fac-similes of the 
handwriting of royal and illustrious personages, with their authentic portraits” of 1788 
as the “first English book in which autographs were a major feature” (12). The book 
featured 269 portraits, with each subject’s signature engraved at bottom. Munby notes 
that Thane’s book “was much sought after and changed hands for as much as twenty-five 
pounds” (12). 
 
23 I borrow the term “Autograph-hunters” from Charles Robinson’s “Confessions of an 
Autograph-Hunter.” 
 
24 Upon arriving at the scene of the Carew murder, Utterson finds that his gift to Jekyll, 
“a heavy cane” (46), has been used in the fatal assault (47). 
 
25 This opportunity for “minute analysis” accounts for much of Walter Benjamin’s 
fascination with graphology. Reading Benjamin’s “On the Mimetic Faculty” in the light 
of his essay on the work of art, graphology emerges as a kind of proto-cinema. Just as 
cinema examines a dimension of commonplace human movement and expression that is 
entirely familiar to us, and yet essentially invisible to the naked eye (the camera 
“introduces us to unconscious optics as does psychoanalysis to unconscious impulses” 
(237), graphology’s study of the body’s unconscious movements teaches us “to recognize 
in handwriting images that the unconscious of the writer conceals in it” (335).   
 
26 “Every designer and every painter reproduces himself, more or less, in his works; you 
discover in them either something of his exterior or of his mind, as we shall presently 
show…” (Lavater, v.4, 198). 
 
27 For a comparable British example, see George Fielding Blandford’s Lectures on the 
Treatment, Medical and Legal, of Insane Patients, delivered at the schools of St. George’s 
Hospital and collected within Insanity and its Treatment (1886). See 351-356. See also: 
Holt-Schooling, “The Handwriting of Mad People” (1896). 
 
28 Melanie Klein’s “The Role of the School in the Libidinal Development of the Child” 
(1923) examines this tendency for the body to insert itself into the handwriting of 
schoolchildren. Klein’s particular interest has to do with the libidinal investment in 
writing, how the act functions as a substitute for the act of coitus, and principally how the 
‘I’ stands for the erect penis and the self-sufficient individual. Freud as well intuited the 
libidinal charge of writing, an association that had to be repressed in order for writing to 
proceed: “As soon as writing, which entails making a liquid flow out of a tube onto a 
piece of white paper, assumes the significance of copulation, or as soon as walking 
becomes a symbolic substitute for treading upon the body of mother earth, both writing 
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and walking are stopped because they represent the performance of a forbidden sexual 
act” (Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety 90).  
 
29 Consulting the mirror, Jekyll finds that his entire body has been transformed overnight, 
but his reference to the “Babylonian finger on the wall” at Belshazzar’s feast emphasizes 
the disembodied hand while ushering readers into another scene of interpretation, 
featuring writing that must be deciphered before the passing of judgment. 
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3 
Entranced:  
Richard Marsh’s The Beetle and Literature of the Impressionable Mind 
 
Published in 1897 and immediately enjoying a popularity that not even Bram Stoker’s 
Dracula could rival, Richard Marsh’s The Beetle takes place in contemporary London, 
where a hideous creature has arrived from Egypt to exact vengeance upon Paul 
Lessingham, a respected British politician with whom the fiend shares a scandalous 
history.1 Though our narrator innocently notes that Lessingham’s portfolio has never 
included “Foreign Affairs,” the politician has found himself entangled in some 
mysterious indiscretion, one of those “pages in the book of every man’s life […] which 
he would wish to keep turned down” (121), to borrow Marsh’s turn of phrase. While 
traveling in Egypt, Lessingham is lured into the Cult of Isis by the siren-song of a 
beautiful woman. Drugged, seduced, and held captive in a “mesmeric stupor,” he is 
forced to witness “orgies of nameless horrors” and sacrificial rites “too bizarre, too 
hideous to be true.” Months pass before this dark cloud lifts, but at the first lapse of his 
persecutor’s captivating influence, Lessingham breaks free of her clutches and flees to 
England. However, what happens in Cairo does not stay in Cairo, and the scorned Beetle 
descends upon London, exercising its hypnotic powers over each of our protagonists in 
turn. These acts of possession carry a charge that is as much physically and sexually 
invasive as it is psychic.  
The Beetle’s erotic association with Lessingham is the inaugural event of Marsh’s 
narrative, but long before we learn of this tryst, our first glimpse of the Beetle establishes 
the polymorphous nature of its threat. This is how Robert Holt, the tale’s first victim, 
describes his succumbing to the Beetle: “Fingers were pressed into my cheeks, they were 
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thrust into my mouth, they touched my staring eyes, shut my eyelids, then opened them 
again, and--horror of horrors!—the blubber lips were pressed to mine—the soul of 
something evil entered into me in the guise of a kiss” (57, emphasis added). The horror of 
the creature’s “kiss” has everything to do with surfaces yielding to pressure, the subject 
giving in and giving way, its submission expressed through the continual “into” that 
becomes the refrain of Holt’s account. Holt’s enthralling description of the assault is 
characteristic of the novel in that it invites us to consider the homographic valences of 
becoming “entranced.” The word is itself a double entrance, a single passage leading now 
into one chamber and then into another. Perhaps these two destinations are so similar in 
appearance that to distinguish between them—to insist, as our first narrator does, that 
things are “the same, yet not the same” (60)—amounts to a kind of paranoia.2 Everything 
seems to be in its proper place, and yet I falter under this slight vertigo of meaning. Such 
reading betrays an excessive sensitivity resonating most sympathetically with the tightly 
wound nerves of the novel’s most helpless victims. Our straining eyes begin to “see 
double,” discerning difference where others observe only the placid consistency of an 
unchanging world. The representational torsion generated by these two divergent 
perspectives within “paranoid” gothic literature produces the doppelganger. 
 Within The Beetle, one could remark simply that the hypnotist entrances his 
victim by finding an entrance where none was found before. The framework of the novel 
could not highlight these concerns more explicitly. Its first two chapters, simply entitled 
“Inside” and “Outside,” announce the passage from outside in as a crucial thematic 
concern of the text’s troubled topography. Accordingly, Book One’s title, “The House 
With the Open Window,” names the breach through which we follow Robert Holt, our 
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first narrator, into the Beetle’s world. Holt considers the door, but decides instead upon 
the “aperture” of a window, bypassing the accepted path, breaking and entering. This 
unlawful trespass emblematizes Marsh’s narrative technique and prefigures his concern 
with the permeability of private spaces and bodies. Exploiting the eye as the central locus 
of his concern with the penetrability of bodies and the dissolution of subjects, Marsh 
vividly imagines what Jonathan Crary has described as the “carnal density of vision.”3 
We find in his novel a compelling depiction of the eye as an organ of exposed 
vulnerability rather than veiled power. The baleful Beetle unleashes a range of menacing 
trompe l’oeil techniques (from mesmeric trance to optical illusions to cross-dressing) that 
form the novel’s central tableaux. If the objective reality of these spectacles is 
questionable, their subjective and intensive power is unmistakable. In Marsh’s novel, 
visual apprehension occurs not as the benign reception of information, but as a visceral 
threat that jeopardizes the coherence and autonomy of the subject. 
For its thematic exploitation of such indeterminacy between the self and its 
others, the Gothic has often been acknowledged as a paradox of genre, the category of the 
uncategorizable. Kelly Hurley’s The Gothic Body: Sexuality, Materialism, and 
Degeneration at the Fin-de-Siècle understands as the fundamental spectacle of Gothic 
narrative this representation “of the human subject undergoing dissolution,” a prospect 
that triggers hysterical anxiety in Sartre’s analysis, repression and denial in Freud’s, and 
abjection in Kristeva’s. Hurley’s work aligns itself most closely with Kristeva, exploring 
the jouissance provoked by these “abhuman” bodies, and anticipating the promise they 
hold “of a monstrous becoming” (4). The abject threatens to break down the constitutive 
boundaries of the subject, and this dizzying indeterminacy of one’s selfhood plunges the 
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“I,” the pillar of the symbolic, “toward the place where meaning collapses” (Powers 2). 
Gothic literature conventionally induces this collapse through creatures such as the 
Beetle; figures too unstable to explicitly “symbolize” any one threat in particular, these 
monstrous demonstrations disrupt economies of representation. Marsh’s characterization 
of this extraordinary being—an insect-humanoid, neither male nor female—has prompted 
critics to read the novel as a perpetually anxious text, the portentous symptom of a 
blighted cultural uncanny. Judith Halberstam’s Skin Shows: Gothic Horror and the 
Technology of Monsters explores how the Gothic grants thought (for Halberstam, 
principally anxious thought) a body, making it multiple, visceral, and hideous. Figures 
such as Frankenstein’s monster and Dracula’s vampire are overdetermined signifiers of 
abjection, Gordian knots tied so that they cannot be undone through any particular 
reading. Halberstam contends that in “any attempt to fix monstrosity, some aspect of it 
escapes unread” (29).  
It is this ambivalence of the text that allows Hurley to attribute the Beetle’s 
origins in the Egyptian Cult of Isis to the repressed materials of an imperial unconscious, 
remarking that The Beetle “serves to reflect and feed into British suspicion of and 
contempt for Egyptians during a period of heightened British military activity in Egypt” 
(127). The creature accommodates as well Roger Luckhurst’s understanding of the novel 
as “a somewhat normative allegory of the fantastic dangers of miscegenation and pre-
nuptial sex, exploiting the syphilitic dangers broadcast by social purity campaigners” 
(162). In his introduction to The Beetle (2004), Julian Wolfreys provides a thorough 
review of the text’s surprisingly modest critical reception, giving a general account of the 
confusions of race, species, gender, and sexuality roused by the monster and claiming 
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that, in the end, its “body is grotesque because it is unstable, excessive, ambiguously 
traced by so many fragments of identity” (19).4 Wolfreys’ survey exhibits a number of 
these very compelling cases made for the Beetle as an embodiment of the Freudian 
“return of the repressed.” Incorporating as it does so many abjected materials, the 
abhorrent body of the Beetle becomes legible as a material index of fin-de-siècle cultural 
concerns. Understandably, critical response has been singularly drawn to this captivating 
figure. However, my own analysis departs from this approach in turning to the other 
(perhaps initially less conspicuous) bodies that populate the text. These permeable bodies 
and “impressionable minds” bear the physical imprint of the text upon themselves, and 
struggle to transmit the import and impact of their experience. 
This chapter explores trance-literature through its persistent evocation of the 
“impressionable mind,” a trope that submits writing as a privileged figure for the 
subject's permeability. Marsh’s association of hypnosis with photography impels us to 
consider the contemporaneous development of “the negative” within photographic and 
psychoanalytic discourse. The traffic between these two registers allows Freud to remark 
that the unconscious resembles “a photographic apparatus” (Interpretation 574), while 
Oliver Wendell Holmes speaks of the camera as a “mirror with memory” and a 
“conscience” (“Stereoscope” 741). Freud’s analogy recognizes the inscribed character of 
the subject, while Holmes’ imagines the subjective nature of the scriptural. Within The 
Beetle, this chiasmus is mapped out along the lines of optical relations. The mechanics of 
photography allow for a reflexive understanding of the gaze that engenders the 
subjectivity of objects and the objectification of viewing subjects. This inverted gaze 
accentuates the vulnerability of perception as permeability, and haunts realism with the 
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intimation that its “look” may fail to guarantee the dominance of the subject thereby 
enlightened.  
 
Vital Signs: Photography and the Gothic 
The fundamental challenge posed by the Gothic to modern understandings of inscription 
derives from the genre’s uncanny belief in the transubstantiation of signs and bodies, 
whereby the word is made flesh, and the flesh is “made word.” We will address each of 
these conversions in turn. The first, and more familiarly gothic trajectory is manifest 
within Marsh’s novel through the monster itself, whose affiliation with the idolatrous cult 
of Isis endows her with the power to animate signs. The superstitious veneration of 
symbols displayed by the Egyptian cult amounts to a colonialist update of the threat of 
Catholic iconophilia, a further disavowal of “the darkest age of Christianity” referenced 
within Horace Walpole’s preface to his seminal gothic novel The Castle of Otranto (59). 
The larval process of metamorphosis undergone by Beetles emblematizes the fluid 
transformation of substances just as ably as the liquid process of photography.5 Notably, 
much of the creature’s horror derives from its uncanny aesthetic productions. From 
weaving to photogravure, the Beetle produces living texts that trigger a distressing 
ontological confusion by exhibiting the same fluid relation between signs and things 
themselves. 
Marsh’s novel presents us with a familiar instance of this gothic confusion when, 
investigating the Beetle’s residence, Lessingham’s fiancée Marjorie Lindon realizes the 
carpet upon which she is standing is either embroidered or infested with insects: “The 
artist had woven his undesirable subject into the warp and woof of the material with such 
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cunning skill that, as one continued to gaze, one began to wonder if by any possibility the 
creatures could be alive.” Marjorie’s attention is drawn next to a bundle of carpets, one of 
which has been adorned with the representation of a human sacrifice. Of the “naked 
white woman being burned” upon the altar, she remarks, “[t]here could be no doubt as to 
her being alive” (230). This body contorts itself “into shapes which were horribly 
suggestive of the agony which she was enduring,” convincing Marjorie that “the artist . . . 
seemed to have exhausted his powers in his efforts to convey a vivid impression of the 
pains which were tormenting her.” For Marjorie, the scene presents “as ghastly a piece of 
realism as one could see” (230). Though the content of the image depicted in such an 
unflinching manner may be upsetting in itself, it is something else that makes the realism 
of this scene so haunting. A revival of the living tapestry convention we find in Otranto 
and other early Gothic novels, the image is beyond lifelike; impossibly, it is itself 
animate, literally swarming with life. Such “ghastly” representations stage the collapse of 
realism by pushing it beyond the limits of resemblance, thereby refusing the abdication of 
realism to the ever-receding horizon of the real. When representation fails to keep its 
respectful distance through the disclaimers of fiction and the restraint of figure, it 
becomes gothic.  
What is perhaps more surprising is the way in which modern technologies push 
Marsh’s narrative in this gothic direction as well; through indexical replication, the 
“exact reproduction” becomes too real. Walter Benjamin touches upon this 
technologically-induced enchantment in his “Short History of Photography,” where he 
remarks: “the most precise technology can give its products a magical value” (243). The 
monster’s calling card, which features an image of an uncommon species of Beetle 
  
127 
“produced apparently by some process of photogravure,” is so startlingly vibrant that a 
mere “glance” sends Paul Lessingham into fits: “As he did so, something surprising 
occurred. On the instant a look came on to his face which, literally, transfigured him” 
(114). Even Atherton, the novel’s most resolutely skeptical character, finds that “the 
whole thing was so dexterously done that the creature seemed alive. The semblance of 
reality was, indeed, so vivid that it needed a second glance to be assured that it was a 
mere trick of the reproducer” (115). Such nervous fascination with contemporary 
technology reminds us that the untimeliness of gothic poesis cannot be restricted to 
antiquated techniques and archaic understandings of signification. Furthermore, Marsh’s 
enlistment of this contemporary technology not only “updates” the gothic trope of the 
living sign, but suggests a reversal of its orientation, towards realism rather than romance. 
This reorientation allows the “techno-gothic” mode to address the idolatry of modern 
visual culture. Lessingham’s “transfiguration” suggests that the modern subject is 
transformed in the act of looking. His body is drawn into a field of vision where signs are 
imbued with life, and living bodies are apprehended as signs. 
The occult powers of photography are broadly attested to within nineteenth-
century literature. Indeed, in Alison Chapman’s reading, “early photography was often 
seen not as analogous to mesmerism, but one and the same operation” (“Ghost” 67). The 
crucial difference to be marked with Marsh’s text, however, is that it disturbs the 
common alignment of mesmerist with photographer to be found within texts such as 
Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The House of Seven Gables (in the character of Holgrave), Robert 
Browning’s “Mesmerism,” and George du Maurier’s Trilby. In each of these texts, the 
intensity of concentration involved in “fixing” the photograph’s subject is imagined as a 
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sadistic procedure, while Marsh depicts the photographic observer as passive, even 
masochistic. For if the “stillness of the photographic sitter” renders him “conducive to 
trance,” so too does the receptive stance of the viewer. Just as Stevenson tells us of Hyde, 
Marsh’s Beetle has “never been photographed” (JH 49), unless one counts the indelible 
images lodged within the minds of his witnesses.6 In their attempts at visual 
apprehension, Marsh’s protagonists repeatedly turn to photographic apparatuses. 
However, rather than functioning as the instruments of uncanny power that we see 
elsewhere in other photographic Gothic fiction, they serve as emblems of a traumatic and 
ineffable sensitivity to the external world. 
The most striking incidence of this photographic receptivity occurs during Sydney 
Atherton’s first encounter with the Beetle. Atherton writes: “I kept my glance riveted on 
the creature, with the idea of photographing it on my brain. I believe that if it were 
possible to take a retinal print—which some day it will be—you would have a perfect 
picture of what it was I saw” (150). With these curious words, the reader is conducted 
into one of The Beetle’s most climactic moments, in which the mysterious creature at last 
reveals him—or her, or it—self to our narrator. The scene treats readers to not one but 
two metamorphoses. There is, of course, the emergence of Atherton’s antagonist from his 
“loose draperies,” revealing a golden-green creature “six or seven inches high, and about 
a foot in length” (150). But in the midst of this mutation comes another just as startling. 
Before the reader stands Atherton, and we watch him transform himself—through a 
technological fantasy that enframes the gothic nightmare—into a photographic machine. 
Marsh’s peculiar hero is a narrator less inclined to write than to be written upon. 
Departing from descriptive narrative techniques, he appeals to his own body as an archive 
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of the event. Yielding his “brain” and retina to the Beetle, he will passively receive the 
imprint of the scene upon himself. In this way, the text orchestrates an ekphrastic relation 
to its secret, making of the novel a caption read underneath a photograph yet to be 
developed. 
Atherton’s invocation of this visual index would seem here to privilege 
photographic substantiation over the testimony of language, but for Marsh’s characters 
the appeal of the photographic metaphor lies not merely in the new model of writing it 
presents, but in the way the photographic process embodies a familiar sensation of being 
written. It is not the stylus, but the surface of inscription that these characters identify 
themselves with. It is this strange affinity that prompts the conversation between 
novelistic and photographic method beyond consideration of the mimetic possibilities of 
aesthetic forms, to consider changes in the subject of representation itself. How is it, 
Marsh asks, that we are stared back at by the world, and altered by our own instruments 
of perception?   
It is Lacan who provides us with the most sustained theoretical attempt at 
grappling with these paradoxes of vision. Though psychoanalysis and the Gothic have 
enjoyed a long and fruitful conversation, the prevailing tenor and atmosphere of Lacan’s 
lectures and writings has generally proven less hospitable to ghost stories than Freud’s 
corpus, which seems most at home when drifting through dream-states inhabited by 
sinister shadows and menacing doubles. However, Lacan’s discussion of the gaze draws 
upon imagery ranging from the surreal (the can of sardines that devours him with its 
sunlit glint) to the gothic (the anamorphically distorted skull in Hans Holbein’s 
Ambassadors).7  Lacan’s reference to the gaze in his first reading seminar (Freud’s 
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Papers on Technique) presents us with a kind of “haunted” house, the darkened window 
of which bears a distinct resemblance to the “aperture” that marks our entrance into 
Marsh’s narrative. Lacan writes: “I can feel myself under the gaze of someone whose 
eyes I do not see, not even discern. All that is necessary is for something to signify to me 
that there may be others there. This window, if it gets a bit dark, and if I have reasons for 
thinking that there is someone behind it, is straight-away a gaze” (215). And here is the 
destitute Robert Holt, the Beetle’s first victim, standing outside the villain’s house on a 
cold and rainy night: “I saw the open window. I stared at it, conscious, as I did so, of a 
curious catching of the breath. It was so near to me; so very near. I had but to stretch out 
my hand to thrust it through the aperture” (49). Once inside this darkened window, 
however, Holt begins dimly to apprehend his mistake: 
I became, on a sudden, aware, that something was with me in the room. There 
was nothing, ostensible, to lead me to such a conviction; it may be that my 
faculties were unnaturally keen; but, all at once, I knew that there was something 
there. What was more, I had a horrible persuasion that, though unseeing, I was 
seen; that my every movement was being watched. (49, emphasis added) 
By unlinking eye and gaze, Lacanian optics proposes a counter-intuitive reversal that 
discards commonsensical certainties concerning the presumed activity of the viewer and 
the passivity of the viewed: “in the scopic field, everything is articulated between two 
terms that act in an antinomic way—on the side of things, there is the gaze, that is to say, 
things look at me, and yet I see them” (Fundamental 109). Lacan is attracted to the 
paradoxical notion that the eye itself has become the blind spot of the subject, and 
functions less as the instrument of vision than that of its censorship. Fixation on the eye 
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enacts a critical displacement within the field of visuality that grants priority to the “I.” 
This orientation schematizes vision according to the dictates of the imaginary, an 
ordering of perspective dedicated to the erection and orthopedic support of the subject. 
Lacan rejects this emphasis, reconfiguring the coordinates of the gaze to shift attention to 
the seemingly subordinate principle of the objective gaze, the real upon which the 
imaginary order is grounded. In doing so, his concept denies any simple equivalence of 
vision with power. Surveillance of the world is no guarantee of the subject’s dominance. 
Lacan’s preferred visual trope for this reversal is the trompe l’oeil, the painting that lures 
its viewer into the frame with the promise of a certain perspectival order, only to collapse 
this order in upon the subject. This “trick” of the image is withheld until the viewer hits 
his or her mark, ensnared in the netting of the field of vision. Every picture, Lacan warns 
us, is such a trap.  
 This is also the case within the darkened windows of Lacan and Marsh: the 
intensity and concentration of the subject’s look results not in stricter control of the 
objects he examines, but in a paradoxical submission to these objects of perception. Our 
bodies become, in Lacan’s words, “photo-sensitive” (Fundamental 94). The longer one 
stares into the darkness, the deeper and wider it spreads, as its shadows come to life. The 
state of the body while under hypnosis provides a direct illustration of this point. When in 
a deep hypnotic trance, the subject’s pupils dilate, and tend to remain in this receptive 
condition, even when a bright light is shone into them.8 It is in this posture of openness 
and impressionability that we are “photo-graphed” by the objects we view (Fundamental 
106). It should come as no surprise that Lacan imagines the gaze in such photographic 
terms. It is not that photography merely provides an available analogy for the 
  
132 
unconscious. Rather, this technology makes the unconscious available. Without 
attributing the “discovery” of the unconscious exclusively to technology, we can say that 
it facilitated a new way of articulating and “imaging” the subject by giving concrete, 
objective expression to invisible internal psycho-physiological processes.  
 The conjoined history of photography and of the subject demonstrates Lacan’s 
assertion that  “the slightest alteration in the relation between men and the signifier . . . 
changes the whole course of history by modifying the moorings that anchor his being” 
(Ecrits 174). The gaze is not intrinsic to the subject, but arises in large part through 
technologies that broker the prosthetic invention of the human. Borrowing from 
photography, psychoanalysis and the Gothic account for this reciprocal influence of the 
visual relation, and point to the possibility of an inverted optics that charts the changes in 
the subject of representation brought about through the act of looking.  
Typically, discussion of photography within Victorian culture pointedly turned 
away from this photographing subject, insisting that the significant work of photography 
was performed by the machine and not the operator. Among photography’s creators, 
much of the rhetoric enframing photographic “description” tended to emphasize the way 
in which the automatic processes of the apparatus sidelined the photographer, eliminating 
the subjective element of previous strategies of depiction. From one point of view, the 
camera presented a model of vision decoupled from the body, introducing an objective 
mechanical eye that corrected subjective human error. Early photography texts such as 
Philip Henry Delamotte’s The Sunbeam (1859) and Marcus Aurelius Root’s The Camera 
and the Pencil (1864) stress the primacy of nature’s inscriptions. Likewise, Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’ “Doings of the Sunbeam” (1863) solicits the photographer’s humility 
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in the face of nature’s powers. Outlining the detailed process of making photographs, he 
intermittently pauses to check the presumptions of his own language: “while we make a 
photograph,—say, rather, while the mysterious forces which we place in condition to act 
work that miracle for us” (3). William H. Fox Talbot, who patented the calotype (or 
talbotype) process and determined a method for the development of multiple prints from 
a photographic negative, insists on this deferral of authorship as well, conceiving of the 
photographic process as one through which the object composes its own self-portrait. In 
“Some Account of the Art of Photogenic Drawing,” presented to the Royal Society in 
1839, he describes his photograph of Lacock Abbey in such terms: “this building I 
believe to be the first that was ever yet known to have drawn its own picture” (46). 
Talbot’s The Pencil of Nature (1844), touted in its 1969 reprinting as the Gutenberg 
Bible of the photographic age, was the first book to be illustrated with mass-produced 
photographs, images derived from his calotype process. Talbot prefaces this work with a 
“Note to the Reader” informing his audience that the following plates have been 
“impressed by the agency of Light alone, without any aid whatever from the artist’s 
pencil” (n. pag).9 If the artist has refrained from tampering with the images themselves, 
his pencil has been doubly occupied in delineating the discursive support framing 
precisely what it was his viewers were intended to see. The true artistry of Holmes and 
Talbot emerges in their pivotal roles in promulgating the mythology of photography as a 
distinct language affording privileged access to things in themselves. 
 Certainly, many of Talbot’s contemporaries resisted this myth, maintaining that 
even a “senseless machine” such as the camera could produce representations in which 
one can “clearly perceive a human mind at work” (103 Sizeranne). Sir William de 
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Wivelesley Abney, three-time President of the Royal Photographic Society and editor of 
the Journal of the Photographic Society from 1881 to 1894, concedes that photography 
“can be, and very often is, a purely mechanical production” (303). However, he maintains 
that many photographs obtain to his criteria for works of art; these are “productions of the 
hand” in which “we can see an impress of the mind” (303). Traces such as these were 
persistently invoked in the defence of photography’s status as Art.10 Participating in an 
1899 Magazine of Art symposium organized around the question “Is Photography Among 
the Fine Arts,” Robert de la Sizeranne emphasizes the photographer’s “interventions” in 
the process—from composition to developing to printing—in order to demonstrate the 
means by which the artist “impresses his personality so strongly on the operations that the 
result is completely transfigured” (103). These impressions are evidence of the creative 
mind exercising its “will to art” upon a malleable reality. Within critical discussion of 
photography, the question as to whether it is the subject or the object that writes has 
remained an insistent problem. Recent attempts at tackling the issue of photographic 
agency have tended to insist on photography’s art (or artifice), though the prevalent tone 
has shifted from celebration of the artistic impulse to a more skeptical, iconoclastic 
account of how discourse frames its object. “When we press the button of a camera,” 
argues Walter Benn Michaels, “we are writing” (222). This “writing” translates physical, 
indexical marks into symbolic signs, prompting the dutiful poststructural installation of 
scare quotes around “the world” and scuttling myths of transparency with the opacity of 
semiotics. We make photographs when we “take” photographs (Lewis 5); the marks that 
emerge are indices of reality’s production, not its retrieval.  
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 Such are the questions that realism and its critique make possible. However, 
within the bounds of this questioning, the subject all too commonly escapes interrogation 
by posing as the a priori of representation.11 The camera cannot merely be considered as 
another tool at the disposal of a relatively stable viewing subject, endowed with an ever-
widening arsenal of representational techniques to choose from. For the tool brings about 
not only the extension of the subject (through the colonization or domestication of the 
perceptible world), but its metamorphosis as well. Consequently, genealogies of media 
cannot credibly organize their evolution of forms along the lines of a presumed shared 
genus, naming for instance the camera obscura as the primogenitor of the daguerrotype, 
which in its turn begat the cinema. This history of progressive invention obscures the 
true, miscegenous nature of machine and human lineage, a shared evolution that proceeds 
not along parallel lines, but as the double helix of a shared DNA strand. 
It is chiefly through Atherton’s imperious attitude toward science that Marsh’s 
text represents human resistance to such technological implantations. Atherton’s 
distinctly colonial understanding of technology imagines his inventions as extensions of 
the body and instruments of British imperialism. Indeed, the patent for his “System of 
Telegraphy at Sea” has just been purchased by the Admiralty (109). Atherton uses 
technology as weaponry; he is always at work on “new projectile[s]” (109) that assert his 
dominance, and that of the British empire. In a manner highly reminiscent of the contest 
staged between Dracula and Stoker’s techno-savvy Crew of Light, Atherton’s powers as 
an inventor are explicitly pitted against the Beetle’s magic. In his second confrontation 
with the Beetle, Atherton rehearses an old chestnut of techno-colonialism, terrorizing his 
visitor with “a little exhibition of electricity” and a demonstration of the combustible 
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properties of phosphorus bromide. These displays of superior modern “firepower” leave 
the Beetle “prostrated on his knees,” and “salaaming in a condition of abject terror” 
(145). “My lord! my lord!” the creature whimpers, “I entreat you, my lord to use me as 
your slave!” (145). Exploiting the “shock and awe” that advanced technology instills 
within all such supposedly credulous and superstitious ethnic creatures, Atherton’s 
technological mastery countermands the Beetle’s insubordinate position. 
What is it then that prevents Marsh from employing a camera to similar ends, 
granting Atherton visual dominion over the Beetle by “capturing” it photographically? 
Historically speaking, the camera would have long been available to Marsh; other 
novelists had put the machine to use in their narratives. In the same year as The Beetle’s 
publication, for instance, Stoker will provide Jonathan Harker with a Kodak camera (54), 
allowing him to chart out a photographic map of Count Dracula’s Carfax estate. 
However, for all of its photographic reflections on vision and memory, there are no 
cameras in The Beetle. They make no objective appearance within the novel’s mise-en-
scene, existing only within the minds and bodies of characters. Photography manifests 
itself not as a technology but as a quality of feeling, and an embodied metaphor for the 
impact of experience. Producing the latent print lodged within Atherton’s retina, it is an 
impression, rather than a means of expression available to Marsh’s characters. 
Robert Holt, the novel’s first hapless victim, imagines his psyche as a 
photographic surface as well. When he first finds himself outside of the Beetle’s 
residence, his perception takes in the scene with the startling precision of a camera-eye: 
“I realised, and, so to speak, mentally photographed all the little details of the house. An 
instant before, the world swam before my eyes. Now I saw everything, with a clearness 
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which, as it were, was shocking” (47).12  Holt’s “so to speak” brackets his expression as a 
figure of speech, subordinating photography to language as merely one of many 
analogies at its disposal. And yet, before long, this analogy has turned on Holt, as the 
photographic capacity of the psyche comes to illustrate not his determined will-to-
perceive, but a helpless inability not to see. Holt finds that under the Beetle’s trance, 
“every detail of my involuntary actions was projected upon my brain in a series of 
pictures, whose clear-cut outlines, so long as memory endures, will never fade” (71). 
This internalized camera cannot be brandished as a weapon, or bandied about like 
the auxiliary phallus so clearly envisioned by McLuhan when he subtitles Understanding 
Media “Extensions of Man.” Though the notion of a photographic memory commonly 
signifies a clarity of visual recollection that allows for startlingly objective control over 
past impressions, Holt finds to his dismay that one does not possess this ability so much 
as one is possessed by it. The Beetle coaxes us out of the bounds of realism by 
internalizing the terms of the photographic analogy. Marsh’s writing experiment is not 
merely a remediation of the novel through the camera, nor are his narrators simply 
writers who fantasize about being photographers. In a much more integral sense, they 
dream of becoming photographic.  
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FIGURE 3.1 
“Elephans Photographicus.” From Punch 44 (1863): 249.  
 
A satirical Punch illustration published in 1863 offers a glimpse of such a 
becoming in its depiction of the “Elephans Photographicus.” While this “Curious 
Animal” will most likely be unfamiliar to a twenty-first century audience, its descendents 
can today be observed, among other habitats, in the films of Terry Gilliam and Tim 
Burton. In films such as Brazil and Sleepy Hollow, the act of looking—extended and 
retooled through ocular prosthetics—transforms the seer. Through such surreal bodies a 
certain technique of visualization becomes itself visible, as we find ourselves looking 
through the magnifying glass from the other side at the contorted gaze of prying eyes, 
subject to effects of distortion that range from the ridiculous to the grotesque.  
  
139 
In the Punch cartoon as well, the purportedly disinterested gaze of realism 
facilitated by the camera eye becomes monstrous. The photographer’s head has been 
swallowed up by the hood of the camera, locked into its Cyclops-eye through a process of 
prosthetic fusion. The unsettling insectoid features of this strange beast, including its 
delicate segmented forelegs, would almost seem to nominate the human-machine-insect 
hybrid as an imaginative condensation of the Beetle’s twin metamorphoses. Beyond this 
striking homeomorphic identification, however, the image fittingly illustrates Marsh’s 
novel in its depiction of the fixation of the operator’s gaze. It suggests that, as irrevocably 
as the subject of any photograph, the operator is fixed, or stuck in position (that of taking 
the photograph), in her own way captured by the camera eye. Resisting alignment with 
the photographer’s perspective, the Punch cartoon reverses the gaze to suggest that 
photography’s true impact has less to do with the evolution of representational techniques 
than with the metamorphosis of the human body as a “viewing machine.” 
  
“Everything is just as wrong as it can be”: The Development of the Negative  
If photography facilitated a new photographic understanding of the human body, the 
daguerrotype was hardly the first optical instrument to inspire analogies with the 
physiology and psychology of human vision. The camera obscura had long been utilized 
as an illustration of the workings of the eye and mind, our internalized darkened 
chambers. In the seventeenth century Johannes Kepler, the German astronomer 
responsible for coining the term “camera obscura,” used the mechanism to illustrate “how 
an infinity of rays from each point in the visual field is drawn into a coherent, point-to-
point correspondence in the eye.” Kepler argued that, like the convex glass lens of the 
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camera, the eye’s crystalline lens and cornea refract and refocus incoming rays. These 
rays are received upon the “plate” or “canvas” of the retina (Lindberg 7). 
 The camera obscura operated upon a relatively simple optical principle deduced 
by the ancient Greeks: that the passage of light through a small aperture into a darkened 
chamber will project an inverted image on any surface facing the aperture. To find the 
first comprehensive scientific description of the camera obscura, our investigation returns 
to Cairo. It is here that the Arabian astronomer and mathematician Ibn al-Haytham (965-
1039) conducted a series of experiments that convinced him of the fallacy of the ancient 
Greek hypothesis that the eye scanned objects by sending out tractor rays to apprehend 
the image. Rather, al-Haytham argued that images were impressed upon the anterior wall 
of the eye through light reflected into the eye, by a process that came to be modeled by 
the camera obscura’s darkened room. 
 Stationed inside this chamber that essentially functioned as a giant eyeball, men 
of art and science cast themselves into a mise-en-abime of the optical situation. The 
darkness of the room—this eye within an eye—established a private space of 
contemplation. The occupants of the camera obscura were not shackled like the slaves of 
Plato’s allegory, but entered the cave to see more clearly the exterior world. The use of 
the camera obscura in solar observation provides the most straightforward enactment of 
this logic, allowing as it does the astronomer to circumvent the paradox (the painful 
ramifications of which were explored by scientists such as Joseph Plateau) that one 
cannot see the sun as long as one is looking at it.13 
Jonathan Crary speaks succinctly about the “operation of individuation” carried 
out by the camera obscura, exploring the manner in which this device facilitated the 
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definition of “an observer as isolated, enclosed, or autonomous within its dark confines” 
(29). The mechanism requires  
askesis, or withdrawal from the world, in order to regulate and purify one's 
 relation to the manifold contents of the now ‘exterior’ world. Thus the camera 
 obscura is inseparable from a certain metaphysic of interiority: it is a figure for 
 both the observer who is nominally a free sovereign individual and a privatised 
 subject confined in a quasi-domestic space, cut off from a public exterior world. 
 (29) 
Inside this temple of the eye, the observer found sanctuary from the troubled dynamic of 
visual experience. Now one could see without being seen, without being “touched” 
by the things one viewed. 
 The essential innovation of the photographic negative is that this surface 
apprehends not only the projection of light (as had the camera obscura), but also its 
inscriptive powers. These two distinct functions correspond to the paradigmatic shift that 
Crary identifies between the geometrical understanding of optics in circulation 
throughout the eighteenth century and the physiological theories that dominated 
nineteenth-century research on the topic. As a technology of visualization, the 
photograph embodies this new way of understanding the phenomenology of vision. The 
camera obscura had literally removed the body from the field of vision so that it could 
organize objects in space by way of abstract geometries. Conversely, the seat of vision in 
photographic visuality is materially present to the objects it sees. Perceived affinities 
between photographic and human perception engender a new observer, one whose body 
is marked by the irreducibly physical acts of “exposure” and incorporation that are the 
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prerequisites of vision. This exposure of the body gives rise to what Steven Shaviro has 
described as “a new regime of the image, one in which vision is visceral and intensive, 
instead of representational and extensive.” (139). This subject experiences vision in a 
manner that would later be theorized by Maurice Merleau-Ponty as “palpation of the eye” 
(“Intertwining” 251-252), a cross-examination that entwines seer and seen in a visceral 
chiasmus. Marsh’s narrative helps us to imagine this “carnal density of vision” (Crary 
150), as his characters strain to grant expression to the palpable and traumatic experience 
of seeing.14 Scenes such as Holt’s initial victimization communicate the equivocal nature 
of photographic capture, a process whereby the world acts upon viewers with or without 
their consent, imprinting indelible images upon bodies that emulate the responsive 
passivity of the index.  
 This automatic writing, which proceeds without the inclination of the subject, 
challenges the integrity and autonomy of the subject’s interior life. The photographic 
method bars the subject from the process of inscription; the images that emerge from the 
negative are but the traces of prior writings that she has no “hand” in. The primary shift 
to be recognized within the passage to photography is the movement it effectuates from a 
Cartesian model of consciousness (enframed within the camera obscura), to a model of 
the unconscious (embodied in the “negative”). The photographic process passes through a 
twilight zone that lengthens the shadow cast by the term “negative,” accentuating the 
darker nuances of the word.15 John Abbott, writing for Harper’s New Monthly Magazine 
in 1870, would address this issue these connotations in his piece on “The Negative in 
Photography”: 
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The word negative, which the photographer applies to the first image which he 
obtains of the subject, whatever it may be, that he is to photograph, is rather a 
misnomer, inasmuch as the properties which characterize it, though striking and 
peculiar, do not seem very clearly to involve any idea of negation. If it had been 
called the reverse, instead of the negative, its name would have been perhaps 
more suggestive of its character. But the name negative is established, and must 
stand. (845) 
Abbott objects to this name, because it is not in accordance with his vision of 
photography that its processes should be carried out under the sign of negativity. And yet, 
he acknowledges that his own “positive” image of the art will always be underwritten by 
the priority of this “misnomer’s” indelible trace. “The name negative is established, and 
must stand,” Abbott concludes. This false name will always cast its shadow over any true 
name given to photography. 
If Abbott resists this undercurrent of negativity, Oliver Wendell Holmes exploits 
it with relish. In Holmes’ view, the photographic negative is “perverse and totally 
depraved . . . it might almost seem as if some magic and diabolic power had wrenched all 
things from their proprieties, where the light of the eye was darkness, and the deepest 
blackness was glided with the brightest glare” (“Stereoscope” 740). In Holmes’s writing, 
the negative emerges as a world of perversion in need of redemption: “the glass plate has 
the right part of the object on the left side of its picture, and the left part on its right side; 
its light is darkness, and its darkness is light. Everything is just as wrong as it can be, 
except that the relations of each wrong to the other wrongs are like the relations of the 
corresponding rights to each other in the original natural image. This is a negative 
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picture” (740-741). This darkness, however, is to serve as a prelude to a functional 
dialectic of photo-synthesis (if I may be permitted to play along with Holmes’s rhetoric). 
Holmes declares: “This negative is now to give birth to a positive,—this mass of 
contradictions to assert its hidden truth in a perfect harmonious affirmation of the realities 
of Nature. Behold the process!” (741). In his own exploration of the kinship between 
camera and psyche, however, Freud maintains the persistence of unconscious remainders. 
“Not every negative,” he reminds us, “necessarily becomes a positive; nor is it necessary 
that every unconscious mental process should turn into a conscious one” (Introductory 
Lectures 365). Freud employs the photographic analogy to demonstrate the “negative” 
dialectic of the psyche, a darkroom littered with the unprocessed materials that form the 
ground of the unconscious.16 This photographic negative, embedded within a body 
waiting to be processed, emerges as a fitting emblem for Gothic writing. It develops the 
genre’s tropes of haunted writing in the latency of the image and the automation of its 
inscription, an invisible presence that endures as the trace of a prior writing.  
Nearly twenty years before Freud, Joseph Mortimer Granville had opened his 
discussion of photographic memory with the suggestion that the “subconsciousness” 
might be structured like a camera.17  In an 1879 article for The Lancet, Granville asserts 
that, “although the brain is undoubtedly capable of a process analogous to instantaneous 
photographing, it rarely performs this function at the behest of the will” (458). “The 
natural and only true basis of memory,” for Granville, “is a well-formed impression. It is 
not essential that the impression should be fully understood at the time it is made” (459). 
The imposition of memories upon a subject is non-consensual, a relation of force rather 
than knowledge. Granville characterizes this automatic “storing of impressions” as a form 
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of “instantaneous mental photography,” a faculty that is “more commonly the agent of 
the subconsciousness than of the supreme consciousness” (458). This recalcitrant, 
subterranean machine “takes in the impressions we would gladly have effaced, while 
those it is desired to retain are obliterated almost as soon as they are registered” (458). 
The essay’s title, “Ways of Remembering,” indicates its instructional tone, and 
Granville’s advice in the cultivation of mnemonic techniques strives toward the 
integration of understanding and memory. However, he describes the relationship 
between these two functions of the mind as amounting “almost [to] antagonism,” 
remarking that, for many, the faculty of apprehension is developed “at the cost of that of 
mental registration or memory,” while, on the other hand, “idiots have often 
extraordinary powers of retention and recollection” (458). Stimuli make the most 
profound impression on bodies that fail to understand what they have experienced. The 
strength of the “idiot mind” lies precisely in its weakness. It is impressionable in more 
than a figural sense: easily influenced because lacking powers of discrimination, but also 
possessing receptive capacities unattainable to the hardened wax of a more judicious, 
critical mind.  
Marsh’s novel is similarly concerned with the possibility that different bodies are 
differently susceptible to external impressions. Unsurprisingly, gender is put forward as a 
crucial criterion of impressionability, though Holt’s experience suggests that one’s 
vocation and habits of writing may have detrimental effects as well. In an amusing turn of 
phrase, Sydney Atherton describes Holt as a “quilldriver,” a vernacular term that Francis 
Grose’s Dictionary of The Vulgar Tongue (1811) defines as “a clerk, scribe, or hackney 
writer.” The last of these epithets for “inferior” classes of writers is the namesake of the 
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Hackney coach-for-hire. The implied analogy suggests that this kind of “mindless 
paperwork” is a task intended for bureaucratic beasts, bearing an informational burden 
not their own. Wolfreys’ edition of The Beetle suggests the “pen-pusher” as an equivalent 
term within contemporary idiom, and the more familiar connotations of this modern 
expression of alienated labour also help illuminate those of the former. A contemporary 
of the “typewriter girl,” Holt has long been trained to “take dictation,” and it is no doubt 
this former experience that renders Holt most suggestible to the dictates of the Beetle.  
Marsh devotes no small amount of energy to delineating the relative 
impressionability of each of his characters, but even Paul Lessingham, whose 
“impenetrability is proverbial” (75), nonetheless finds that the name of “Rue de 
Rabagas,” the “dirty street” upon which he first met the Beetle, “has left an impress on 
the tablets of my memory which is never likely to be obliterated” (238).18 All of Marsh’s 
characters possess an unusually acute sense of the physicality and the traumatic force of 
word and thought. Sydney, witnessing the Beetle’s fierce expression of hatred for 
Lessingham, remarks that he “should hardly have been surprised if the mere utterance of 
the words had seared his lips” (143). Robert Holt describes the Beetle’s tone as 
containing “a mixture of mockery and bitterness, as if he wished his words to have the 
effect of corrosive sublimate, and to sear me as he uttered them” (65). Moments later, the 
Beetle’s purported wish begins to make its effect felt, and Robert struggles to explain 
how the creature’s “sentences, in some strange, indescribable way, seemed, as they came 
from his lips, to warp my limbs; to enwrap themselves about me; to confine me, tighter 
and tighter, within” (66). It can hardly matter that, on a rational level, Holt remains 
unconvinced by the creature’s “wild and wanton” words (66). They nonetheless perform 
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their incontrovertible work directly upon his body, circumventing the mind to orchestrate 
immediate and visceral communication between “lips” and “limbs.” 
  
The Optogram: “Fleshing Out” the Negative 
The traumatic dimension of this inscriptive memory is expressed vividly in the “urban 
legend” of the optogram. This optical phenomenon—unauthenticated, yet unremitting—
is defined in Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913) as “An image of external 
objects fixed on the retina by the photochemical action of light on the visual purple.” 
C.M. Archer’s fourth installment of “The Anecdote History of Photography” for 
Recreative Science (1861) stands as one of the first attempts to gather evidence 
supporting this theory. Archer’s article devotes itself to a survey of materials that have 
been sensitized to receive photographic impressions. His overview considers the 
treatment of wood, marble, lithographic stone, and concludes with “The Human Eye and 
Its Similarity to the Photographic Camera.” This final analogy requires no such 
manipulation of materials. Archer begins with the mechanics of the comparison, 
describing the eye’s “lens and dark chamber” (350) and explaining the way in which an 
image “is thrown on the retina and interior of the eye, just as the image is by the lens on 
the plate or paper on the camera, or on the Daguerrotype plate” (351). From here, his 
argument continues in an interesting and speculative direction, one worthy of the 
fantastic fictions of Marsh and his contemporaries. Archer quotes R.W. Hackwood’s 
1857 article for Notes and Queries, which claims, on the authority of unnamed American 
doctors, “that the last image formed on the retina of the eye of a dying person remains 
impressed upon it like the image on the photograph, and that [if] the last object seen by a 
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murdered person was his murderer, the portrait drawn upon the eye would remain a 
fearful witness in death to detect him and lead to his conviction” (351). Say, for a 
moment, that life truly does flash before one’s eyes in that final moment. It would not 
strain the imagination much farther to imagine that, “behind” one’s eyes, death—the 
negative image of life—had imprinted itself.  
Veronique Campion-Vincent provides a fascinating history of this piece of 
modern folklore in her essay, “The Tell-Tale Eye.”19  Campion-Vincent attributes its first 
mention to the French press in 1863, which reported the photographic experiments of an 
English photographer by the name of Warner. Warner had allegedly fashioned a 
collodian reproduction of a steer’s eye, taken immediately after its death: “Examining 
this proof through a microscope he distinctly saw on the retina the lines of the 
slaughterhouse’s pavement, the last object having affected the animal’s vision as it was 
bowing its head to receive the fatal blow” (trans. Campion-Vincent 14). The article 
concludes with the suggestion of this phenomenon’s forensic applications, surmising that 
“if one reproduces through photography the eyes of a murdered person, and if one 
operates within twenty-four hours of death, one reflects upon the retina thanks to the 
microscope the image of the last object presented in front of the victim’s eyes” (14). In 
June of 1866, Notes and Queries cited an article from the Memphis Bulletin “which had 
asserted that the police had photographed and enlarged ‘with the aid of a microscope’ the 
retina of a murder victim and found ‘perfectly delineated,’ ‘a pistol, the hand and part of 
the face of the man who committed the crime’” (Achende 474). Such reports were 
investigated by scientists such as Dr. Vernois of France’s Society for Forensic Medicine, 
whose bizarre and grisly experiments were conducted upon seventeen animals, each of 
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which Vernois “killed […] violently when their eyes were well-lit, and then immediately 
photographed their retinas” (Campion-Vincent 15).20 Franz Boll's 1876 discovery of 
“retinal violet” brought new physiological evidence to the hypothesis that external light 
imprints itself in the eye to form visual images. A year after this discovery, a professor of 
physiology at the University of Heidelberg by the name of Wilhelm Friedrich Kühne 
produced perhaps the most distinct, even iconic, photochemical retinal image (which he 
was the first to name an “optogram”) in the dissected retina of a rabbit.21 
 
 
FIGURE 3.2  
Wilhelm Friedrich Kühne. “Retinal Photograph.” 1878. 
 
In his 1877 address to the British Medical Association, Professor of Physiology 
Arthur Gamgee explained the rather grim process by which Kühne was able to obtain this 
elusive image: 
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Kühne took a rabbit and fixed its head and one of its eyeballs at a distance of a 
 metre and a half from an opening thirty metres [sic] square in a window shutter. 
 The head was covered for five minutes with a black cloth, and then exposed for 
 three minutes to a somewhat cloudy midday sky. The animal was then instantly 
 decapitated; the eyeball which had been exposed was rapidly extirpated by the aid 
 of yellow light, then opened, and instantly plunged into a 5 per cent. solution of 
 alum. Two minutes after death, the second eyeball, without removal from the 
 head, was subjected to exactly the same process as the first. (223) 
Death never comes gently for these eyes: whether animal or human, the fatal tableau 
frozen upon its surface it is invariably a violent one. One begins to imagine, recalling 
Nietzsche’s painful history of mnemotechnics as traumatic understanding, that its clarity 
has been achieved precisely through this violence.22 Gamgee insists that a clear retinal 
impression is dependent on the destructive force of the visual stimuli, even before its 
brutal extraction: “in order to obtain an obvious picture,” he advises, “the effect of light 
would have to be so prolonged or so intense as to destroy the balance between the 
destruction of the vision-purple and the power of the retinal epithelium to restore it” 
(223). 
Seeking professional corroboration of this extraordinary theory, Archer invokes 
the same violence in his recounting of the tale of an American doctor who “examined the 
eye of a murdered man at Auburn by means of the microscope, and found impressed 
upon the retina the rude, worn away figure of a man, supposed to be the assassin!” (351). 
Archer imagines death as the rigor mortis of perception, a final cooling and hardening of 
this impressionable wax. And yet, the manifestation of the assassin introduces an element 
  
151 
of condensation to this fantasy. The image seared into the eyes of the corpse could just as 
easily have been that of a family member, a loved one, or vigilant physician, but the 
exclamatory climax of Archer’s tale of murder serves to underscore the aggressive assault 
upon the eye, the cumulative violence of all inscriptions upon this vulnerable surface. 
Life is not ended, but emblematized by this figure. Is there such a thing as a “passing” 
impression, or is it that the perceiving subject passes away, that all of life adds up to this 
murder at the hand of the image?  The dependably fatal trajectory of the optogram 
narrative testifies to the insupportable weight of past impressions. The basic analogy 
between camera and eye is scientifically sound, but the attempt to imagine the traumatic 
permanence of the trace through the “seen but unseeing” gaze of this dead eye pushes the 
theory into the realm of the Gothic.23 
 Oliver Wendell Holmes expresses the fantastic means by which technology 
fixates upon such passing impressions when he describes the daguerrotype as a “mirror 
with a memory” (“Stereoscope” 739, emphasis original). The phrase strikes me as an 
extremely evocative one, not least because it is a catachresis. To begin with, the mirror 
with a memory is a thoroughly useless one. Like a solar-powered flashlight, or fireproof 
matches, the innovation directly contradicts the essential logic of the device. This new 
feature is no improvement or natural evolution of the tool, but its very ruin. Holmes’s 
striking description reminds us that the mirror’s principal value was its dependable 
forgetfulness. Ordinarily, the mirror presents the viewer with an immaculate facade, 
gathering no accumulation of traces and no residue of former encounters. It is a 
perpetually innocent surface reflecting an eternal present. By contrast with this servile 
affirmation of the present moment, Holmes’s mirror receives the trace and goes on 
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bearing it upon its own countenance, preserving a history that will not be unwritten, a 
slate that cannot be wiped clean. By endowing the implements of representation with a 
consciousness, Holmes’s figure suggests a hidden reciprocity; the object also looks, the 
mirror is both passive instrument and active agent of reflection. This mirror is an 
animistic image, one that readers of the Gothic might be tempted to exhibit within the 
gallery of that genre’s living portraits, those objects of representation that have taken on 
lives of their own, each burdened by their own histories. Remembering when we would 
forget, accumulating a visual static of past moments that fill up the field of representation 
and choke the present and the living, these recalcitrant objects of representation 
emblematize the traumatic core of gothic narrative. 
Conversant with the modern myth of the optogram, Atherton’s “retinal print” and 
Holt’s mental photography (47) indicate Marsh’s interest in employing photographic 
analogies to develop a literalized understanding of the mind’s “impressionability.” Five 
years after The Beetle’s publication, the retinal photograph emerges as a piece of crucial 
forensic evidence in Jules Verne’s The Kip Brothers (Les Frères Kip 1902, English trans. 
2007). An enlargement of a dead-man’s photograph reveals the image of his true 
murderer engraved upon his retina, exonerating the Kip brothers who have been falsely 
accused and thereby bringing about the sort of photo-synthesis envisioned by Holmes. In 
Marsh’s novel, however, the retinal photography theory remains firmly within the realm 
of speculation. Never objectively verified, this physiological negative goes unprocessed, 
a traumatic secret that remains lodged within the body. Though each one of Marsh’s 
characters are convinced they have been marked by their encounters with the monstrous 
Beetle, they have no way of externalizing or objectifying their experience. In accordance 
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with Freud’s negative dialectic of photography, “not every negative . . . becomes a 
positive” (365). As it did for Freud, technology only gives them the materials to 
indirectly express this inexpressibility. Photography submits these undeveloped materials 
that haunt the margins of the text, lying just beyond the edge of objective visible 
inscription. 
This heightened consciousness of the body’s susceptibility to external impressions 
inspires a fear of writing worthy of Judge Daniel Paul Schreber’s paranoid neurology. A 
contemporary of Marsh’s, Schreber is a writer known to us primarily through his readers, 
and the most formative of these readers is Freud. Freud had never met Schreber in person 
(an unprecedented situation in his case studies), but responded to Schreber’s Memoirs of 
My Nervous Illness seven years after its publication, in his “Psycho-Analytic Notes Upon 
an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia” (1911). Freud understood the 
Memoirs as a chronicle of Schreber’s descent into paranoid psychosis. Reading the 
fantastic cosmology of the narrative, the unfolding of an elaborate delusion in which 
Schreber is persecuted sexually and neurologically by his doctor, Freud interprets this 
seemingly external threat as the projection of an impulse from within Schreber. This 
homoerotic wish would only be frustrated by the external world, so Schreber’s response 
(rather than repress the impulse as the neurotic would) is to remodel that external world, 
and bypass the reality principle altogether. 
 Freud’s intervention here, as everywhere, is to uncover the erotic subtext of 
psychic phenomena, a diagnosis that Sedgwick extends to the “paranoid gothic” (92) in 
Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire. What both of these 
readings obscure, however, is the primary status of writing within paranoid narrative. An 
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analysis of writing need not—indeed, cannot—abandon the libidinal aspect of either 
Marsh’s or Schreber’s texts. Rather, writing and bodies become indistinguishable in the 
gothic. In the foreclosure of the symbolic (the anti-foundational ground of the psychotic) 
the “literary” is invaded by the literal. Statues bleed, and portraits of the dead suddenly 
surge into life; bodies ward off sublimation, resisting incorporation as transparent 
signifiers. This is the topology and tropology of Schreber’s paranoid (and quintessentially 
gothic) scene of inscription. As delineated within Schreber’s Memoirs, the human soul is 
“contained in the nerves of the body,” mental life arising out of nervous excitement 
provoked by “external impressions” (45). The “impression” here describes both thought 
and the imprint this thought makes in its collision with matter. Schreber understands God 
to be an omniscient being. However, this divine knowledge is gleaned not out of constant 
surveillance, but from a comprehensive postmortem. “After death,” Schreber explains, 
“the nerves of human beings with all the impressions they had received during life lay 
bare before God’s eye” (54). In the beginning was the Word, but in the end there will be a 
book: a history engraved upon the parchment of the body, from which the final judgment 
will be read. 
 This is not the book we are accustomed to reading. As consumers of fiction, we 
may enjoy a God’s-eye view, which lays bare the hearts and minds of characters, but 
rarely do we flinch at this intrusion, let alone manifest Schreber’s feverish paranoia. 
What is more remarkable, I think, is that readers do not seem to flinch at making this 
intrusion. Tracing the evolution of narrative technique in communicating this interiority, 
Dorrit Cohn’s Transparent Minds (1978) remains an important study of this startling 
communion that literature customarily holds with the private lives of its characters. What 
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is most valuable about Cohn’s work is that she allows herself to be astonished by 
literature, all that it is capable of and all that other readers have learned to take for 
granted. Narrative fiction, Cohn reminds us, “is the only literary genre, as well as the 
only kind of narrative, in which the unspoken thoughts, feelings, perceptions of a person 
other than the speaker can be portrayed” (7). 
 Cohn concerns herself with one trajectory of this experimentation, a venture that 
culminates in the Modernist novel and its eradication of any barrier between 
consciousness and expression. Within The Beetle, the problem of permeability becomes 
focalized around the hypnotist, whose uncanny ability to read and influence the inner 
thoughts of other characters renders the conventional omniscience of fictional narration 
suspect through a subversively analogous performance. (Put directly, it seems entirely 
normal when a narrator peers inside a character’s mind, but disturbing when a giant 
hypnotic Beetle does so.) This character grants readers access to interior life, but figures 
the process as less a stream of consciousness than a rupture of the brain.  
Menke’s reading of the telepathic—or telegraphic—register of George Eliot’s 
“The Lifted Veil” holds much in common with Cohn’s text, but it may also help to trace 
out the divergent strategies of Modernist and Gothic introspection. While many have 
understood “The Lifted Veil” as an anomalous break from Eliot’s committed realist style, 
Menke productively reads the novella as “a disenchanted account of realism” (154) that 
directly confronts, rather than merely straying from, her “major” works. Her narrator 
Latimer’s “uncanny access to information” (153), obtained through the involuntary and 
deeply painful psychic interpenetration of his mind with those of others, serves to 
“highlight and defamiliarize a convention so basic that it is difficult to fully recognize it 
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as such: that realist fiction may without forgoing its realism pretend to give us access to 
something we never encounter in real life—the unspoken thoughts of others” (151).  
If the Gothic “defamiliarizes” and “disenchants” the conventions of realism, it 
achieves these effects by way of a profound desublimation of narrative bodies. Eliot re-
imagines the psychic power of the narrating voice—a power extended to any reader who 
picks up the book and intercepts the transmission—as physical vulnerability. She hovers 
at the tremulous threshold of Latimer’s impressionable body; rather than the benign 
registering of information, each psychic transmission strikes a visceral blow against his 
unstable constitution.  
The Beetle allows us to imagine the hypnotist as a similar allegorical figure, and a 
critical anamorphic lens through which the Gothic represents narrative incursions into 
subjective space. Recalling his encounter with the Beetle, Robert Holt surmises: “It may 
be that he read my story, unspoken though it was,—it is conceivable. His eyes had 
powers of penetration which were peculiarly their own,—that I know” (55). Trance-
literature rarely takes for granted the interior perspective (how it is, for instance, that we 
read Holt’s story), carefully managing “unwarranted” intrusions into the interiority of its 
characters. Every ‘passage’ is a breaching, the mind a site of dramatic penetrations and 
extractions facilitated by various techniques and technologies of writing.  
 As practiced in The Beetle, mindreading and mindwriting are not strictly literary 
activities. Consequently, Cohn’s “psycho-narration,” a narratological term for the 
rendering of interiority, would seem inadequate for our purposes here. Cohn’s is a 
taxonomical act, uncovering an interior subcategory of literary technique, rather than 
exposing literature to an outside. She provides us with a careful study of the general 
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tendencies within modern literature, but what remains unclear is any sense of a larger 
context that would shape conceptions of what the literary ought to accomplish. In light of 
the Gothic, the question of how interiority communicates itself is less a narratological 
concern than an epistemological one. Thus, the Beetle is much more than an allegory of 
reading in any narrowly literary sense. Resisting the sublimation of the apparatuses of the 
inside, the novel questions how it is that interiority comes to be understood as the special 
province of the literary, and why literature would concern itself with this space in the first 
place.  
 When gothic fiction does present us with glimpses of pure interiority, its vision of this 
space is thoroughly, and often grotesquely, material. We are less likely to see the stream 
of consciousness than the oozing of guts or plasma. In such graphic scenes, the Gothic 
provides nauseating confirmation of a materialist conviction that “inside the body there is 
only more body” (Cohen 16). At the conclusion of Marsh’s novel, for instance, the 
Beetle’s plot is brought to an end by the convenient, if not entirely implausible, incident 
of a train wreck. Searching the carriage for the secret of the creature’s identity, our 
protagonists find only the repellent residue of his insides. The reader is given a 
description of the substance, as well as the range of speculations it provokes among the 
experts: 
On the cushions and woodwork . . . were huge blotches,—stains of some sort. 
When first noticed they were damp, and gave out a most unpleasant smell. One of 
the pieces of woodwork is yet in my possession,—with the stain still on it. 
Experts have pronounced upon it too,—with the result that opinions are divided. 
Some maintain that the stain was produced by human blood, which had been 
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subjected to a great heat, and, so to speak, parboiled. Others declare that it is the 
blood of some wild animal,—possibly of some creature of the cat species. Yet 
others affirm that it is not blood at all, but merely paint. While a fourth describes 
it as—I quote the written opinion which lies in front of me—‘caused apparently 
by a deposit of some sort of viscid matter, probably the excretion of some variety 
of lizard.’ (319) 
Effectively “swatted” by the machinations of Marsh’s plot, the crushed insect’s body 
offers no resistance to inspection. One could only object that it yields too completely, as 
Marsh’s act of grotesque desublimation pushes matter beyond the point of intelligibility. 
The Beetle’s exoskeleton imposes structure, and the coherence of a body, from without. 
In its absence, we find there is no way of conceptualizing what lies within; none of the 
experts can say precisely what these stains might be.  
 If Marsh’s depiction of human interiority never reaches such limits of abjection, it 
is nonetheless just as resolutely grossly material. Frankly, Marsh’s characters do not 
possess a “depth” of character or psychological complexity that would render their 
interior worlds worth discovering. In composing these characters, Marsh was either 
incapable or uninterested in depths; he attends rather to the vulnerable physical surfaces 
of these admittedly stock types. While the modernist novel of consciousness accentuates 
the emanation of spirit, the paranoid Gothic text obsesses over the penetrability of bodies. 
 Marjorie Lindon is also trapped in the train carriage, and though she survives this 
violent impact, she suffers from another sort of trauma. Her scars are on the inside; in the 
literal sense if not quite the figural, they compose that interiority. On the final page of The 
Beetle, the reader is informed of Marjorie’s compulsive writing. “Told, and re-told, and 
  
159 
re-told again” (322), her story traces an endless circle, each recital beginning and ending 
with the scene of her seduction at the hands of the Beetle. Like Atherton’s internal 
camera, her body produces an endless stream of negatives of narrative, destined never to 
see the light of day. This story, transcribed countless times, has nonetheless been rescued 
from the brink of extinction. Marjorie’s many versions “have all of them been destroyed, 
with one exception. That exception is herein placed before the reader” (322). This direct 
and singular address inscribes the scene of our reading within the margins of the text. 
Moreover, the presentation of this mass-produced text as manu-scripture  (a sacred and 
auratic text, resurrected from the grave or plucked from the flames, from the brink of 
extinction) removes writing from general circulation in order to imagine the text as a 
token of direct commerce between two bodies. The hallucination of reading thereby 
induced transforms the surface of the paper into a palimpsest, within which the 
manuscript (along with all of the destroyed versions lying underneath) has been buried. 
This fantasy recasts fictional writing as an artifact possessing the singularity of an index, 
a piece of evidence “placed before the reader” that retains the direct imprint of the body 
writing. In this way, Marsh’s text promises to sidestep the tone of epistemological 
ambivalence that closes Stoker’s Dracula, where the Crew of Light’s victory over the 
Count is undercut by Jonathan Harker’s acknowledgement that nothing but a “mass of 
inauthentic documents” remains as testament that any of these events actually happened. 
 The indexical power of the photographic apparatus promises a documentary 
realism, but Marsh’s novel stakes its claim to authenticity on the incorporation of its 
narrative into bodies. Sharing the curiosity displayed within Archer’s “Anecdote History 
of Photography,” Marsh experiments with the photographic propensities of other 
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materials, reserving its highest interest in the exploration of the human body as an 
impressionable surface. The truly innovative aspect of Marsh’s use of photography is that 
he denies the camera any objective presence in the narrative. Instead, it remains lodged 
inside the imaginations of its protagonists, a recalcitrant machine that performs its work 
stubbornly within, allowing the text’s narrators to gesture towards intensive experience 
without ever quite managing to express, externalize, or objectively account for what has 
been implanted. We are still waiting for a future when the body will be able to speak, and 
deliver itself from the burden of all it has seen. For now, all we hold as readers is this 
oblique text, which affords only glimpses of fragments embedded within the body, 
traumatic negatives of narrative. The photographic metaphor illuminates our inability to 
reflect, to know ourselves except in a mirror, through an other, in reverse and retrospect. 
It presents us with the possibility that our own processes of reflection might be as 
superficial as those commonly ascribed to the looking glass, our interior read only 
through compulsive reference to the outside.  
 Marsh’s integration of Victorian optics and the psychophysiology of perception 
within The Beetle develops this deepening sense that the gaze radiates not from within the 
subject, but towards it from the objects it views. The photographic model of observation 
requires that we look by first being looked upon, stared at by the sun. This mutual 
exposure and fixation constitutes the “apprehensive dilemma” of the Gothic – namely, 
that in order to capture whatever is out there, one always ends up having to expose 
oneself to that outside. The “negative” bears witness to the impact of that inverse gaze, 
embodying the dimly understood influence of another that founds the shadowy substrate 
of our being. 
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1 The novel first appeared in serialized form within the pages of Answers. Bearing the 
title The Peril of Paul Lessingham: The Story of A Haunted Man, it made its debut on 
March 13, and was published in fifteen weekly installments. Later that same year, 
Marsh’s story was published in volume form under his revised title. 
 
2 As Julian Wolfreys notes in his edition of The Beetle, Marsh’s phrase echoes 
Tennyson’s “the same, but not the same” (In Memoriam LXXXVII, 14). 
3 Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century, 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 150. 
 
4 Hurley’s chapter in The Gothic Body stands as the most substantial engagement with the 
novel. Glen Cavaliero’s study of The Supernatural and English Fiction turns briefly to 
Marsh’s novel, attending in particular to its “enquiring, materialistic approach to 
preternatural phenomena,” one that Cavaliero recognizes as “characteristic of its time” 
(50). In the context of Cavaliero’s genre study, the extraordinary popularity of The Beetle 
upon its publication designates the novel as an exemplary text of a culture in transition. 
Featuring “little of the genuinely supernatural” (49), the tale instead ushers its readers 
into the traditions of the thriller and the horror story, taking its place among 
contemporaries of Marsh’s such as Arthur Machen (50). Luckhurst’s diagnosis of 
Victorian sexual anxiety has been mentioned above as well, though his reading concerns 
itself less with this allegedly conservative aspect of the text than with the narrative’s 
more speculative engagement with hypnosis. According to Luckhurst, The Beetle invites 
rereading because it “shows the ways in which popular fiction and audiences of the time 
were conversant with different categories of trance” (210). 
 
5 The maturation of the Beetle involves a radical metamorphosis, with the larval and adult 
stages differing considerably in their structure and behaviour. 
 
6 Quoting the Abbé Moreau’s description of an encounter with the accused at the trial of 
Campi, Havelock Ellis provides us a with a similar testament to the traumatic and 
inscriptive power of the criminal’s body: “His repellant head was photographed on my 
memory […] lighting up the livid features with sinister gleam, two small piercing mobile 
eyes, of a ferocity which I could scarcely bear to see” (The Criminal 93). 
 
7 Both images are referred to within Lacan’s Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis (95; 88-89). 
 
8 See Breuer, Physically Focused Hypnotherapy. 
 
9 See also Joseph-Nicéphore Niépce’s Notice on the Heliograph, 1829: “The discovery I 
made and have called heliography consists of the spontaneous reproduction of images 
taken through a camera obscura using action and light, with the gradation of shade from 
black to white” (emphasis mine). 
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10 The question as to whether photography was the work of artists or mere technicians 
remained a persistent one throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, as 
photography maintained an uneasy relationship with the arts—and with painting in 
particular, understood alternately as handmaid, rival, and potential usurper to that more 
established art of pictorial representation. In the late 1850s articles such as “The Art of 
Photography” and J. Carpenter’s “Photography: A Suppressed Art” peppered the pages of 
art journals, pressing for the legitimization of the practice through the elusive honorific of 
Fine Art. In 1880, Abney would write in London’s Magazine of Art, prefacing his own 
argument with reference to the “constant . . . battle of words which is being waged 
between the devotees of photography and those whom the world at large call artists” 
(302). Nearly twenty years later, Fernand Khnopff would write: “within the last few 
months, there is not an art-review, whether illustrated or not, which does not contain 
various articles on the subject” of the individuality and the aesthetic limitations of the 
photograph. For critical discussion of this subject, see Green-Lewis on the nineteenth 
century’s realist debate over the necessity of sharp focus and the technical avoidance of 
artistic flourishes within photographic practice (57).  
 
11 Martin Meisel’s Realizations: Narrative, Pictorial, and Theatrical Arts in Nineteenth-
Century England provides an exemplary general account of nineteenth-century vision 
that proceeds along these lines. Its title alludes to the production of reality, but his project 
lacks the reflexive turn that would consider subjects as the first aesthetic production 
within acts of representation.  
 
12 Holt’s protracted process of recognition, coming as it does only gradually into focus, 
provides a distinctly photographic foretoken of his traumatic encounter in the Beetle’s 
own darkroom. Climbing through the “aperture” of an open window to escape from the 
relentless rain, Holt finds himself suffering from “a horrible persuasion that, though 
unseeing, I was seen” (49). 
 
13 For more on Plateau’s self-experimentation with the phenomenon of retinal after-
images, often conducted by staring at the sun for extended periods of time in order to 
experience the optical “hallucinations” produced by the eye after the stimulus had been 
removed, see Crary 107-109.   
 
14 Linda Williams extends this understanding of a “carnal density of vision” to embodied 
cinematic experience, exploring the visceral effects of spectral filmic images in Hard 
Core.  
 
15 The terms “negative” and “positive” were coined by Sir John Frederick William 
Herschel, drawing upon an analogy between photography and electricity (Shadows 95). 
Herschel can also be credited with popularizing the term “photography” itself.  
 
16 Freud discusses this analogy in On The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) as well: “we 
should picture the instrument which carries out our mental functions as resembling a 
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compound microscope or a photographic apparatus, or something of the kind” (574). See 
also Freud’s “A Note On the Unconscious” (1912): “Unconsciousness is a regular and 
inevitable phase in the processes constituting our psychical activity: every psychical act 
begins as an unconscious one, and it may either remain so or go on developing into 
consciousness, according as it meets with resistance or not. . . . A rough but not 
inadequate analogy to this supposed relation of conscious to unconscious activity might 
be drawn from the field of ordinary photography. The first phase of the photograph is the 
‘negative’: every photographic picture has to pass through the ‘negative process’: and 
some of these negatives which have held good in examination are admitted to the 
‘positive process’ ending in the picture”  (264).  
 
17 Five years before Granville, William Benjamin Carpenter, a prominent mental 
physiologist, had also employed photographic analogies to illustrate how revival of 
seemingly forgotten memories might transpire: “just as the invisible impression left upon 
the sensitive paper of the Photographer is developed into a picture by the application of 
particular chemical re-agents” (Principles 436). 
 
18 Two descriptions of Marjorie typify the novel’s concern with degrees of nervous 
impressionability. The first is Sydney’s: “I knew her to be, in general, the least hysterical 
of young women” (166). Concerning herself, Marjorie reflects: “I had never, till then, had 
reason to suppose that I was a coward. Nor to suspect myself of being the possessor of 
‘nerves.’ I was as little as anyone to be frightened by shadows” (204). 
 
19 In its allusion to Poe’s tale, Campion-Vincent’s title suggests the gothic tenor of this 
idea. On the subject within science-fiction, see Arthur B. Evans, “Optograms and Fiction: 
Photo in a Dead Man's Eye.” Within the cinema, see Tom Gunning, “Tracing the 
Individual Body: Photograph, Detectives, and Early Cinema.” Within French literature, 
see Andrea Goulet, Optiques: The Science of the Eye and the Birth of Modern French 
Fiction. 
 
20 The particular photograph which prompted Vernois’ experiments is described by Dr. 
Bourion, who sent the photograph, as an extravagant portrait of domestic strife: “This 
photograph, taken upon the retina of a woman murdered on 14 June 1868, represents the 
moment during which the murderer, after he has hit the mother, kills the child and the 
family’s dog rushed toward the unhappy little victim” (trans. Campion-Vincent 15). 
 
21 According to the OED, Kühne coined the term in a 3 January 1877 paper for 
Centralblatt für die medicinischen Wissenschaften. 
 
22 “‘If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never 
ceases to hurt stays in the memory’—this is a main clause of the oldest (unhappily also 
the most enduring) psychology on earth . . . Man could never do without blood, torture, 
and sacrifices when he felt the need to create a memory for himself” (Nietzsche 60-61). 
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23 For further scientific consideration of the optogram in the Victorian period, see Foster, 
481 and Morgan, 276. 
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5 
“Cruelly true”: 
Media, Immediacy and Fidelity in Bram Stoker’s Dracula 
 
 
“Let us define our terms. A woman who writes her lover four letters a day is not a 
graphomaniac, she is simply a woman in love. But my friend who xeroxes his love letters 
so he can publish them someday - my friend is a graphomaniac.” 
(Milan Kundera, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting 127) 
 
“We were struck by the fact, that in all the mass of material of which the record is 
composed, there is hardly one authentic document; nothing but a mass of typewriting. . .” 
(Bram Stoker, Dracula 419) 
 
Jonathan’s post-script is the final nail in Dracula’s coffin. With the words quoted above, 
the novel itself crumbles to dust, felled by a few simple, yet devastating strokes of the 
typewriter. The novel’s self-identification as a work of fiction in the age of mechanical 
reproduction signals Dracula’s precocious modernity; on nearly every page, Stoker 
works tenaciously to destroy the auratic power of the “found” manuscript so hallowed 
within Gothic fiction. This “master copy” is a hollow relic. The Count betrays a fatally 
outmoded overestimation of its powers when, having ransacked the Crew of Light’s 
headquarters, he throws their manuscripts and phonograph cylinders in the fire.1 He fails 
to understand that this gesture, far from frustrating Mina’s efforts, merely presages his 
own fate at her hands. Because the endlessly industrious Mina has made and 
disseminated other copies, these masters are utterly devoid of value, except perhaps as 
kindling for the Count’s own funeral pyre. Destroying the masters, Dracula initiates the 
ceremony that confirms his own obsolescence. 
 Mina Harker controls the narrative not by “mastering” it, but by copying it. Her 
crucial textual submissions are works of diligent reproduction rather than authoritative 
production. However, if Stoker’s text is unrepentantly inauthentic—valorizing as it does 
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the copy over the original, and reproduction over production—it nonetheless attempts to 
control the channels of reproduction with tyrannical rigor. Stephen Arata has written 
cogently of the fears of miscegenation encoded within the novel’s valuations of blood.2 
When, having succumbed to the foreign influence of the Count, Lucy’s tender flesh 
compromises the integrity of the national body, the full weight of the empire is leveled 
upon her corpse in order to staunch the bleeding. In a brutal scene that Christopher Craft 
has memorably described as an act of “corrective penetration” (118), the band of men 
violently reinscribe Lucy’s bond with Arthur through a ritualistic disinterment and 
staking that serve as grotesque sacraments of marital wedlock and consummation.  
 Just as the blood of many characters circulates freely through Lucy’s body, so 
their writing flows through Mina.3 This informational permeability invites comparison 
between Lucy’s fold of men and Mina’s “manifold” technique.4 “Why can’t they let a girl 
make three copies,” Mina might ask, “or as many as she wants?”5 Stoker’s novel 
frequently connects circulation with infidelity: Van Helsing encourages the association 
when he suggests that his donation of blood to Lucy has made of him a bigamist, while 
Arthur understands the transfusion as a kind of marriage (211). Mina’s commitment to 
the open circulation of information, particularly when manifest as a desire to reproduce 
the most intimate emotions of her male allies, proves just as troubling for the Crew of 
Light as Lucy’s sexual indiscretions.  
 Attuning itself to the disruptive undercurrent of Mina’s textual reproduction, 
recent criticism of Dracula has in many ways mirrored the narrative progression of 
Stoker’s novel. Once upon a time, it was Lucy’s body that solicited the most significant 
amount of critical attention. Critics were drawn to the exhilarating climax of her 
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desecration, after which many would promptly nod off. “Fortunately,” as Geoffrey 
Winthrop-Young ironically noted in 1998, “the dreary days when Dracula was read 
predominantly as a twisted yarn about really strange sex are over” (“riposte”). Citing 
Kittler’s revolutionary reading of the novel, Winthrop-Young claims: “we have come to 
appreciate [Dracula] as the ‘perennially misjudged heroic epic of the final victory of 
technological media of the blood-sucking despots of old Europe’” (“riposte”). Sexuality 
has been reread as textuality, and Lucy’s body has yielded to Mina’s machine. And yet, if 
Winthrop-Young’s statement serves as a fair description of the critical turn in Dracula’s 
reception, it runs the risk of reinforcing the novel’s polarizing contrasts between Lucy’s 
“feminine” body and Mina’s “man’s brain” (274). In Stoker’s novel, both female bodies 
are the object of intense scrutiny, even if the text fixes a decidedly less lascivious gaze 
upon Mina. The subtexts of information-flow in Dracula are no less carnal than the 
“undercurrents” of bloodflow; as I will argue, the conjugal sense of fidelity channels 
desire into the emergent rhetoric of technological fidelity.6  
 This chapter explores the careful discipline and management of textual 
reproduction in Stoker’s novel. The conjugal and technological definitions of fidelity are 
neatly synthesized in Mina’s writing practices; insofar as she imagines an act of 
reproduction that performs a perfect echo of production, these conjoined ideals of fidelity 
endorse a conservative technological and sexual value that preserves the master of the 
text and of the home. Fidelity is a criterion of value applied to reproduction machines, 
and one could certainly argue that this includes women living within a patriarchal society 
that is deeply invested in certifying the authenticity of patrilineal inheritance. The 
tendency for Stoker’s narrative to dramatically transpose questions of fidelity from 
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textual to sexual registers—culminating in the final moment where the “inauthentic” 
typewriter in Mina’s lap is replaced by her and Jonathan’s more “legitimate” infant son—
should serve as a reminder that one cannot identify Dracula as an allegory of writing, 
without then tracing out the problems of gender, technology and epistemology, that 
intersect with cultural values of writing.7  
 But how compatible are these ideals of sexual and textual fidelity within Stoker’s 
unfolding narrative? Ironically, while Stoker’s text is at great pains to assert its indexical 
faithfulness to the events transcribed within its pages, it simultaneously stages the utter 
failure of human fidelity. The integrity of subjects is incessantly compromised, their 
mental borders, physical bounds and social bonds breached through scandalous 
intimacies with other bodies. Stoker’s characters find they cannot be true to themselves or 
to one another. They depend instead upon the integrity of machinery, which recuperates 
their falseness as a deeper kind of truth. These machines unlock the graphomaniacal 
tendencies of our protagonists, enjoying an intimacy with the body that is barred to the 
subject. They are im-mediate media, already inside and operating under the threshold of 
consciousness. Indeed, Van Helsing’s strict regimen of automatic writing requires that his 
subjects disable themselves (and particularly the censorial mechanisms of the ego) in 
order to enable their writing machines. In this sense, Bram Stoker’s Dracula stands as the 
first machine-novel, the first to acknowledge the technological feedback jointly 
responsible for the inscription of its narrative.    
Dracula is a text that flaunts this hybrid form of modern writing, taking 
undeniable delight in the modern cogs and wheels that turn its narrative. Every 
blockbuster needs a catchphrase, and critical consensus would seem to have nominated 
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Jonathan Harker’s “nineteenth-century up-to-date with a vengeance” (67) as Dracula’s. 
Jonathan’s enthusiasm is typical of a novel that is full of characters that spend an 
inordinate amount of their time writing about writing, in all of its guises, techniques and 
technologies. Contemporary reviews of the novel registered dissatisfaction with this 
technologized gloss of the novel. A reviewer for the Spectator suggested Stoker’s tale 
“would have been all the more effective if he had chosen an earlier period. The up-to-
dateness of the book -- the phonograph diaries, typewriters, and so on -- hardly fits in 
with the mediaeval methods which ultimately secure the victory for Count Dracula's 
foes” (151). Anachronism, of course, is not only one of the central tensions of Stoker’s 
novel, but perhaps the most persistent concern of the Gothic genre. Jonathan’s signature 
phrase encapsulates Stoker’s productive exploitation of this tension, typifying a text torn 
between an extreme commitment to modernity and an obsessive preoccupation with the 
past.  
Charting this tension within the novel, the first section of this chapter examines 
Dracula in light of the novelistic tradition of “writing to the moment,” exploring how 
writing mediates the action of Stoker’s narrative. The chaste nature of Mina and 
Jonathan’s relationship (so at odds with the private sexual adventures of each) is clearly 
“underwritten” by their shared commitment to the purification of communications media. 
While this analysis of the transliteration of sex into text is informed by Foucault’s work 
on the “putting into discourse of sex” (HS 12), it is especially aided by Kittler’s reading 
of Dracula in “Dracula’s Legacy” and Discourse Networks—each of which plug 
discourse theory into the specific technologies that allow writing to reify sex and subjects 
as quantities of information. If epistolary form foregrounds discursive mediation between 
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its characters by dramatizing the act of writing, Stoker’s technologized retrofit of this 
conceit struggles to repeal this distance through the deployment of what I have named 
“immediate media.”  
Exploring the tensions of this paradox, the second section of the chapter attempts 
to contextualize literary technique within the technological ecology of Dracula’s 
historical moment, examining the transformative effects of speed-culture upon the 
composition of the novel and the constitutions of its characters. The perceived necessity 
of synchronizing writing with the narrative’s other acts prompts Stoker’s narrators to 
cultivate automatic habits of writing. While the graphomania of his main characters 
yields an exhaustive record of events (for which the epistolary novel since Richardson 
has been infamous), the sheer quantity of writing produced therein is less significant than 
its peculiar quality. Stoker’s machine novel generates a langue inconnue in the special 
sense I have intended within this dissertation: that is to say, a language that remains 
unknown to itself, and hidden from its own author. In Stoker’s novel of possession, then, 
the vampire is not the only force capable of robbing the protagonists of their faculties. 
Jonathan seems to intuit the mesmeric power of media when, having witnessed his wife’s 
hypnotism at Van Helsing’s hands, he remarks of her spellbound voice: “I have heard her 
using the same tone when reading her shorthand notes” (353). Bypassing the 
consciousness of its narrators, the novel’s array of automatic writing technologies 
generates not transparently objective information, but evidence of a subject voided and 
objectified by machinery. In Dracula, the familiar gothic figure of the living-dead returns 
as media-effect. 
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  The graphomaniac writing produced by Stoker’s body/machines brings to light 
the paradoxical relation between mechanical fidelity and infidelity; we find a 
technological (p)reiteration of the heimlich/unheimlich dynamic in the uncanny and 
subversive echo of Seward’s “cruelly true” phonograph. The machine’s unthinking 
loyalty to sonic phenomena inevitably amounts to a betrayal of the speaker, primarily in 
its leaden refusal of any subjective view of the subject. In the chapter’s two final sections, 
I examine how the Victorian “phonographic imagination” reconfigured human and 
animal understandings of fidelity. This phrase is derived from Ivan Kreilkamp’s 
“phonographic logic,” a term devised to describe: “a certain logic of modernity as 
governed by mechanical reproduction” (211). However, if Kreilkamp’s title signals his 
interest in the phonograph-sponsored “awareness that language might function with no 
clear connection to its human source” (211), this section charts out divergent 
phonographic intuitions that erupt within Stoker’s novel and resonate elsewhere in 
phonographic fiction of the Victorian period. Within such texts, the phonograph models 
an analog experience of communication rooted in indexical relations between bodies in 
contact.  This logic of analogical inscription has largely been neglected in studies of 
Dracula that overstress the dissociative and disembodying effects of writing-
technologies. The “wonder and terror of the phonograph” (183) recognized by Kreilkamp 
issues not only from its ability to dislodge voices from bodies, but also from the uncanny 
means by which the machine grants a body to ephemeral sonic phenomena. 
As critics have noted from the beginning in one way or another, Stoker’s text is 
persistently disturbed by the body of its own writing. If Dracula frequently gives voice to 
an urgent desire for instantaneous and transparently legible communication, its obsessive 
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pursuit of this makes writing present in a way seldom seen in the modern novel. I have 
written earlier that Gothic media are distinguished by the stress they lay upon the 
physical dimension of acts of inscription. Instead of the eradication of physical 
interference, the experience of immediacy offered within the Gothic depends essentially 
upon the presence of bodies and the intimacy of their contiguity. Gothic signification 
presents itself “in the flesh,” understanding physical presence as the criterion of 
authenticity. The Gothic hysterically insists upon an embodied, phenomenological 
poetics: to “conceive” an idea, we must first pass through the flesh, with all of its noise 
and distortions. By contrast with transcendent fantasies of technology, Stoker advances a 
resistant vision of communications channeled through human terminal points. Here is a 
novel that imagines a mode of telepathic “information processing” made possible through 
two punctured bodies, draining languidly into each other. This logic survives within the 
indexical register of the novel, where the truth of bodies is attained through touching and 
tracing—from the “cruelly true” (261) sound of Seward’s voice on the phonograph, to the 
monstrous and sublime intimacy into which the vampire’s mouth initiates Renfield, Lucy 
and Mina. 
 
Writing to the Moment: Gender, Fidelity, Inscription 
Stoker opens his novel with the question of fidelity, pledging the immediate and 
uncompromised faithfulness of the text to its moment. Dracula’s prefatory note returns 
us to Walpole’s Castle of Otranto, and the conventionally Gothic problem of the past’s 
reconciliation with the present. “All needless matters,” Stoker assures us, “have been 
eliminated, so that a history almost at variance with the possibilities of later-day belief 
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may stand forth as simple fact” (29). To remark that the tale of a vampire who descends 
upon London to ravage the locals is not “faithful” to reality must read as an 
understatement bordering on the absurd, and yet Dracula does take great pains to 
reconcile these fantastic events with “the facts.” Stoker’s acknowledgement of the 
novel’s oscillation between fantasy and “fact” echoes Walpole’s balancing of “invention” 
and “truth” (61) in his own narrative—though the authors have antithetical strategies for 
managing the uneasy relation between these two registers.  
To begin with, Walpole presents his text as a found manuscript, while Stoker 
submits an edited typescript. The former is an auratic text imbued with its own history, 
rooting its authority in the past. Indeed, Walpole’s second preface—which crumples up 
the found manuscript once its conceit has been found no longer necessary—nonetheless 
features another appeal to history, shielding Otranto’s fantastic elements behind the 
authority of the English canon. “The great master of nature, Shakespeare,” Walpole 
insists, “was the model I copied” (66). Walpole retains the myth of the deferential scribe, 
though now it is from the text of the English literary tradition that he copies.  
For Stoker, by contrast, authority is to be attained through the uncompromising 
faithfulness of the record to its moment. While the novel clearly departs from any 
mimetic criterion of writing, its text is tightly bound by the principle of fidelity. Mimesis, 
the artful imitation of the real world, exists within the domain of aesthetics, while 
Stoker’s “verbatim” records (219) import technical and legal discourse. From classical 
aesthetics to modern cultural theory, mimesis has been understood as a distinctly human 
enterprise. Aristotle understood mimetic performance as derived from human instincts 
(Poetics 4.1448b), while Walter Benjamin found in the mimetic impulse an enduring and 
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defining human trait (“On the Mimetic Faculty”).8 If mimesis is bred in the bone, fidelity 
depends upon the calibration of machinery. In deferring to these apparatuses, the 
discourse of fidelity adopts a more stringent criterion of comprehensiveness and 
exactitude. This precision relies crucially upon the immediate inscription of events: 
“There is throughout,” Stoker promises, “no statement of past things wherein memory 
may err, for all the records chosen are exactly contemporary” (29). Memory is the great 
enemy of the text: there can be no looking back, only an immersion in the moment, 
realized and intensified through acts of writing.  
Stoker’s attempt to perfectly synchronize word and act mimics Samuel 
Richardson’s technique of “writing to the moment.” Richardson had first named this 
device in his introduction to History of Sir Charles Grandison (1753),9 but it is his earlier 
preface to Clarissa (1748) that best clarifies the emotional intent of this method. This 
novel is presented to the public as a series of letters abounding in “instantaneous 
descriptions and reflections” (5). “Much more lively and affecting,” Richardson writes, 
“must be the style of those who write in the height of a present distress; the mind tortured 
by the pangs of uncertainty (the events then hidden in the womb of fate) than the dry, 
narrative, unanimated style of a person relating difficulties and danger surmounted, can 
be; the relater perfectly at ease; and if himself unmoved by his own story, not likely 
greatly to affect the reader” (5). Here, as in Pamela, Richardson’s intention had been to 
elevate the intensity of scenes by setting writing and action in dramatic tension with each 
other. Richardson’s chief interest seems to be with capturing the emotional fidelity of an 
instant, opting for the confusion of the moment over the composed outlook of 
recollection. Placing the writer squarely on the axis of action, as it were, destabilizes 
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narration by rendering it vulnerable to the world it describes. The epistolary scene of 
writing finds the female writing without “a room of her own.” The composure one 
ordinarily associates with the act disappears when the door to one’s study can only be 
locked from the outside, and when the violent plots of others are expected to interrupt 
writing at any moment. 
Dracula retrofits the novelistic technique of “writing to the moment” by 
deploying the arsenal of writing technologies currently at its disposal in order to present 
writing that is also unmistakably of its moment. Expanding beyond the correspondence of 
letters, to the collection of telegrams, phonograph recordings, train schedules, newspaper 
clippings, and more, Stoker’s archive upgrades the epistolary mode to encompass a more 
comprehensive documentary form. While imagining the modest beginnings of the “little 
oak table” that now supports his own highly sophisticated stenographic labours, Jonathan 
Harker gives us a glimpse of his perspective on this contrast. His haughtily modern 
fantasy of “old times” invites a comparison between the epistolary novel and Stoker’s 
own “state-of-the-art” narrative technologies: 
Here I am, sitting at a little oak table where in old times possibly some fair lady 
sat to pen, with much thought and many blushes, her ill-spelt love-letter, and 
writing in my diary in short-hand all that has happened since I closed it last. It is 
nineteenth-century up-to-date with a vengeance. And yet, unless my senses 
deceive me, the old centuries had, and have, powers of their own which mere 
‘modernity’ cannot kill. (67) 
Jonathan imagines his own modernity as male, defined against an epistolary scene 
featuring “some fair lady,” a quaint description that evokes the chivalrous tone of the 
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romance. The young solicitor finds himself correcting the hypothetical spelling mistakes 
he has supplied for his predecessor. In addition to these errors, Jonathan notes that she 
writes with “much thought and many blushes.” Her script, then, is characterized by 
imprecision, hesitation, and discomposure. Jonathan’s missives, by contrast, are pure 
speed, unencumbered by the discourse of sentiment and the excesses of emotion typically 
associated with the epistolary genre of the eighteenth century.10 Even letters to his fiancée 
are written in shorthand: no lover’s discourse, but the colorless signature of the business 
world. Communicating through channels better suited for the transmission of information 
than poetry, Jonathan and Mina’s sexless, almost contractual stenographic relationship 
(her labour as amanuensis will promote the progress of his career) participates in the 
ambiguously gendered rhetoric of our contemporary “partnerships.”  
 Jonathan’s writing is an act of conscious “remediation” (Bolter and Grusin), a 
process “by which new media technologies refashion prior media forms" (273). Driving 
this remediation is Jonathan’s desire to re-gender the scene of writing, thereby banishing 
this conspicuous (and vulnerable) female body. But Jonathan’s repudiation of the “fair 
lady” is written in a moment of deep uncertainty and insecurity, as he finds himself in a 
position quite familiar to the typical epistolary heroine, fending off the advances of an 
amorous host with dishonorable intentions who has held him captive in his tower. Thus, 
the comparison he devises, though intended as a point of contrast, instead represents a 
projection and disavowal of the feminine role that has been thrust upon him. Trapped in 
this room, Jonathan is dimly aware that writing grants him some sort of power: if his 
neck is bared to the Count, his thoughts at least can be veiled in shorthand. Writing of his 
correspondence, Jonathan notes: “I understood as well as if he had spoken that I should 
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be careful what I wrote, for he would be able to read it” (63). Jonathan rests easy in the 
knowledge that he need not censor his letters to Mina, “for to her I could write in 
shorthand, which would puzzle the Count, if he did see it” (64). 
Writing technique is understood in terms of power, and this power is imagined in 
distinctly gendered terms; Mina must also work to avoid the perils of female inscription, 
dangers realized in Lucy’s example. Geoffrey Wall’s “Different From Writing” delivers a 
plausible reading of Mina and Lucy’s childhood intimacies, detecting a “specifically 
feminine idiom of the erotic and the confidential” (17) shaped within their adult 
correspondence. He cites Lucy’s intimate letter to Mina: “I wish I were with you, dear, 
sitting by the fire, undressing, as we used to sit; and I would try to tell you what I feel” 
(88). Significantly, the letter’s erotic undertones, imagining confession as an 
“undressing,” are creations of Lucy’s mind. Far from evincing a generalized “feminine 
idiom” the passage does much to explain the differences between these two women, as 
well as hinting at why it will be Mina and not Lucy who transcribes our story. Lucy’s 
intercourse is consistently susceptible to innuendo; as both vampire and victim, her 
correspondences are invariably sensual. Letters to Mina are smudged with Lucy’s tears 
(90), making her bodily present in her writing, and threatening that this uncontained body 
may erase the significant content of her writing. Spilling ink as liberally as tears, Lucy 
recognizes her letter is “sloppy … in more ways than one” (91). The image of both 
liquids upon the page intimates the foolishly sentimental style of Jonathan’s “fair lady.” It 
will be Mina’s task as typist to desiccate these pages for the Crew of Light’s inspection 
(and ours as readers as well).11 Lucy’s epistolary work is suffused with feminine 
sexuality (if different in tone from the kind that always stood behind the pretexts of 
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instruction in Richardson’s novels). Her contributions to the narrative are invariably 
defined by a scandalous contiguity between body and writing. In the moments before her 
death, Lucy provides her best imitation of Mina’s discursive exertions. Dutifully 
documenting her final moments, she tucks the letter into her bosom, somehow knowing 
this is the place her protectors are sure to find it (181). Mina’s interactions with the men 
cannot be conflated under a generalized conception of the feminine, as they fail to evoke 
the same connotations as Lucy’s. Consequently, understanding Mina's discursive position 
requires a careful reading of her activities, considering how these intimacies are 
negotiated within the text, and the scrupulous sublimation of her body’s presence within 
her writing. 
 The “instrumental” role of Mina’s body within Dracula’s network enacts a 
recurring Victorian lesson concerning technology: every step that communications seem 
to take towards disembodied experience is in fact always reliant upon physical (if hidden) 
networks. Whether in the field of spiritual messages or telecommunications, these 
networks have most often been facilitated through female bodies, and Mina’s experience 
epitomizes the careful negotiation of the burdens and scandals associated with serving as 
the “medium” of communications. 
As the chief information processor of Stoker’s narrative, Mina’s discursive 
control is unparalleled. Training as a faithful wife and typist, Mina disciplines and 
domesticates her own writing practices in order to take dictation exclusively from her 
husband. She has “been practicing shorthand very assiduously” (86), as she explains to 
Lucy. If Mina fails to denounce the possibility of “pre-marital stenography” outright, it 
seems that, in her fantasy, this bureaucratic relationship will have to wait for its 
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consummation: “[w]hen we are married I shall be able to be useful to Jonathan, and if I 
can stenograph well enough I can take down what he wants to say in this way and write it 
out for him on the typewriter, at which also I am practicing very hard” (86). 
This sublimation prevents Mina’s discursive work from being obscured by her 
gender; by strong contrast with Lucy, Mina’s bedroom scenes attract little in the way of 
“ungentlemanly” attention from the men. Seward gives us a glimpse of his perspective in 
one description of the newlyweds’ exertions: “After lunch Harker and his wife went back 
to their own room, and as I passed a while ago I heard the click of the typewriter. They 
are hard at it” (263). The remark is made without any perceptible aspersions: the couple’s 
conduct is unimpeachable because Mina’s sexual and textual work exertions are mutually 
exclusive activities. Proposing the “unusual” act of “break[ing] into a lady’s room,” Van 
Helsing explains to his crew that: “All chambers are alike to the doctor” (321). The “lady 
journalist,” we may assume, exhibits the same professional indifference to such 
nominally private spaces. To her, the bedroom is a writing-space just like any other. 
 Kittler’s Discourse Networks casts Mina as a “discourse functionary,” arguing 
that her “desexualization permits the most intimate diaries and perverse sexualities to be 
textualized” (355). Mina’s journalistic objectivity is evident also in her lack of observable 
sentimentality towards her newly-wed husband’s travel-diary: the wedding present 
entrusted to her as a gesture of their mutual confidence. Upon recovering from the shock 
of reading Jonathan’s sexual escapades with the Count’s daughters, Mina’s thoughts 
immediately turn to circulating the story. “There may be a solemn duty,” she imagines, 
“and if it come we must not shrink from it…I shall be prepared. I shall get my typewriter 
this very hour and begin transcribing” (216). It is through this act that Jonathan’s 
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indiscretions with the vampresses come to be recorded not only for Mina, but broadcast 
to the other men as well. In each of Mina’s mediated relationships, her loyalty to the men 
is manifest through (and hence subject to) her loyalty to the text. As such, she seeks the 
exposure of intimacies rather than their preservation. This desire extends new 
possibilities for containing her discursive promiscuity, but presents previously 
unimagined obstacles as well.  
Mina and Jonathan’s marriage obliges the couple to put their most private 
thoughts in circulation, with each other at the very least. Though one does not necessarily 
get the sense she is ready for this sort of commitment, Lucy intuits this marital obligation 
in a letter to Mina: “A woman ought to tell her husband everything – don’t you think so, 
dear?” (89). Lucy’s tone is uncertain, and clearly defers to Mina’s much stronger 
convictions, but it serves as a succinct description of her friend’s marital “journalism,” a 
vocation that associates romantic fidelity with the responsibility of “telling everything.” 
Mina’s devotion to this task is relentless: “lest it should be that he should think for a 
moment that I kept anything from him, I still keep my journal as usual. Then if he has 
feared of my trust I shall show it to him, with every thought of my heart put down for his 
dear eyes to read” (296). Mina fears that any gap within her text could be construed as a 
lapse in fidelity, read as a sin of omission that would open up a chasm of silence between 
the two newlyweds.12 Seward laments “that men cannot be trusted unless they are 
watched” (313), but Mina aims to prove to her husband that she is capable of the most 
vigilant self-surveillance. After her rendezvous with the Count, Mina’s pen does falter, a 
development that has her attendant quite uneasy. Picking up the pen in her stead, Van 
Helsing notes that Mina “was not like herself,” reasoning: “She make no entry into her 
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little diary, she who write so faithful at every pause. Something whisper to me that all is 
not well” (404). Van Helsing’s observation integrates the diaristic and diagnostic. For the 
doctor, hovering at his patient’s bedside, the cessation of writing is a matter just as grave 
as the interruption of his patient’s vital signs. 
Stoker’s characters inhabit a universe composed of writing, millions of little 
scraps of paper held together by “the Great Recorder,” a being constantly in their 
thoughts.13 This divine creature’s eternal occupation is writing, an act that imbues life 
with meaning and provides evidence that one’s life has been “profitable” (104). Even 
heaven, it would seem, is bound by the requirements of its bureaucracy. The Recording 
Angel serves as an accountant, counting up sums and tabulating “ledger account[s] with a 
balance to profit or loss” (104). If there truly is “a Recording Angel,” Jonathan knows his 
wife’s noble and selfless acts will be “noted to her ever-lasting honour” (367). Should no 
such being exist, the Crew of Light always has Mina herself.  
Jonathan, we know, has not exactly been an angel at the Count’s castle. But he at 
least records his infidelities as faithfully as he can. Describing his  “wicked, burning 
desire” that the Count’s vampresses “would kiss me with those red lips,” Jonathan writes: 
“It is not good to note this down, lest some day it should meet Mina's eyes and cause her 
pain, but it is the truth” (69). The merit of this painful writing is the truth it produces: 
inserted into discourse, sex immediately becomes symbolized as sexuality.14 Furtive 
passions, once defanged, serve as useful information. Some consolation is to be found in 
writing’s constancy—though a husband may stray from his wife, his hand never strays 
from the page.  
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The text exhibits a handful of these hesitant submissions. Lucy chastises herself 
for her own polygamous desires, admitted in her letter to Mina. She writes: “this is 
heresy, and I must not say it” (91). Initial resistances give way to, and “give up” writing. 
After Mina’s decision to transcribe the evidence (263) is itself documented, recaptured 
voices cannot help but take on some of the mechanical echo of the machine through 
which they come to us. Insofar as one remains conscious of Stoker’s narrative 
contrivance, Mina’s mediated transmissions make deliberations about whether or not to 
speak ring hollow, seeming a posture or rhetorical strategy. Though formed (then 
reformed) as a question, the answer—that the confession will be incorporated—is always 
directly in front of us. As such, the machine carries out the logic of Van Helsing’s 
“knowing” that seeks confirmation only (355). The very presence of the question on the 
page closes down precisely as it opens up the possibility of not writing. 
Mina likewise honours her commitment to the textualization of even the most 
painful experiences. Even the sudden, traumatic recollection of Mina’s “baptism of 
blood,” where she is seduced and initiated into the vampire’s sanguine information 
network, cannot derail the continuity of her documentation. Mina writes that the vampire 
“seized my neck and pressed my mouth to the wound, so that I must either suffocate or 
swallow some to the… Oh, my God! My God! What have I done?” (328). Mina’s 
revulsion at the thought of her violation forces out her interjection: “Oh, my God! My 
God!” This felicitous interruption of Dracula’s sexual climax leads Christopher Craft to 
note that “Mina’s verbal ejaculation supplants the Count’s liquid one” (278). This is the 
prophylactic of the symbolic: the inescapable propensity of language to expurgate sex in 
the very act of naming it. But perhaps the most striking aspect of this textual moment is 
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that Mina’s “verbal ejaculation” is simultaneously written, suggesting that typing for her 
is an involuntary physical reaction every bit as instinctual as her cry. This peculiar 
graphomaniacal instinct, which Mina shares with her husband, insulates their marriage 
from the wayward actions of their bodies. This is why the novel comes closest to 
depicting the consummation of marriage in its ceremonies of writing, rituals of textual 
exchange and binding.15  
It is this insistent textualization of sexual dynamics that leads Kittler to propose 
the typewriter as a complex emblem of Mina and Jonathan’s quintessentially modern 
relationship. In the long shadow cast by Kittler’s powerful and imposing interpretation of 
the novel, the typewriter has been commonly approached as the master technology, and 
the technology of mastery. Kittler argues that the typewriter instates a new management 
of bodies under the regime of the symbolic, a system organized through a “spacing” that 
dissociates bodies as well as characters on the page. Assimilating the male instrument of 
stylus, along with the female apparatus of the sewing machine, the androgynous 
typewriter renders obsolete the gendered metaphysics of earlier writing-systems (351). 
Observing her carefully managed transformation into a “discourse functionary,” Kittler 
submits Mina’s typewriter-work as evidence that the discourse network of 1900 dissolves 
“any sexual relation between the sexes” (DN 359). This is an audacious and compelling 
statement, but one that is simply not borne out with any consistency in Stoker’s text. For 
if the mediation of Jonathan and Mina’s relationship through the typewriter facilitates the 
sublimation of the narrative’s libidinal undercurrents, numerous other techniques and 
technologies of writing pull us in precisely the opposite direction, towards an immediacy 
of bodies and machines.  
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In what follows, I will address two of these strategies at length. The first attempts 
to secure a temporal immediacy through techniques of speed-writing, while the second 
plays with spatial immediacy, primarily through the text’s “phonographic logic.”16 Both 
techniques attempt to harness the power and truth of writing as an automatic act, 
emerging at the point where human and mechanical expression blend into each other. In a 
machine-novel such as Dracula, “writing to the moment” still provides glimpses of the 
chaotic interior life of the writing subject, but the technical apparatus of writing disrupts 
any fantasy of this interiority as simply human. Stoker’s vision of the writer as a 
distracted subject, persistently (and ideally) blind to the truth of what she writes, short-
circuits the autonomy of writing, making it an obsessive, mechanical process. The 
phonograph, on the other hand, frustrates the distancing techniques of writing. If the 
typewriter organizes texts and bodies through spacing, the mechanics of the phonograph 
(which operates through indexical touching) inspired within the Victorian consciousness 
an entirely different fantasy of signification—that of a system of signs that is material 
rather than abstract, analogical rather than digital. It is this form of palpably immediate 
inscription that my reading of the novel understands as figured by the phonograph and 
enacted by the vampire. The “writing” performed by this creature presents us with the 
painful and stigmatic signs of bodily contact, enigmatic symptoms of a monstrous act of 
reproduction that results in an uncanny attachment of the subject. 
 
Graphomania: Speed, Machinery, Distraction 
True to the informational impulses of its cultural juncture, Dracula is a novel that 
exhibits considerable impatience with the belatedness of writing, and excitement over the 
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imminent possibility that inscription technologies would participate in the moment, rather 
than merely picking up the pieces afterward. The text intends to set the act of writing in 
the present tense, but instead ends up underlining the tensions of presence. Friction arises 
out of the text’s paradoxical straining towards an immediacy of media, a commitment 
that turns to an array of writing techniques the truth-value of which hinges upon 
automatic and instantaneous reproduction. When Mina presents Van Helsing with her 
detailed and exact transcription of all communications between the Crew of Light up 
until that morning, the professor can only respond by asking: “But why not up to now?” 
(274-275). Van Helsing’s relentless desire for immediate disclosure and documentation 
serves to underline the Sisyphean task of writing within this uniquely obsessive text. His 
frantic concern with remaining technologically “present”—along with the profound 
labour this immediacy requires—has only become more resonant within the current age 
of so-called “connectivity” mapped out by cellular phones, social networking sites, 
instant messaging, and other codes and machines that we use to constantly “keep in 
touch,” but that so often seem only to frustrate and obstruct possibilities for first-hand 
experience and direct communication. 
 Particularly from the digitized perspective of the twenty-first century, we tend to 
imagine “im-mediacy” as the disappearance of mediation: a state of instantaneous 
communication attained through the elimination of opaque bodies that obstruct flows of 
perception and information. Victorian technophiles commonly vaunted this immediacy of 
media. We might turn, for instance, to George Wilson’s rapturous description of the 
telegraph in 1852. Penning what would become a much-repeated phrase in Victorian 
discussions of technology, he marvels at the machine’s ability, “so far as the conveyance 
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of our thoughts is concerned,” to “annihilate space and time” (36). In its relentless pursuit 
of temporal immediacy, the modern logic of Stoker’s text strains toward this 
transparency, employing diverse writing techniques and technologies to break down the 
mechanics and streamline the physical act of writing by transmuting inscription into 
increasingly mobile and transmissible forms of information.  
 From the outset, the problem of “timeliness” impacts Stoker’s narrative. The first 
detail Jonathan notes of his journey is that he “should have arrived at 6:46, but train was 
an hour late” (31). When a second late train leaves him waiting at the Transylvanian 
station, his slight setback inspires our Occidental tourist to press a general distinction 
between East and West. “It seems to me,” the seasoned traveler notes, “that the further 
East you go the more unpunctual are the trains” (33). Clearly we are led to infer that it is 
not only the trains that are “running behind the times.” Their disorder is understood to be 
symptomatic of a much more fundamental delay: that of the Orient’s arrival at the dawn 
of modernity. Even with the proper technology at hand, Jonathan suggests that the East is 
ill-equipped for the present moment, incapable of keeping up with the pace of late 
nineteenth-century life. A number of critics have noted the essential role speed plays 
within Stoker’s text, concentrating predominantly on the radical acceleration of transport 
and communications networks exploited by the Crew of Light.17 My interest here is in 
questioning the extent to which such readings echo the dominant rhetoric of technology 
within the Victorian period, tending to showcase the efficacy of machines in perfect 
working order. Dracula dislodges the significance of speed from a familiar idiom of 
capital that strains to emphasize efficiency and productivity, in order to unmask its 
obsessive, repetitive, and destructive tendencies. 
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It is not only that these speed-machines sometimes break down, though Victorian 
critics of technological progress have furnished us with many examples of how they have 
failed us.18 Beyond malfunctioning in ways we had failed to anticipate, however, speed-
machines often work in ways we do not realize, their effects lost in the blur. Matthew 
Arnold affords a glimpse of this condition when he writes of the “strange disease of 
modern life / With its sick hurry” (“Scholar-Gipsy”). Max Nordau, who describes the 
pathological nature of modern existence in no uncertain terms, warns of “the little shocks 
of railway traveling, not perceived by consciousness” that  “cost our brains wear and 
tear” (39). Though many of Degeneration’s conclusions are indefensible, Nordau’s 
concerns remind us that it is not the catastrophes of the industrial age that solicit our most 
careful attention, but the often devastating effects of its routine functioning. Even when 
operating smoothly and without incident, technology ceaselessly performs its silent work 
upon us, just below the threshold of our perception. Through an exploration of the 
emotional and psychical investments in writing within Dracula, we can begin to discern 
the affective and obsessive relation to writing within the Victorian scriptural economy. 
The diaries of Jonathan and Seward in particular betray the crucial psychological 
undercurrents running deeper than the practical effects of informational exchanges. 
Speed-writing represents a unique development within modern culture because it 
accelerates the mind rather than the body, streamlining, blurring, and disorienting the 
interior life that it inscribes. Within Stoker’s novel—and Victorian culture more 
broadly—speed is not merely a principle of acceleration, but of transformation. Beyond 
certain limits of the human (mental, physical, psychical), the machine takes the wheel, 
and one of the most compelling subtexts of Stoker’s novel of “possession” is its 
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underlying fascination with how bodies and minds yield to the automatisms of 
machinery. 
One of the most compelling aspects of Dracula’s epistolary structure is its 
recognition of the mechanics of expression as a problem of speed. With the hindsight of 
the Modernist perspective, the narrative contrivances of diaristic and epistolary forms are 
often characterized as premature expressions unequal to the task of keeping pace with 
thought. The study of “Diary and Continuity” conducted within Dorrit Cohn’s 
Transparent Minds, for instance, focuses on the incongruities of the epistolary mode, 
wincing as writing improbably reaches the full presence of the present. As perhaps the 
most familiar formulation of this coincidence of writing and presence, “writing to the 
moment” aspires to an unprecedented immediacy of the novel, but results in a thoroughly 
mediated narrative (an opaque text that goes on writing right through the moment). In its 
persistent dramatization of the scenes of composition and transmission, the epistolary 
conceit designates writing as the only present action of the novel. Richardson’s narrators 
have had their hands tied, bound to the dutiful inscription of the world they inhabit. There 
are so many moments when Richardson’s reader marvels that Pamela, even in the face of 
imminent danger, fails to put down the pen and act. But this act of writing is her role; her 
primary obligation is not to her own life, but to the account of that life. 
Though her concerns are securely couched within the realm of literature, Cohn’s 
history of literary innovation strangely echoes the rhetoric of technological innovation 
during the Victorian era. Cohn maintains: “a different form is needed to synchronize 
language and experience, a form whose reality model is faster and freer than a written, or 
even an oral record” (212). Compare this statement on the novel’s future with an early 
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speculation on the future of the phonograph from 1878’s Nature: “some substitute or 
substitutes for the clumsy mode of recording our thoughts by pen and ink, so inconsistent 
with the general rapidity of our time, must be close at hand” (117). The author’s closing 
sentiment might have been snatched straight from the pages of Transparent Minds, a 
congruence that impels us to trace out the affinities between aesthetic innovation and 
technological inventions within a culture pressured by a dawning sense of “the general 
rapidity of [its] time.” The accelerated pace of modern life cannot be documented with 
archaic writing tools. In an era of remarkable technological development, the relative 
belatedness of writing as a technique for the transcription of thought is almost an 
embarrassment; it is “clumsy” and outdated, straggling behind in clear violation of the 
laws of the general acceleration of culture. There remains a troubling asymmetry between 
industrial and informational structures at the close of the nineteenth century. Machines do 
not bring about writing’s obsolescence; in fact, they often seem to require more writing.    
Dracula’s hybrid of technique and technology facilitates a convergence of 
novelistic and bureaucratic concerns, grappling with their shared, modern desire for an 
im-mediate method of registration that is no longer subject to the operations of deferral 
and difference that typically govern writing. Critical response to this convergence must 
fuse literary technique (“writing to the moment,” which foregrounds the novelistic 
tradition) with writing technologies (“writing of its moment,” which situates inscription 
with regard to the historically specific fantasies of immediacy circulating through 
Victorian culture).  
Aspiring to a perfect synchronicity between the event and its inscription, 
experience and its representation, Stoker’s characters try their hand at stenography, 
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phonography, telegraphy, photography, and typewriting, among other technologies. The 
end result of this towering stockpile of technology is that, although Stoker’s prefatory 
note promises accuracy secured by presence, the only “exactly contemporary” act within 
Dracula is writing itself. Headnotes designating the time, location, and medium of 
different inscriptions incessantly interrupt a narrative within which it might otherwise be 
quite easy to forget that the action is being recollected at a remove, often a double 
withdrawal of composition and transcription. The pleasures of any imagined immediacy 
are denied with these interruptions, the cumbersome nature of the typewriter ushering in 
Stoker's explicitly mediated narrative. As such, each headnote registers both a presence 
and an absence, dramatizing the scenes and seams of writing that gather themselves 
around the incident, attempting to recapture it “verbatim.” It takes an act of rigid critical 
circumvention to ignore the text’s “hardware.”  
  Dracula’s parallel narrative and libidinal economies are defined by what Jay 
David Bolter and Richard Grusin have identified as “our culture's contradicting 
imperatives for immediacy and hypermediacy” (5). In Remediation: Understanding New 
Media (2000), Bolter and Grusin have described the longing for immediacy as “the desire 
to get beyond the medium to the objects of representation themselves” (83). This 
inclination guides audiences towards immersive styles of “representation whose goal is to 
make the viewer forget the presence of the medium (canvas, photographic film, cinema 
and so on) and believe that he is in the presence of the objects of representation” (272-
273). However, Bolter and Grusin argue, modern media are defined by a “double logic of 
immediacy and hypermediacy” (viii), with the latter logic serving to foreground the 
  
191 
medium in order to draw the viewer’s attention (in a strategy similar to corporate 
branding) to the unique affordances of a particular medium platform (272).  
 Dracula is “nineteenth century up-to-date,” but “with a vengeance”; every page is 
marked by a conspicuous excitement regarding its incipient modernity. Geoffrey Wall 
has characterized the enthusiastic manner in which Stoker’s novel “contemplates its 
materials and methods” as “innocent [and] unironic” (15), and perhaps this is the 
inevitable fate of discourse concerning new media that have since grown old. But we 
must be careful not to let our own professedly “disenchanted” modernity blind us to what 
Dracula has to say concerning technology. Featuring prominently and conspicuously the 
implements and pretexts of writing, along with everything considered “exterior” to 
thought, this mode of fiction expresses the difficult labour involved in “coming to terms” 
with thought (and with the interiors of others, which we can only apprehend by drilling 
through their exteriors). This irreducible presence of the novel’s hardware testifies to the 
difficulty, or impossibility, of any unmediated experience of the present moment. 
We need, then, to resist the tendency to see such representations of narrative labor 
as simply opaque: they contribute something more than just  “a rather tantalizing and 
somewhat wearisome form of narration,” as one Victorian critic of Dracula had it 
(“Booking” 327). To borrow from Thurschwell and Price’s Literary Secretaries/ 
Secretarial Culture (a collection in which Mina plays a starring role), Stoker is concerned 
with “the representation, self-representation and non-representation . . . of those who do 
write” (1). Rather than a clumsy impediment to the proper contents of the novel, these 
bodies and machines are the material bedrock of what surfaces, typically in a highly 
sublimated form, as “textuality.” Stoker’s novel, by contrast, is one that “shows its 
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work,” rendering the patient and diligent labour that brings text into being. Dracula 
presents writing as the indigestible, inassimilable substrate of the text. These are stories 
about writing, not ones merely told through its transparent medium. 
 In sharpening our focus from the abstract concept of “textuality” to “the 
representation . . . of those who do write,” we might begin with the observation that the 
narratological breakthrough of “writing to the moment,” depends crucially upon a 
characterological innovation. The fundamental difficulty this mode of narrative presents, 
of course, is a question of motivation: one must invent a plausible reason for anyone 
wanting so desperately to write so much. The pretext for all of this textuality must be 
found in characters for which writing is an almost involuntary reflex. If there is no text 
without the act of writing, the novel requires characters that are virtual ”writing 
machines,” for which writing is as instinctive as breathing, let alone speaking. In her 
moment of deepest responsibility to the Crew of Light’s shared text, Lucy Westenra 
becomes just such a being: “I feel I am dying of weakness, and have barely strength to 
write, but it must be done if I die in the doing” (178-79). The physical exertion of writing 
is a necessary sacrifice, warding off the possibility that her corpse will be illegible, its 
history unintelligible. 
This cultivation of the compulsive habits of writing thought necessary to justify 
the very existence of the narrative is not unprecedented within the novel’s history. One 
and a half centuries earlier, Richardson’s Pamela had explained: “I have got such a knack 
of writing, that I cannot sit without a pen in hand” (367). Pamela sounds as if she is 
describing here a habit of nervous agitation, the kind of fidgeting one indulges in when 
one can neither sit still nor act out. Stoker’s text is composed through a similar agitation, 
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by authors who “fear to be idle” (356) and most often turn to writing and reading merely 
in order to soothe themselves. As Clive Leatherdale wryly notes, “The Count, it seems, 
has the knack of making everyone with whom he has any dealings take up their pencils” 
(214). It is these tiny sharpened stakes that are thrust at Dracula’s heart with the most 
tireless determination. The primary difference to be marked between the early epistolary 
novel and Dracula, however, is the latter’s institutionalization of the graphomaniacal 
imperative. For Stoker’s narrators, the compulsion to write is an automatic reflex 
conditioned by professional and other external obligations. Under the discursive 
requirements of bureaucracy, the novel becomes so many forms to be filled out, so many 
papers in need of proper filing. In the administration of such texts, writing is only one 
task among many: one must also document and duplicate everything, a tedious, often 
ridiculous, but undeniably realistic part of our existence under the institutions to which 
we are “accountable.” Leatherdale neglects to mention that most of Stoker’s heroes are 
“pencil-pushers” of one sort or another. For the young solicitor, the aspiring “lady-
journalist,” and increasingly even doctors such as Seward and Van Helsing, the labours 
of documentation and registration would have been an essential part of the job 
description, an institutional imperative. Stoker’s characters are only “moonlighting” as 
vampire-hunters, so it is perhaps not surprising that their daily habits of writing should 
carry over into these pursuits.  
Under Van Helsing’s directives, then, there is “wild work” (396), but also plenty 
of paperwork, to be done. The clearest reason we are given for Van Helsing’s partiality 
towards his former student is the fact that his “case-book was ever more full than the 
rest” (155). Consequently, when Seward’s judgment falters, Van Helsing advises him to 
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return to these texts, contending that: “knowledge is stronger than memory, and we 
should not trust the weaker” (155). In the severe distrust it places in memory, Van 
Helsing’s pedagogical strategy is absolutely antithetical to the Socratic method, which 
insists upon the essential role of the subject in dynamizing knowledge as an activity 
always in process. Socrates criticized writing by arguing it served not as a tool of 
memory, but of forgetting.19 Writing for him can only inscribe the epitaph of knowledge, 
marking the final resting place of a body whose spirit has fled.  
Van Helsing, by contrast, would rather let thought calcify into writing. This 
process transforms experience into “hard fact,” killing knowledge in order to preserve it. 
In this sense, the doctor’s method begins to resemble vampirism itself, as Wicke 
suggests. Rosemary Jann notes Van Helsing’s tendency to act “as if the very act of 
ordering details and writing them down verifies the experience as authentic, even if the 
meaning is not fully understood at the time” (278). It is not simply that Van Helsing 
believes everything that he reads, but that setting down a thought or experience makes it a 
piece of evidence, the subjective nature of which can be more easily assessed when laid 
bare and open to view. Writing extricates (or abjects) experience from the body, forcing it 
outside of the subject, where neither can contaminate the other. In the pursuit of fidelity, 
subjective recollection stands as the principle impediment to narrative. Van Helsing’s 
scientific objectivity principally concerns itself with the objectification and automation of 
knowledge, turning thought into writing, and thereby purging it from the dark insides of 
the self.  
To revise Jann’s reading on one other point: is it not precisely because one’s 
experience is misunderstood that its transcription remains authentic?  Though commonly 
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understood as a means of careful attention to the particulars of the self, Jonathan’s 
journal-keeping, in its speed and comprehensiveness, actually aspires to the kind of 
distracted activity most likely to keep secrets hidden even from one’s own consciousness. 
It is clear that, for Jonathan, writing is the antidote to memory: a pharmakon that serves 
as a means of burying experience somewhere distant from the self. Handing his journal to 
his fiancé, Jonathan explains: “the secret is here, and I do not want to know it” (140). It is 
almost as if he has not written it himself. In this moment, we have to wonder if 
Jonathan’s shorthand technique has not been a way of encrypting secrets from his own 
consciousness as well as his oppressor’s, using these coded signs to hide Dracula from 
himself (particularly the ways the vampire is already buried inside Jonathan), as much as 
hiding himself from Dracula.  
Dracula is a text composed primarily by writers who find themselves unable, for 
a host of reasons, to actually read what they have written. Mina’s trances, from which she 
awakens utterly unaware of what has passed from her lips, are only the most spectacular 
demonstration of this principle. The interior is always a surprise to the writer, with 
another reader providing the critical distance required to make sense of his enigmatic 
text. The assumption that the subject is illegible to himself, and cannot read what he 
himself has written, is an essential characteristic of the rhetoric of graphomania. Van 
Helsing’s speculations concerning Renfield further illuminate his interest in this relation 
between blindness and insight. It is Renfield’s “very obliquity of thought and memory” 
that “fascinates” the doctor, who surmises: “I may gain more knowledge out of the folly 
of this madman that I shall from the teaching of the most wise” (295). This blind 
textuality forms the necessary complement to Van Helsing’s incitement to transcribe 
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everything, no matter how seemingly insignificant. As Jonathan writes in (and of) his 
journal: “All, big and little, must go down; perhaps at the end the little things may teach 
us most” (329). Van Helsing trains his pupils in the “indiscriminate recording of all 
perceptions” that, for Nordau, marked Tolstoi and Wagner as consummate 
graphomaniacs (199). This dutiful recording of the self, prompted by Van Helsing’s 
contention that “[n]othing is too small” (156), depends crucially on a refusal of one’s 
personal perspective—if one is to catch the details that may not, at first glance, seem to 
be part of “the big picture.”20 Such perspective would only prejudice the writer’s frames 
of reference and cause him or her to take on an editorial stance that, as Freud has argued, 
cannot be distinguished from censorial mechanisms.21 Writing is not the mark of 
consciousness, but serves primarily as a technique for stemming this activity.  
In foregrounding the acts of transcription, editing and circulation that constitute 
its text, Dracula dislocates truth from the hands of the author. The editor—intercessor of 
the “found manuscript” device—arrives on the scene in order to convince the reader that 
there was no “editing” consciousness in the writer, who scribbled away without second 
thoughts or second-guessing, without any consciousness of a second body in the room 
reading over her shoulder. Mina plays this role for the others, spelling out her role in 
facilitating the unconscious in moments such as the one in which she returns Seward’s 
phonographic recordings, telling him: “I think that the cylinders which you gave me 
contained more than you intended me to know” (261). Within Dracula, the most direct 
expression is the one without direction, the letter left unsent, a stray signal intercepted by 
an unintended audience. The editor addresses the reader so that the writer may write 
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without address. It is through this intervention that we find ourselves holding an 
“unauthorized” text.  
As a technique of distraction, writing to the moment generates many of the same 
effects that Elizabeth Napier has attributed to the irresistible momentum of Gothic 
plotting. While Napier sees the “frenetic air” of Otranto as “its most innovative and 
compelling feature” (90), she finds the most “significant consequence of the speed and 
fragmentation of narration in Walpole’s novel is a serious reduction of emphasis on the 
internal lives of his characters” (92). Hollowing out the interior folds of a character 
simply builds up too much resistance. Instead, Walpole streamlines his characters by 
compelling them to act in “expected, or formulaic, ways” (92).22 Only through such 
generic, conventional behavior can they “keep pace with the story he wants to tell” (92). 
In the minds of characters and readers alike, the Gothic instills a sense of perpetual 
distraction, relentlessly knocking us about from one explosive incident to another.  
When critics speak of Gothic “machinery,” it is invariably in response to the 
genre’s reliance upon such external sources of motivation. This term was commonly 
employed by critics to dismiss the implausible nature of Gothic narrative, but in the late-
nineteenth century, the deus ex machina device might not have pressed the limits of 
credibility nearly so acutely as before. (The crucial difference presented by the modern 
novel is that the machine replaces, rather than represents, the divine.)  Given the ubiquity 
of mechanical processes within daily modern industrial life, it seems entirely reasonable 
that machines would intervene within plots; realism, in fact, would almost seem to dictate 
their inclusion. Mechanical disasters such as the train wreck that brings Richard Marsh’s 
Beetle’s reign of terror to an abrupt end merely parlayed the kind of common 
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technological fatalities to the fates of its characters.23 Such collisions suggest a fatal 
incompatibility of bodies and machines, but the interpenetration of these realms is not 
always figured through violence. The gothic presents us with many unsettling collusions 
between human and machine, where the threat of the latter is converted into a promise 
that mechanization can sustain (a kind of) life. Having signed this pact, characters 
themselves take on mechanical traits, their voices developing a metallic resonance. 
In granting its characters an exceptional consciousness of Gothic figuration and 
convention, Charles Maturin’s Melmoth the Wanderer (1820) stands as an exemplary 
reflexive study of the genre’s mechanisms.24 Maturin’s characters are deeply critical of 
social conventions, but also uncommonly aware of the conventional nature of the genre 
they inhabit. Maturin’s Alonzo, finding himself in the middle of the kind of flight 
scenario described by Napier, addresses the mechanics at work within his story: 
I appeared to myself like a piece of mechanism wound up to perform certain 
functions, in which its co-operation was irresistible […] as the shortness of the 
time left me no opportunity for deliberation, it left me also none for choice. I was 
like a clock whose hands are pushed forward, and I struck the hours I was 
impelled to strike. When a powerful agency is thus exercised on us,–when another 
undertakes to think, feel, and act for us, we are delighted to transfer to him, not 
only our physical, but our moral responsibility. (181)   
While Maturin’s scene contextualizes Gothic machinery with reference to earlier 
philosophical arguments about human nature that commonly employed the clock as the 
emblem of a mechanistic universe, the forced hand of the clock also signifies the artificial 
compression of time within gothic narrative, as well as the suggesting the effects of that 
  
199 
acceleration on the subject.25 Under the influence of another, Alonzo finds cold 
consolation in the thought that his circumstances have rendered him a kind of automaton-
subject. 
However, the awareness Maturin grants to his characters comes with a price. The 
conscious automaton is implicated in its own compulsions; Alonzo must admit he is 
“delighted” to submit to this fatalistic fantasy. Melmoth investigates the human desire to 
yield itself to the inhuman, the scandalous wish “to be the clock,” in order that one 
“might have no feeling, no motive for hurrying on the approach of time” (146-47, 
emphasis original). Melmoth’s protagonists are driven to distraction by the constant hum 
of machinery that administrates daily life under religious and civic institutions. The 
wanderer himself may be the most explicit embodiment of the living-dead, but the most 
sinister Faustian pact is one signed with the machine. Selling one’s “soul” reads as a 
figure for the delegation of one’s will to an external agent.  
In “Signs of the Times,” Carlyle had lamented the absence of internal, 
“Dynamical” motivation within culture (72). His was the “age of machinery” because 
individuals had systematically conceded their power to institutional imperatives. 
Maturin’s Alonzo anticipates Carlyle’s critique of modern institutionalized life when he 
remarks that: “The moment life is put beyond the reach of your will, and placed under the 
influence of mechanical operations, it becomes, to thinking beings, a torment 
insupportable” (111). However, Maturin is compelled to address as well the torment of 
thought, a burden that becomes less and less supportable as the individual’s will is 
relentlessly frustrated by the crushing, mindless indifference of social and religious 
institutions. Wrongfully imprisoned in an asylum where, surrounded by the folly of 
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inmates and wardens alike, sanity becomes a “curse” (57), one character voices the “wish 
to become one of them, to escape the agony of consciousness” (56). The appeal of this 
conformity runs deeper than the lure of passivity Sedgwick finds in “paranoid gothic” 
writers such as Thomas De Quincey and Daniel Paul Schreber.26 Alonzo’s temptation to 
invite “the machine” inside stands as an early apprehension of the death drive, the desire 
to kill a part of ourselves in order that the rest of us might continue on—deadened, but 
free from pain.  
Melmoth’s clock concretizes an artificial experience of speed that has nothing to 
do with saving time. To resort to a dead metaphor, it manages only to “kill time” or, in 
the popular idiom of Stoker’s historical moment, to “annihilate” it. The forced hand of 
the clock empties out the meaning of time into meaningless revolutions, much like 
Jonathan’s circular journey to the count’s castle, or Freud’s circuitous path back to the 
red-light district in “The Uncanny.” If Renfield’s obsessive counting resembles the 
actions of the man who counted out seconds like the clock, how different is Jonathan’s 
prison diary? He has found another way of becoming the clock, of devoting himself to 
recording every increment of time’s passage. In captivity, as the day after day passes by, 
Jonathan denies his experience by “writing through” the moments. Realizing he “must do 
something or go mad,” Jonathan devotes his nervous energy to his diary, reasoning: “I 
must keep writing at every chance, for I dare not stop to think” (329). Writing is speed, 
while thought brings one to a standstill. Jonathan’s statement pathologizes the novel as 
the result of obsessive graphomaniacal activity, a performance that is less an antidote 
against insanity than an escape from the very question. Skimming swiftly along the 
surface of the page, Jonathan prevents himself from sinking into the depths of himself, 
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and giving way to this interior. Behind the frantic plotting that is so familiar within the 
Gothic genre, which identifies writing as necessary for the Crew of Light’s survival, there 
remains this sense that writing is actually a means by which the living become the living-
dead, refusing the primacy of experience through persistent mediatization, encrypting the 
moment before it has even passed.  
 
The Uncanny Return of Technology 
Seward’s use of the phonograph is characterized by a similar desire to employ writing as 
a means of encrypting secrets from himself. Ostensibly obtained for professional work, 
Seward’s phonograph entries are nonetheless referred to (by Seward as well as our 
copyist Mina) as a diary. By contrast with Jonathan and Mina’s “journals,” the term 
betrays the informal and personal nature of its contents. Read in light of her professed 
desire to “do as the lady journalists do” (86), Mina’s classification of her written 
contributions as journal entries suggests the “extroverted” tendency of her own writing. 
Seward’s case studies fail to retain the disinterested and authoritative tone of scientific 
inquiry, as his recorded observations of Renfield repeatedly give way to private 
reflections and personal doubts. 
When he cannot speak to Lucy, Seward turns to the sympathetic ear of his 
phonograph, into which he pours the plaintive tones of his unrequited love. For Seward, 
the phonograph serves as a technology of interiorization, its concave shape suggesting its 
discretion. The unreciprocated nature of Seward’s desire for Lucy finds its technological 
analog in the fact that he has never imagined receiving anything back from the 
phonograph. In his hands, the machine remains every bit as unresponsive as Lucy. When 
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pressed for a demonstration of the phonograph, he sheepishly admits to Mina that, 
“although I have kept the diary for months past, it never once struck me how I was going 
to find any particular part of it in case I wanted to look it up?” (259). Seward’s was a 
record never intended to be played back; he had seen it as medium of storage, and not 
transmission. Entrusting these cylinders to Mina, he exhibits the same confusion with 
regard to women. In accordance with the original meaning of the term, Seward’s 
“secretary” is to serve as a repository of secrets (OED). He imagines speaking into a 
void, blindly placing his private thoughts into another medium of which he has little 
understanding. Seward thinks he has laid these feelings to rest, quietly suggesting to 
Mina: “No one need ever know, shall ever know.” Mina’s grave response is sympathetic, 
but unequivocal: “Ah, but they must!” (261). The doctor’s first bout of concern 
(regarding the phonograph) pothers over the difficulty of retrieval, his second 
(concerning Mina) over the impossibility of retraction.  
 Seward’s inability to decrypt his personal phonographic records belies Edison’s 
claim that his “wax cylinders speak for themselves and will not have to wait centuries to 
be deciphered” by future civilizations (“Perfected Phonograph” 645). In place of this 
vision of universal comprehension, Seward’s “glitch” provides us with a momentary 
experience of fundamental technological alienation, where even the speaker finds himself 
exiled from his own words and voice. Edison’s statement is typical of what Jason Camlot 
has identified as the Victorian “rhetoric of immediacy” (147) concerning the 
phonograph.27 For Camlot, the most striking aspect of this rhetoric was its “enthusiastic 
willingness to embrace the phonograph as something of a transparent medium” (149). 
Camlot’s richly researched essay provides a wealth of cultural materials that advance this 
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understanding of the phonograph, including a promotional recording that captures the 
phonograph’s “own” voice declaring: “My voice is the clearest, smoothest and most 
natural of any talking machine” (158 in Camlot). It is easy to imagine Victorians 
fascinated by the “natural” sound of machines posing as humans, but they were also 
curious about the many ways this technology might bring to light the unnatural aspects of 
the human talking machine. It is here that the darker ironies of this technological 
“immediacy”—ironies that were frequently acknowledged by Edison himself, as we will 
see—begin to assert themselves. In Stoker’s techno-gothic imagination, the voice of 
Edison’s “tongueless, toothless instrument” (Edison, in Kahn 93) is neither neutral nor 
transparent. A technological iteration of the Gothic collapse of distinctions between 
heimlich and unheimlich, the phonograph’s unsettling echo blurs distinctions between 
fidelity and infidelity with technological reproductions that faithfully serve sonic 
phenomena while utterly betraying the speaker. 
Wandering among the vaults under the monastery from which he is determined to 
make his escape, Melmoth the Wanderer’s Alonzo gives voice to an abiding Gothic fear 
when he considers with dread the possibility that he may never find the exit. He is 
overwhelmed by “the chance, the fear, that we may never come to light” (185). Dracula’s 
characters are just as often moved by the opposite fear, that the protective shroud of 
darkness will be torn away, that the labyrinth cannot not help them to “lose themselves.” 
Freud, quoting Schelling’s definition of the uncanny, interprets this term as the name for 
“everything . . . that ought to have remained secret and hidden but has come to light” 
(126). This uncanny return is inscribed within reproductive technology, the curse of 
recursive writing machines.  
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In critical readings of Dracula, the phonograph has often been lost within 
Stoker’s sprawling network of writing and reading machines. Dracula is a novel that 
concerns itself with the symbolic processing of the Real, an operation best exemplified in 
Mina’s typewritten transcriptions of Seward’s phonograph cylinders. Returning to 
Seward after her first experience with the machine, Mina reports that the phonograph “is 
a wonderful machine, but it is cruelly true. It told me, in its very tones, the anguish of 
your heart. It was like a soul crying out to Almighty God” (261). Perhaps it is Mina’s 
maternal instinct that impels her to hush the plaintive cry of this phonograph with her 
typewriter, muting its painful tones with the conviction that: “No one must hear them 
spoken ever again!” (261). There is no doubt that the typewriter represents the dominant 
register of the novel, and perhaps the prominence of the phonograph has suffered because 
of the way the novel encrypts (or, as Jennifer Wicke has it, vampirizes) this medium 
through type. And yet, if speech does occupy a lower rung on the media food-chain, it is 
rarely fully digested by Mina’s typewriter. It is difficult not to think of the phonograph 
when Harker describes the Count’s voice as a “harsh, metallic whisper” that emanates 
from some unlocatable source overhead (77). We can still hear this voice, which enters 
the novel in strange ways, disrupting the regularity of Mina’s “clean” copy that the text 
requires.28  The epistemological bent of her textual strategy is fundamentally symbolic, 
attempting as it does to modernize the Gothic, and revise the manuscript. This 
mechanical process of symbolization, as I have remarked above, is the focus of Kittler’s 
formidable reading of Stoker’s media-parable. Adopted from Foucault’s conception of 
the episteme, Kittler’s “shock and awe” philosophy of media constructs a history where 
one technology of writing is instantly and utterly overwhelmed by its successor (which 
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brings with it a total regime change). The gothic imagination, by contrast, is obsessed 
with the palimpsest: a model of textuality that hallucinates, within the placid surface of 
present text, the ruin of previous writings and haunting echoes of departed voices. We 
could turn, of course, to the example of the found manuscript, which receives its most 
evocatively gothic treatment in Hogg’s Confessions of A Justified Sinner. Here, a text is 
buried within the text, a facsimile of the hand behind the anonymity of type. To gothicize 
McLuhan’s dictum, every new medium is erected amongst the ruins of previous media-
forms.29  
Dracula is a text haunted by the voices within it, voices that frustrate and 
interrupt the process of symbolization undertaken by Mina’s typewriter. The grooves of 
the phonograph appear to Seward as a mechanical labyrinth, a place to safely bury his 
secret by “engraving” it technologically. Having never considered the possibility that 
these thoughts might find their way back out to the surface, the sight of their resurrection 
inspires a dread akin to Lucy’s rising from the coffin (her body’s own unstable archive). 
Edison intuits the uncanny nature of the phonographic encounter in his own writings. 
Chief among the device’s suggested uses was the ability to hear voices return from the 
grave. The phonograph is an open casket of sorts, allowing us to lovingly attend to the 
departed. But while the voice of another allows for a sentimental reunion, the possibility 
of one’s own voice returning from the dead is a profoundly alienating thought:  
Your words are preserved in the tin foil and will come back upon the application 
of the instrument years after you are dead in exactly the same tone of voice you 
spoke in then . . . This tongueless, toothless instrument, without larynx or 
pharynx, dumb, voiceless matter, nevertheless mimics your tones, speaks with 
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your voice, speaks with your words, and centuries after you have crumbled into 
dust will repeat again and again, to a generation that could never know you, every 
idle thought, every fond fancy, every vain word that you chose to whisper against 
this thin iron diaphragm. (qtd. in Kahn 93) 
If Edison’s statement offers the promise of immortality, it is perhaps the least comforting 
vision possible: a doppelganger voice that outlives its owner only to turn upon him. The 
subject finds itself locked out of its own life, as the sound that once resonated inside—an 
echo that seemed to constitutively shape that interior—returns as utterly exterior. This 
partial object, an uncanny automaton without tongue or teeth, nonetheless speaks. If 
writing in Plato’s Phaedrus inscribed the epitaph of thought—“dead discourse” (276a)—
Edison’s open crypt transmits a kind of “undead” speech. Unhinged from its authorizing 
body, this mortifying sound sardonically and irreverently commits to posterity our most 
idle thoughts and careless whispers. Mina’s description of the phonographic replication 
as “cruelly true” (261) captures perfectly Edison’s apprehension of the phonograph’s 
sadistic fidelity. 
 In 1878, the Journal of Science illustrated this machine’s upsetting tendency to 
capture accidents of the voice in its account of an early phonograph demonstration:  
 songs sung into it by Mr. Spagnoletti, Mr. Edmunds, and Mr. Preece, were 
 reproduced with very respectable correctness; and even the breakdown of one of 
 the singers at a high note, accompanied by a little impatient remark, was faithfully 
 recorded, and given out again with exasperating fidelity. (“Phonograph” 252) 
Having “faithfully recorded” the trio’s repertoire, the phonograph manages to reproduce 
these songs with “respectable correctness.” A human voice breaks down, but the machine 
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does not malfunction. In an act of “exasperating fidelity,” the phonograph presents us 
with an unerring record of human error.  
Edison’s playful promotion of the phonograph often suggested the machine was 
as likely to betray the voice as to support it. Was the phonograph too close, and too 
diligent a listener, to properly bear witness to the speaker? The exactness of the machine 
laid bare a crucial irony within the concept of fidelity, prompting Edison to write in one 
moment of the “faithful recording” produced by the phonograph, and note in the next 
that: “This little instrument records the utterance of the human voice, and like a faithless 
confidante repeats every secret confided to it whenever requested to do so” (“The 
Phonograph” 249). The machine could be at once “faithful” and “faithless” because its 
loyalty to sound extended beyond (and potentially compromised) the narrow signal of the 
speaker. Edison’s rhetoric impishly exploits the pleasure and anxiety provoked by the 
thought of a voice that was seemingly unfiltered, uncensored, and devoid of any capacity 
for discrimination: “With charming impartiality it will express itself in the divine strains 
of a lyric goddess or use the startling vernacular of a street Arab” (249). The phonograph 
did not—indeed, could not—recognize the distinctions and divisions of culture. All 
languages were the same to this illiterate and polyglot machine; it understood nothing of 
what it heard, and so was uniquely qualified to repeat everything.  
Of course, the incendiary juxtaposition of “goddess” and “street Arab”—
particularly when the machine-voice has been explicitly feminized as a “confidante”— 
suggests that such recordings would only serve to more deeply entrench cultural 
constructions of difference. If Edison’s first invocation of the “tongueless, toothless 
instrument” serves to highlight the foreignness lodged within the subject, this latter 
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experiment directs the alienating capacity of the disembodied voice against the other in a 
strategic manner, furnishing physical evidence that seems to corroborate the prejudices of 
the listener by tangibly confirming the other’s difference. The phonographic register of 
Stoker’s novel—present in Seward’s cylinders, but also in Jonathan and Mina’s phonetic 
shorthand— blurs this line between fidelity and faithlessness insofar as it serves to 
highlight difference within the novel’s characters (playing back unacknowledged 
differences to the self).30 The technological perfection of mechanical reproduction reveals 
that human “fidelity” and “reality” were only approximate values, indistinct principles 
that had to be tempered as they approached full disclosure. 
Though it sometimes emerges from within Stoker’s “proper” English subjects, the 
novel most often projects this noise upon classed and raced “others,” generating an echo 
that denatures the language of the novel through exactness of its recording. In his 
professional dealings with the Count, Jonathan courteously insists: “You know and speak 
English thoroughly!” (51). Though he denies the exotic nature of Dracula’s speech, 
Jonathan’s private writings are suffused with oral fascination, concerned with the sound 
of words rather than their meaning, and convinced that these sounds tell us more than the 
speaker knows. Jonathan and Mina’s shorthand technique records voices phonetically, 
and the preservation of dialect within Dracula is a way of alienating the speaker from his 
own words, highlighting his foreignness. Thus, the careful transcription of the “glitches” 
of dialect mark the writer’s absolute fidelity to the voice, but also constitute, in their 
betrayal of the speaking subject, an infidelity. When mimicry tends toward mockery, 
Jonathan’s diaries read as “cruelly true.” Recording verbatim becomes an aggressive 
practice, passively encoding implicit critical commentary in the refusal to edit. Jonathan 
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may have been led astray by “phonetic spelling” (302), the external “dis-guise” of speech 
whose corrupting influence Saussure had warned about, but when langue and parole 
diverge, his text consistently chooses to follow the idiosyncrasies of the latter.31 In the 
pursuit of accurate recording, the journalist always faces a dilemma: whether to remain 
faithful to the exact transcript, or to charitably filter out any “noise” that might interfere 
with the “ideal” of the speaker’s intended message. Absolute fidelity is maintained at the 
expense of the subject. 
In Dracula, writing swallows speech whole. Mina refrains from assimilating (or 
digesting) the irregularities of speech into the standardized system of “proper” language. 
Her devotion to “verbatim” reportage does not content itself with capturing 
communications “word-for-word,” but burrows into the voice at a deeper level. Mina’s 
precise technique narrows in upon components of speech ordinarily rendered invisible by 
type. The phonograph (and the novel’s strict reproduction of its transmissions) provides 
an aural equivalent of Edweard Muybridge’s motion studies, dissecting and preserving 
for minute analysis the negligible details and irregularities typically smoothed out in the 
“flow” of written records. Stoker shares with Muybridge a fascination with deformities 
and abnormalities of movement (the former being concerned with expression, the latter 
with locomotion); both are interested in correcting the blindness brought on by 
idealizations of the body. Mina makes no attempt to straighten out Van Helsing’s “dis-
figures” of speech; comic malapropisms such as “the milk that is spilt cries not out 
afterwards” (274) provide the grain of his character.  
 If Van Helsing’s speech reveals Stoker’s somewhat clinical interest in the speech 
of “others” (evident in the dialects of the raced and classed mouths that resonate within 
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his text), the faltering speech of the novel’s “proper” English subjects in their more 
emotional moments seems calculated to imbue the protagonists with pathos. Voices are 
nowhere more conspicuously present in Dracula than when they are on the verge of 
breaking down. Mina transcribes Seward’s floundering description of her own preventive 
burial service, during which the doctor stutters out: “I--I cannot go on--words--and--v-
voice--fail m-me!…” (373). Wicke reads this transmission as “the immaterialization of a 
voice” (470), but we are witnessing precisely the opposite phenomenon here. Working 
from Seward’s phonograph cylinders, Mina demonstrates the “minute accuracy” 
promised by Edison in his essay concerning “The Perfected Phonograph.” According to 
Edison, the machine would duplicate an “unimpeachable transcript” of any conversation, 
reproducing not only voices, but “every break and pause, every hesitation or confident 
affirmation, every partial suggestion or particular explanation, infallibly set down in the 
wax” (648). Mina’s type redoubles this transformation, its indelible imprint granting a 
new materiality to the voice. The text represents a voice breaking down, but also 
performs the breaking down of the voice, dissecting every insignificant grain and 
presenting it for examination. Transcribing her own struggles with the unspeakable, Mina 
stutters across the page: “the...the...the...Vampire. Why did I hesitate to write the word?” 
(395). An exemplary display of obedience to Van Helsing’s counsel “to put down in 
record even your doubts and surmises” (156), her entry does not actually hesitate to write, 
but literally writes hesitation. Silence itself is called to account, graphically represented 
by Mina's ellipses. Rather than a “proper” translation from one medium to another, 
moments such as this one find the typewriter mimicking the phonograph by making a 
kind of analog-based gapless recording, where stuttering, second thoughts, and 
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interjections are all recorded upon the page. There is something jarring about these 
remnants of the voice that have survived their remediation into written text, a process that 
normally tends to formalize speech by flattening out the glitches of oral communication. 
Mina’s “exasperating” commitment to absolute fidelity kindles unrest within the text; 
under her stewardship the novel becomes the site for a “live burial” of the voice.  
Noting this strange survival of orality within Dracula, John M. Picker finds at the 
core of Stoker’s tale “a distinctly late-Victorian fascination with the primacy of the 
voices that pulse through it” (776). Though Picker contends that “Dracula only nibbles at 
the possibilities for serious problems with the notion of a phonographic voice” (779), his 
reading of the novel nevertheless does an excellent job of gathering the phonographic 
figures that surface within this “novel of indentations” (including phonographic 
inscriptions, vampiric penetrations, and typewriter impressions). For Picker, the 
phonograph “acts as a locus of sexual anxiety and symbolism among Seward, Lucy 
Westenra, and Mina” (777). My aim in what follows is to explore in greater depth 
Dracula’s techno-eroticism, through consideration of the mechanics of desire set in 
motion by the phonograph—a device that embodies the intimacy of communication by 
linking orality and touch.  
Discussion of Dracula’s “oral fixation” has typically centered upon the figure of 
the vampire.32 The erotic charge with which Stoker alights the seduction of both Jonathan 
and Mina has a distinctly oral character. Possessed by the “wicked, burning desire” that 
his three temptresses “would kiss me with those red lips,” Jonathan lies recumbent as 
“[t]he girl went on her knees, and bent over me, simply gloating.”  Likewise, the 
spectacle of Mina’s “baptism of blood” (384) holds for Seward “a terrible resemblance to 
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a child forcing a kitten's nose into a saucer of milk to compel it to drink” (322). If the 
Count has been saddled with a “child-brain” (382), he has also been cursed with an 
infant-mouth. Like the child, whose oral fixation is understood by Freud to be 
“associated, in the first instance, with the satisfaction of the need for nourishment” (Three 
Essays 182), the vampire’s unquenchable thirst for blood comes from a shadowy place 
between need and desire. Dracula’s relation to his victims vacillates between mastery and 
dependence, ecstasy and desperate compulsion (due to the abject hunger for the bodily 
fluids he craves in order to survive). If the phrase “sexual appetite” has long been interred 
within the graveyard of dead metaphors, Dracula’s disturbing hunger revives the primal 
truth of this state of confusion, where “sexual activity has not yet been separated from the 
ingestion of food” (Three Essays 198).  
This reading of vampirism as the monstrous perpetuation of oral desire finds its 
reciprocal analogy in Freud’s schema of libidinal development in Three Essays on the 
Theory of Sexuality (1905), where he proposes that the oral phase might be considered 
“cannibalistic” in nature (273). The note first appears in a 1915 revision of the Three 
Essays, at the same time Freud was exploring the complex relation between desire and 
destruction in his “Mourning and Melancholia.” Here Freud argues that the ego “wants to 
incorporate” its object of desire, and “it wants to do so by devouring it” (250). 
Anticipating Freud, Stoker imagines the mouth as primarily a site of compulsion, and 
only secondarily as a means of communication. The vampire’s mouth transmits the 
“unspeakable” because it writes without speaking. This assertion of the priority of writing 
is not a playful deconstructive reversal, but the traumatic force of an incomprehensible 
law, one that imposes itself without concern for the subject’s testimony, or even 
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understanding. We have not the proper mirror to read what has been inscribed on 
ourselves. 
 
The Phonographic Imagination: Indexing Bodies 
We find evidence of this bodily trauma in a number of different origin-stories of the 
phonograph, one of which has been preserved within Theodore Achille L. Du Moncel’s 
The Telephone, The Microphone, and The Phonograph. Du Moncel relates the story of 
Edison’s “accidental” discovery with the skeptical distance one ought to maintain when 
relating accounts by “American journals” (310): 
In the course of some experiments Mr. Edison was making with the telephone, a 
stylus attached to the diaphragm pierced his finger at the moment when the 
diaphragm began to vibrate under the influence of the voice, and the prick was 
enough to draw blood. It then occurred to him that if the vibrations of the 
diaphragm enabled the stylus to pierce the skin, they might produce on a flexible 
surface such distinct outlines as to represent all the undulation produced by the 
voice. (310) 
Du Moncel concedes this to be “an ingenious story,” but insists that “we would rather 
believe that the discovery was made in a more serious spirit” (310). This is an ingenious 
story, rather than a story of genius, because it confers agency upon the “accidental” 
operations of the machine, while representing Edison as a receptive medium that serves 
as the surface of experimentation. Bitten by the stylus, Edison is infected with the idea 
rather than inventing it. The possibilities of the machine become real through the piercing 
of skin and the drawing of blood, rather than dawning upon the intellect in a moment of 
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scientific deduction. Edison’s own body serves as the prototype for the phonograph, 
which now must reproduce and improve upon the receptive penetrability of skin.  
In their introduction and elaboration of the concept of “vampiric typewriting,” 
Kittler and Wicke provide some of the most insightful connections between biting and 
writing, though their shared commitment to the typewriter as Dracula’s master 
technology obscures the vital significance of the index within Stoker’s novel. Bite-marks 
are the record of a needle that has been dropped into a permeable surface, and may at any 
time return to the groove that has been cut. The Count taunts Mina with the countless 
times he has returned to re-open her wound: “It is not the first time, or the second, that 
your veins have appeased my thirst!” (327). Leaving behind a trace that serves as 
evidence of his victim’s possession, Dracula’s vampirism retains the classical definition 
of stigmata as brandings that identify the bearer’s enslavement. In its more metaphorical 
sense, the “stigma” denotes an enduring trace (literal or otherwise) left by shameful 
bodily contact. The marks on Lucy and Mina’s necks are scarlet letters, bloody 
inscriptions that, in accordance with the Gothic law of externalization, provide evidence 
of physical commerce with impure forces. The lover’s adulterous kiss remains eternally 
upon one’s throat, its irreversible mark binding two bodies together in calamitous 
sympathy.  
The Gothic imagination has always had a special fascination with stigmata; its 
fictions tend to employ the needle rather than the stylus, and engrave themselves upon 
flesh and blood rather than paper and ink. Following in the tradition of Victorian Gothic’s 
forensic dramas, the Count contributes no writing to Stoker’s narrative, save these legible 
traces of his body. These signature marks remain inarticulate wounds until Van Helsing 
  
215 
identifies Dracula as “of a type,” initiating the forensic process of symbolization that 
narrates a history of bodily contact. Once the Crew of Light finally learns to properly 
interpret these enigmatic, yet indelible markings, every other sign within the narrative 
begins to make sense. A more common variety of criminal might have left fingerprints, 
but the Count’s teeth-marks serve as reliable indices to his villainous actions. Embedding 
signs within flesh grants them a unique material permanence and irrefutable stamp of 
authenticity that the body—more often than not unwillingly—corroborates. 
Whenever popular fin-de-siècle literature borrows the phonograph to perform its 
writing, the results turn out to be scandalous. The stigmatic marks of the machine 
introduce to narrative the discourses of gossip and indiscretion. The machine commonly 
plays the part of Edison’s “faithless confidante,” inciting and affirming defamatory 
rumours. Robert Ganthony’s comic poem “The Phonograph” (1900) finds a man 
recording a simulated “volley of kisses” in order to see “How a kiss would come out / In 
a phonograph way.” When his maid walks in on the performance in flagranti and 
confusedly blurts out, “Oh, sir, how can you?  What are you doing?,” the man falls into a 
panic, upon realizing that the record will appear to testify to the seduction of his maid, 
rather than his new gadget. The speaker’s peculiar impulse to caress the machine would 
seem to illustrate Picker’s claim that, for nineteenth-century writers, “the phonograph 
seemed not only possessed, but more specifically charged with a dangerous sort of 
sexualized femininity” (“Aura” 772). 
In fiction of the Victorian period, bodies both innocent and guilty are betrayed by 
their voices. In Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s “The Voice of Science,” the phonograph allows 
Rupert Esdaile to call into question the integrity of Captain Beesly, his sister’s suitor. 
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When his sister refuses to hear the rumors surrounding Beesly’s time in India, Rupert 
records the names of various women with whom he has been said to have had affairs, and 
broadcasts them at a party. The voice of the machine immediately turns Beesly’s 
complexion “the colour of cheese,” and sends him running, without any attempt to refute 
these unsubstantiated claims. Doyle’s title suggests the authority that the phonograph 
grants to scandalous discourse. The same words that have been rejected as slander from 
the brother are received as truth when passed through the “scientific” machine. Another 
of Doyle’s short stories, “The Story of the Japanned Box,” features a narrator by turns 
upset and intrigued by the mysterious female voice that emanates nightly from his 
master’s study. After a youth squandered away in thoughtless intemperance, and curbed 
only by the intervention of his (now deceased) wife, this man has led an upright and 
ascetic existence, one whose only contradiction would seem to be the open secret of his 
nightly rendezvous with this “other” woman. Who is she, and how has she gained 
entrance to his room without ever once being observed by the staff, whose extraordinary 
vigilance is underwritten by their prurient curiosity? Of course, Doyle’s title hints at the 
answer. The peculiar “Japanned Box” contains a phonographic recording of the deceased 
wife’s voice, which recites nightly her sweet assurance that she watches over her husband 
still. The “kept woman” turns out only to be a preserved voice, but we are left to imagine 
why the master cloaks the signs of the husband’s fidelity under the guise of duplicity. 
Taken together, these texts suggest that the essential scandal of phonographic 
inscription lies in the medium itself, rather than any particular message it might convey. 
This analog recording machine relies fundamentally upon the intercourse of bodies for 
the transcription of sounds. If the phonograph detaches voices from bodies, it does so by 
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apprehending the voice as a body, capturing sonic vibrations in physical contact with the 
recording cylinder. Consequently, an innocent conversation can be re-read as an 
enigmatic moment of physical contact. The physical intimacy between signifier and 
signified captured by this machine subjects all communication to innuendo, transferring 
the concept of reproduction from a textual to an erotic register. What sort of thing would 
the phonograph record? Most often, we find, scenes that reproduce the logic of its 
functioning, by exploiting this new and extraordinary sensitivity to touching. Like a 
fingerprint left at the scene of the crime, the record is an indexical mark that invites us to 
trace out the body, because we know it has brushed up against this surface at some point.  
Though one Victorian satirist might have insisted that: “a man prefers / Direct and 
labial contact,” for many, Edison’s “preposterous plan / For kissing by machinery!” 
(Punch 1888) offered tantalizing possibilities for otherwise unacceptable communication 
between the sexes. American writer Edward Bellamy’s “With the Eyes Shut” (1889) 
explores the phonograph’s ability to return the erotic quality of the voice back to reading. 
Bellamy’s title suggestively indicates not only the practical possibilities of reading by 
phonograph, but the dream state this fantasy-machine inspires. Even the most 
commonplace information, such as the telling of the hours upon a clock, takes on a most 
enchanting ring when imparted by “the strong, sweet, musical tones of a perfect mistress 
of the art of story-telling” (338). The phonograph translates the “arbitrary symbolism” of 
the clock to “the presence of this young woman in my room” (339-340). Initially startled 
by the voice of this “young” and “charming” woman, “who could not have been standing 
more than ten feet from my bed” (339), our narrator turns out the lights in order to better 
enjoy “the bewitching presence which the voice suggested” (340).  
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This confusion of vocal with physical presence was a familiar experience within 
the Victorian imagination, and the most indelible illustration of this uncertainty would 
have to be Victor/RCA’s “His Master’s Voice” trademark, an iconic image that speaks 
volumes about the ways this machine has reconfigured understandings of fidelity. 
Adapted from a painting by Francis Barraud, which depicted his brother’s fox terrier 
peering quizzically into the brass horn of a gramophone, the charm of this enduring 
image depends centrally upon its playful juxtaposition of two different versions of 
fidelity: one animal, the other technological. Nipper, the Victor Talking Machine 
Company’s mascot, embodies the former. The textual invocation of the “master,” whose 
voice we suddenly hear emerging from the trumpet, confirms the message of loyalty and 
obedience communicated by the dog, with its renowned fidelity to “man.” Taking its cue 
from the terrier, the gramophone is equipped with an embossing-point capable of 
“follow[ing sonic phenomena] with such fidelity as to retransmit to the disk . . . any 
property essential to producing upon the ear the same sensation as if coming direct from 
the original source” (“The Phonograph and Its Future” 528). Following the voice 
wherever it may go, the gramophone represents the technological appropriation of this 
devoted attention to man.  
Human civilization’s domestication of phonographic technology further 
establishes its mastery over the animal, which retains a credulous relation to the indexical 
sign (manipulated here to comic effect). Nipper fails to understand that his master’s voice 
has broken from its leash—that the reverberation of the voice no longer necessarily 
heralds the appearance of the body. The fixity of the indexical trace outlasts the 
impermanent presence of the thing itself. 
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And yet, if they knew better than to be led astray by these voices, the question 
remains as to why the Victorians took such pleasure in divorcing sound from the other 
senses, and willfully surrendering themselves to the illusions such sensory deprivation 
could produce. Listening with his eyes closed, Bellamy’s narrator knowingly submits to 
ontological uncertainty in order to enjoy the sensual fantasy conjured by the erotic 
presence of the female voice. We experience this same pleasure when Ganthony’s poem 
enters “playback mode,” and we are asked to forget what we have “seen” and simply 
“listen” to the encounter. Neither is Stoker’s novel immune to this phonographic 
fascination. On her first visit to Seward’s study, Mina mistakes Seward’s conversation 
with his machine for human dialogue, but enters the room to find “He was quite alone” 
(258). Mina’s “intense surprise” in finding “there was no one with him” (258) dramatizes 
the powerful consolatory functions of technology and the degree to which our 
monologues with technology are capable of replicating human intercourse.33  
It seems that whenever the phonograph appeared within popular literature of the 
period, it was set in motion with the express purpose of exploring the novelty of the 
voice’s extraction from the body, and exploiting the misapprehensions caused by this 
division. If Mina’s introduction to the phonograph presents a rather quaint instance of this 
confusion, the voices that assail Renfield’s troubled psyche provide a wretched portrayal 
of a body fatally bound to follow the remote influence of “his master’s voice.”34 Renfield 
is the novel’s nightmare of fidelity, embodying the point along the darker end of the 
spectrum where loyalty deepens into the slavery of absolute possession.  
 In The Beetle, Marsh’s characters had given voice to the impression that their 
bodies might faithfully serve as indices to the identity and actions of their antagonist. In 
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Dracula, this internal conviction becomes a matter of public record. Harker interprets 
Renfield’s actions as “a sort of index to the coming and going of the Count” (264). A 
week later, Seward augments Harker’s term to describe Renfield’s peculiar relationship 
with the Count when he remarks that the two are “mixed up […] in an indexy kind of 
way” (287). Diagnosing Renfield as “indexy” represents possession as a relation between 
signifier and signified. Renfield’s indexical link to the Count illuminates the Gothic 
subtext of Charles Sanders Peirce’s contention that the index is “forced by blind fact to 
correspond to its object” (“Telepathy” 628). Stoker and Peirce’s twin texts of telepathic 
influence cast the involuntary fidelity of the sign as a form of hypnotic possession, 
suggesting that the signified acts “under the influence” of the signified. In the body of the 
index, an automatism, and even a certain uncanny helplessness, steals into Peirce’s 
thought. Here the notion of a ‘motivated’ signifier (as opposed to Saussure’s arbitrary 
link between signifier and signified) must be read as a conceptual euphemism, one that 
only dilutes the strange power under which these signs operate.  
 If Seward detects a “method in [Renfield’s] madness” (102), the latter’s feverish 
writing also reveals the madness of the Crew’s graphical methods. Renfield’s cannibal 
ledger, where he obsessively tabulates the mounting insect and animal lives consumed in 
preparation for human blood, proffers a grim parody of Seward, Mina and Jonathan’s 
graphomaniacal exertions. This “little notebook in which he is always jotting down 
something” (105), like the anorexic’s caloric diary, substitutes ingestion for introspection; 
it chronicles the abject narrative of the outside becoming inside. Seward confides to his 
phonographic diary his envy of Renfield’s ability “to begin a new record with each day” 
of his life (104). For a moment at least, the deranged contents of his patient’s records 
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appear as entirely beside the point, so long as one has “a good unselfish cause” (104) to 
write. Pages later, Mina begins to detect traces of this uncanny selflessness in her fiancé’s 
subtly disfigured writing, finding that his strangely impersonal correspondence with her 
has been written in a hand that “does not read like him, and yet it is his writing” (106). 
His signature has become the index of something other than his own self-possessed 
subjecthood. Indeed, as we have seen, this dispossession of authorship is precisely the 
point of Van Helsing’s strict regimen of graphomaniacal production. To apprehend the 
vampire, each of our writers must become an index, cultivating an impressionable nature 
that can be marked by, and legible to, others. If Seward intends that Renfield’s 
“unconscious cerebration […] will have to give the wall to [its] conscious brother” (102), 
the Crew of Light find themselves making the opposite capitulation, inciting unconscious 
cerebration through automatic writing techniques that decentre consciousness and make 
way for the other.35 
 Mina’s “baptism of blood” marks her initiation within this same unconscious 
network. Needless to say, blood in Dracula carries much more than nutrients and oxygen; 
it is coded with the essence of class, race, masculine vigor, and feminine sexuality.36 
Mina’s “baptism” sees the vampire’s blood finally exploited as either mesmeric fluid or 
electrical conduit. Under its influence, Mina becomes the “faithless confidante” of 
Edison’s phonographic nightmare, a double agent without loyalty to either the Count or 
the Crew. Lacking even the ability to discriminate, she gives way to the “street Arab” as 
readily as the Englishman. 
As a description of Mina’s remote correspondence with the Count, the strictest 
etymological definition of telepathy—that of “touching at a distance”—is the most 
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precise; theirs is an exchange of sound and vibrations, rather than thought. Listening in 
on the scene, we find a portal to a place that is at once strikingly intimate and utterly 
impersonal (352). Sounding only like a telephone left off the hook with no one holding 
the other end, Mina registers sound and sense without language; she gains entrance to 
Dracula’s coffin, but cannot pry into his mind. There is no interior, audible self—only 
sensations from which the Crew must deduce the Count’s location. Is this because 
Dracula has no internal monologue that could be “overheard”? It is true that the Gothic 
tradition strictly disallows this interiority to its monsters. In the empty mirror of vampire 
folklore, we find the vampire incapable, at least in the literal sense, of self-reflection. And 
what do we capture when Mina is employed as the mirror?  As far as the Crew of Light’s 
cutting-edge psychotechnics can determine, Dracula is something less than a “mental 
child,” practically a non-entity. His crypt brims with the same blankness as Renfield’s 
“little notebook.” His thoughts simply do not register: only the body speaks. As Van 
Helsing relates in his journal: “Mina's morning and evening hypnotic answer is unvaried. 
Lapping waves, rushing water, and creaking masts” (376). Mina reproduces sound 
without a subject, noises that have not been sculpted into the consciousness of an 
individual, communicating instead an oceanic feeling that—provided we read Dracula’s 
location as something more than incidental—imparts a sense of the sublime carnal 
immediacy promised by the vampiric body. Though it serves the narrative by orienting 
the Crew of Light, this primal flood at the heart of the novel ought to disorient us as 
readers. The scene challenges us to discard outdated notions of fidelity premised upon the 
“integrity” of the body, in particular the voice as the sounding out of a subject’s resonant 
interiority.  
  
223 
If Kittler’s reading of Dracula’s “typographic logic” explores the potential, 
through modern media, to communicate without touching, the phonograph raises the 
traumatic possibility of touching without communicating. Mirroring the culture in which 
it was written, Dracula’s networks are fundamentally dependent upon the bodies of 
female operators, and so it is that Mina’s relations with Jonathan and the Count, 
respectively, most clearly enact these two capacities of technology. The chaste nature of 
Jonathan and Mina’s relationship exemplifies the disembodied communication typical of 
modern conceptions of immediacy, depending as it does on the streamlining, and even 
eradication of bodies, for the instantaneous communication of information. Stoker’s 
vampire, on the other hand, embodies the Gothic intuition that communication is always 
a matter of intercourse between bodies, no matter how intercessory machines may work 
to sublimate that process. The spatial immediacy of the index, as Dracula’s gothic modes 
of inscription make clear (and as the phonographic valence of the text mimics), interposes 
the oblique (and most often painful) presence of the body. 
Are humans truly capable of fidelity? Despite Mina and Jonathan’s private 
liaisons, the novel suggests they are. However, the means by which this fidelity is 
maintained turn out to be more disturbing than the couple’s frequent failures. On one 
hand, we find a faithfulness to the truth that is underwritten by technology, characterized 
by distraction and detachment, mechanical values that rest uneasily in the human breast. 
On the other hand, we witness the uncanny fidelity that is the symptom of extreme 
attachment and the overpowering force of one body upon another. Within Stoker’s novel, 
it is our protagonists’ capacity for fidelity that is most troubling, because neither 
experience is “true” to the individual: the first breaks down the self by privileging 
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mechanical drive over subjective will, and the automatic over the autonomous gesture. 
The second abdicates the will to the other, arousing the fear that the mind is not strong 
enough to resist being drawn to the brink of possession.   
 Breaching the self-imposed limits allocated by the subject, Mina’s body serves as 
medial instrument and object of the other, dispersed within a depersonalized psychical 
network. It is this communion of bodies that the gothic imagination nervously 
approaches. Its advances are guided by a Victorian dialectic of physical expansion and 
retraction that oscillates between distracted and productive bodies that dilate 
sympathetically with nervous energy, and attentive and restrictive examiners that 
apprehend, codify, and institutionalize these bodies. 
 
                                                
 
1 The indelible phrase “Crew of Light” is Christopher Craft’s coinage, and was first used 
to name Van Helsing, Jonathan and Mina Harker, Jack Seward, Arthur Goldalming, and 
Quincy Morris in “‘Kiss Me With Those Red Lips’: Gender and Inversion in Bram 
Stoker’s Dracula.” Representations 8 (1984): 107-33. 
 
2 See Arata, “The Occidental Tourist: Dracula and the Anxiety of Reverse Colonization.” 
 
3 See Wicke 491-92; Winthrop-Young 115. 
 
4 “Manifold” paper was an early form of carbon paper, employed to produce a number 
duplicates simultaneously. Mina makes reference to her use of this technique on 262. 
 
5 See Lucy’s letter to Mina: “Why can't they let a girl marry three men, or as many as 
want her, and save all this trouble?” (91). 
 
6 The OED identifies George Bartlett Prescott’s The Speaking Telephone, Talking 
Phonograph, and Other Novelties (1878) as the first usage of fidelity in its technological 
sense, intended to communicate “the degree to which a sound or picture reproduced or 
transmitted by any device resembles the original.”  
 
7 See Fleissner 64. As Fleissner has noted, Mina’s typewriter-work positions her within a 
tense negotiation of women’s cultural production (often strategically recast as 
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reproduction). Jonathan suggests as much on the final page of the novel, when he insists 
that it is Mina’s child that matters, and not her text. 
 
8 For more on the human dimension of mimesis, see Robert Storey’s Mimesis and the 
Human Animal: On the Biogenetic Foundations of Literary Representation. On the 
distinction between phonographic fidelity and human imitation, see Camlot. In Camlot’s 
reading of Victorian promotional materials for the phonograph, he finds that: “The 
machine was presented not as a technology that has perfected the art of mimicry, but as a 
kind of perfectly natural mimic, written upon by nature and preserving that natural 
moment eternally” (156). 
 
9 Richardson presents Grandison as a compendium of: “Familiar Letters, written, as it 
were, to the Moment, while the Heart is agitated by Hopes and Fears, on Events 
undecided . . .” (Grandison vi). 
 
10 On the links between stenographic shorthand and male professionalization, see Price 
32-47. 
 
11 On the vampiric tendencies of Mina’s typewriting work, see Wicke. 
 
12 Of course, the major infidelity Coppola’s film adaptation introduces into Stoker’s 
narrative must be accompanied by Mina’s discarding of the text, the dramatic scene 
where pages are torn away one by one, thrown into the water, and float away. Coppola 
had to locate a gap in the text to serve as Mina’s window of opportunity. Though Mina 
writes nothing of these encounters, we have only to consult the record upon Mina’s body 
to find the scarlet-tinged evidence of her assignations with the vampire. 
 
13 See pages 104, 221, 367. 
 
14 On the Victorian “process of transforming sex into discourse” (22), see Foucault, “The 
Incitement to Discourse” History of Sexuality, vol. 1. 17-35. 
 
15 On finding herself alone with her husband for the first time, Mina leads Jonathan 
directly to the bed. Here, she explains: “I took the book [Jonathan’s diary] from under his 
pillow, and wrapped it up in white paper, and tied it with a little bit of pale blue ribbon 
which was round my neck, and sealed it over the knot with sealing wax, and for my seal I 
used my wedding ring. Then I kissed it and showed it to my husband, and told him that I 
would keep it so, and then it would be an outward and visible sign for us all our lives that 
we trusted each other, that I would never open it unless it were for his own dear sake or 
for the sake of some stern duty” (141). 
 
16 See Kreilkamp. 
 
17 See Winthrop-Young, who writes of “the importance of speed as the parameter most 
central to the Control Revolution of the nineteenth century” (116). 
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18 A writer for Punch commented that, “with regard to railway accidents that it is ‘the 
pace that kills’. This is particularly the case when companies go it too fast in the pursuit 
of profit” (“Philosophy” 144). In 1857, The Lancet seconded this indictment of corporate 
indifference, attributing technological malfunctions to the systemic mismanagement of 
railway companies: “They specially maintain, in a series of by-laws, their right to slay, 
smash, mutilate, or cripple their unlucky passengers, and take care that this right shall not 
fall into abeyance for want of exercise” (43). For a thorough consideration of the 
Victorian railway accident, see Drinka. 
 
19 “If men learn this, it will implant forgetfulness in their souls; they will cease to 
exercise memory because they rely on that which is written, calling things to 
remembrance no longer from within themselves, but by means of external marks. What 
you have discovered is a recipe not for memory, but for reminder. And it is no true 
wisdom that you offer your disciples, but only its semblance” (Phaedrus 275a). 
 
20 See Ginzburg. 
 
21 See Freud’s Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis: “It is true that ideas occur to us, 
but we do not allow all of them to count […] In the case of one idea we may say to 
ourselves”: ‘No, this is not relevant, it does not belong here’; in the case of another: ‘this 
is too senseless’ and of a third: ‘this is totally unimportant’. And we can further observe 
how with objections of this sort we may smother ideas and finally expel them altogether, 
even before they have become quite clear” (140). 
 
22 Napier’s assessment of the Gothic novel often sounds very like Schivelbusch’s history 
of the locomotive, the speed of which reorganizes the lived experience of the subject 
according to the criteria and requirements of capital. For Schivelbusch this is a 
fundamentally dehumanizing process, whereby the subject is “streamlined” or 
conditioned for its insertion into modern capitalist existence. 
 
23 See Keep 141. 
 
24 For an extended consideration of Maturin’s text as a meta-gothic work, see 
Eggenschwiler, “Melmoth and Wanderer: Gothic on Gothic.” 
 
25 See the introduction to Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651) and Descartes’s Treatise on Man 
(1664). The latter asks its readers “to consider that [mental and emotional] functions 
(including passion, memory, and imagination) follow from the mere arrangement of the 
machine’s organs every bit as naturally as the movements of a clock or other automaton 
follow from the arrangement of its counter-weights and wheels” (108). 
 
26 See Sedgwick, Between Men. 83-96. 
 
27 Camlot, “Early Talking Books.” 
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28 This point is indebted to Ivan Kreilkamp’s study of the “phonographic culture” of the 
Victorians. Refuting Barthes’ claim that “Writing is the destruction of every voice” (qtd. 
in Kreilkamp, Voice 1), Kreilkamp maintains that ‘voice persists in the discourse of print 
culture, where it remains as trace and residue capable of giving rise to inchoate new 
forms’ (Voice 2). 
 
29 McLuhan: “the ‘content’ of any medium is always another medium” (Understanding 
Media 8). 
 
30 On Jonathan and Mina’s use of Sir Isaac Pitman’s phonetic shorthand system see 
Picker 777. First presented in 1837 (and still the most common form of shorthand in 
Britain), Pitman’s system is composed of symbols that represent sounds rather than 
letters. 
 
31 See page 70 of this dissertation. 
 
32 See Bierman (1972); Smith (1998); Sceats (2001). 
 
33 E.T.A. Hoffmann’s Olympia and Auguste Villiers de L’Isle-Adam’s L’Eve future are 
the foremost literary examples of this erotic simulation. 
 
34 Ganthony parodies the phonograph alongside other audio-curiosities of the age, such as 
ventriloquism and spiritualism. Their placement together suggests a correspondence 
between these technological and ephemeral phantasms of the voice.  
 
35 In Principles of Mental Physiology, William Benjamin Carpenter uses this term to 
describe the ability of the unconscious mind to function “below the plane of 
consciousness, either during profound sleep, or while the attention is wholly engrossed by 
some entirely different train of thought” (516). 
 
36 Remarkably, Dracula’s 1897 publication precedes by four years Karl Landsteiner’s 
discovery of human blood groups. Still, the “quality” of blood is something Van Helsing 
seems to recognize intuitively, as his sequence of transfusions follows an identifiably 
racist and classist hierarchy. 
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Conclusion 
This dissertation traces the networks Victorian culture established between bodies, 
machines, and novels. These networks were founded upon a cultural premise that bodies 
and machines share a common, yet deeply enigmatic, language that placed them in 
cryptic correspondence, if not direct communication, with each other. In the novels and 
technologies studied here, these indirect correspondences are traced via the logic of 
indexical marking. I have argued for the index as a privileged signifier within gothic 
narrative: the form routinely exploits these signs for their evidential power, and (more 
fundamentally) for the involuntary nature of their emergence. Peirce referred to this 
quality of the index as a kind of “blindness,” while Marey had attempted to harness its 
automatic nature to forge a langue inconnue of the phenomenal world. 
 Exploring the Victorian scriptural economy’s exhaustive attempts to capture this 
hidden language of the world through automatic writing technologies, my first chapter 
explored the graphomaniac as a quintessentially Victorian construction, and a projection 
of the culture’s mingled enthusiasm and anxiety concerning the period’s comprehensive 
expansion of what could be apprehended as writing. If the objective and mechanical 
process of the “graphical method” was intended to automatize and thus neutralize the 
examiner’s input, the correlative figure of the graphomaniac, embodying the fantasy of a 
transparent relation between exterior and internal “character,” promised a radical 
simplification of the problem of the subject. Capable only of composing the signs of his 
own discomposure, this pathological writer’s output lacked the versatility of the 
professional author, and yet the “unauthorized” or involuntary nature of his writing held a 
forceful attraction for readers fascinated by the symptomatic value of inscriptions that 
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were no longer subject to the mediation and self-censorship that marked intentional acts 
of writing. 
 It is this unknown language—hidden even from itself—that Gothic narrative 
struggles to communicate to its readers. In highlighting the Victorian techniques and 
technologies of writing that underwrite this struggle, I have sought to situate historically 
Sedgwick’s key observation concerning the Gothic—that it “literalizes and externalizes 
[…] conflicts that are usually seen as internal.” Late eighteenth-century Gothic (the focus 
of Sedgwick’s study) tended to exploit a more overtly superstitious relation to the index, 
employing living tapestries, bleeding statues, and stigmata to demonstrate the unnerving 
vitality of signs. A century later, the “supernatural machinery” that had driven the Gothic 
novel since its inception would be re-mediated through thoroughly natural machines that 
literally externalized the internal, and objectified the subject.1 If Gothic is to be 
distinguished, as I have argued here, by its corporeal strategies of indexical inscription, 
this figural tendency signals a distinctively Gothic epistemology. Late-Victorian Gothic 
novels are decidedly not vehicles for the transmission of othered voices, which are 
routinely suppressed. They are rarely interested in hearing what the monster has to say 
for itself. They refuse the possibility of autonomous narrative in pursuit of the body’s 
story, one captured through a matrix of inscriptions.  
 Though Anne Rice will one day conduct a cordial Interview with the Vampire, 
Bram Stoker’s Count will have to settle for a polygraph examination. The instrument 
serves as a fitting emblem for the novels at each chapter’s core. Insofar as they employ 
the multiple-narrator formula adapted from the epistolary novel, where a number of 
parallel narratives are sequenced within the novel so that the text’s truth can emerge from 
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the spectrum, Jekyll and Hyde, The Beetle, and Dracula are polygraphic narratives. More 
fundamentally, however, the polygraph symbolizes the varied adversarial tactics of 
indirect correspondence resorted to within a form driven by a hermeneutic of suspicion. 
These texts cannot simply tell the truth, but must instead detect the lie. Utterson will give 
voice to this interpretive impulse when he intuits that Hyde’s pseudonym is a falsehood 
to be exposed through the graphological examination of his signature. Along with the 
amateur detectives who police each of these novels, Utterson turns to the involuntary 
indexical traces of the body to determine the hidden identity and deep “character” of his 
antagonist. In doing so, he upholds the fundamentally conservative project of the 
Victorian scriptural economy, conscripting the graphomaniac through the apprehension 
of his involuntary acts of self-registration. For the uncanny ways in which Hyde’s writing 
denatures the discourse of autobiography, I have read Stevenson’s text as a “paranoid 
critique” of modern regimes of self-registration. However, no small part of this story’s 
terror arises from the ease in which such resistant and disruptive catachreses of the body 
can be re-incorporated as legible signs. 
 If the introduction and first chapter leave this relay of dispersal and apprehension 
relatively intact, observing how graphomaniacal bodies are patiently archived and 
codified through graphical method, the turn to the Gothic within the following chapters 
finds the methods of the examiner gradually absorbed into the delirium of the 
graphomaniacal subject. Scientific rhetoric rationalizes and economizes experimental 
bodies, characterizing the examiner’s abdication of will as an act of restraint that 
neutralizes the subject. The Gothic imagination—which marks the speculative science of 
Atherton’s optogram and the pseudo-sciences advanced by Van Helsing—radicalizes that 
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same body, characterizing the will not to will as release, exposing a body dispossessed of 
subjectivity and fundamentally open to the world outside itself. 
 Critical interpretations that stress Gothic’s discursive debt to phrenological, 
physiognomic and degeneration theories of the period—specifically, the speculation that 
bodies bear the stamp of their essential character—identify only the most conservative 
logic of corporeal inscription imagined within the genre. Gothic characterization, I argue, 
theorized a radical dispersal of inscribed signs, alternately intrigued and troubled by the 
possibility that encounters with alterity could remotely mark our own bodies. In chapter 
three, the dawning sense of impressionability that haunts Jekyll’s pursuers has been given 
more concrete shape in the body of the photographic negative. This impression 
corresponds with a historical shift towards an embodied understanding of the observer, 
who finds that in order to bear objective witness to the scene he must objectify his own 
body. Seeing and seen in striking moments of mutual apprehension, Marsh’s observers 
recognize their bodies as the indexical instruments of narrative.   
 If Dracula stands as the dissertation’s most thoroughly networked novel and the 
pinnacle of techno-gothic, it also showcases the most methodical enlistment of 
impressionable human bodies as media. Focalizing Dracula through the complex of 
fidelity, I have asked precisely what kind of truth might be produced through the 
“immediate” transcription of events the novel promises. Stoker’s novel offers a number 
of possible answers to this question, each encoded within different technologies of 
writing—instruments that I broadly categorize in relation to two contradictory strategies 
of immediacy within modern thinking on communications. The first, touted 
enthusiastically by Jonathan and practiced religiously with his fiancée, strives for 
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temporal immediacy through the renunciation of the body. The mechanics of shorthand 
and typewriter abolish physical obstacles to communication and approximate the 
symbolic dream of communicating without touching: even sexual infidelities can now be 
discursively rendered as bloodless information. 
 The second register of immediacy, personified by the vampire and emblematized 
by the analog inscriptions of the phonograph, introduces the scandal of touching without 
communicating. Here, only the body is retained, understood not as an obstacle, but an 
instrument of contiguous impressionability. In a text composed by dedicated 
graphomaniacs, Renfield is the sole writer to be institutionally committed, and Seward’s 
observation of his patient reveals his obsessive writing not to be the symptom of a 
personal pathology, but the index of another’s influence. Through his cultivation of 
bodies as indices of the Count’s identity and movements, Van Helsing exploits the 
evidential power of the index to locate and apprehend bodies. However, his experiment 
with human media culminates in Mina’s final instrumental role as mesmerized medium, 
an encounter that exposes us to a more fundamentally disorienting experience of voided 
subjectivity absorbed into carnal immediacy with the other. 
 In these pages, I have considered the Victorian scriptural economy through the 
lens of the gothic in order to uncover the uncanny power of automatic writing 
technologies to transcribe the automatisms of the subject. Externalizing internal 
“character,” these graphical machines bring on the panic of finding the self objectively 
rendered outside oneself. However, the more radical estrangement brought on by such 
technologies lies in their function as metaphor and means for the internalization of the 
external. In the strange tremor that mars Jekyll’s signature and Jonathan’s, in the 
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obsessive writing of Lindon and Renfield, in the carnal immediacy of Atherton’s retinal 
print and Seward’s phonograph cylinders, and in the eerie transcript of Mina’s trance, the 
Gothic imagines bodies as impressionable media, compulsively reproducing the sign of 
their traumatic encounters with the other.
                                                
 
1 For early considerations of the genre’s dependence on “supernatural machinery,” see 
Walpole’s preface to Otranto, as well as assessments of the novel by Clara Reeve (1777), 
Thomas Macauley (1833), and Sir Walter Scott (1881). 
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